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26 August 1982

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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AFGHANISTAN

SOVIETS BELIEVED TO PERSEVERE DESPITE SETBACKS

Paris EST ET OUEST in French No 665, Jul 82 pp 22-27

[Article by Andre Tong: "The Soviet Hold Over Afghanistan"]

[Text] The Soviet Union does not intend to release its grip on Afghanistan despite the fierce tenacity of the Mujaheddin [Islamic crusaders] and the deliquescence of the Babrak Karmal regime. Against these two factors of insecurity, Moscow pits brutality in the field and in the conduct of the Kabul government.

Admission From Karmal

Speaking before the Seventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) on 5 December 1981, Babrak Karmal, secretary general of the PDPA Central Committee and president of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, publicly admitted the lack of discipline and even rivalries raging within the party. The majority faction, the Kalq (the People), confronts the minority Partcham (the Flag) faction relentlessly and with violence, despite the merger of these two groups into a single party, as decreed by the Soviets.¹

"While continuing to esteem our cadres, we are duty-bound and even forced to be far more demanding of them regarding missions entrusted to them, to wage a veritable battle against all kinds of irresponsibility, lack of discipline and ultraconservatism.

"The fight for the unity of our party is an important area of work. Unfortunately, we are still witnessing manifestations of splinter tactics and cliquishness and the party is still not intransigent on this level. It should be emphasized once more than splinter tactics and divisiveness are incompatible with party membership and this rule must be strictly applied, without any exceptions."²

In his speech, Karmal also admitted that the Resistance "has succeeded in pitting a large part of the population, especially the clergy and the peasants, against the revolutionary government."²

General Conference of PDPA

Following the plenary session, it was decided to call a general conference of the PDPA in order to draw up the government's political line and revise party bylaws. Cell meetings were organized, along with city, district and provincial conferences and assemblies in units of the army and the people's militia. Delegates to the conference had to be designated by elections. Given the rivalry between Khalqi and Partchami members, it was decided to place two different ballot boxes at each polling place, one for Khalqi candidates and the other for the Partchami. The orders given by Kabul were to favor the election of Partchami candidates, Karmal's party. There were many incidents everywhere, causing injuries and murderous encounters between units of the Afghan army, commanded either by Khalqi or Partchami officers, as in Ghazni Province, Kamki Khayber and Khoskunar.

In Paktya Province, southeast of Kabul, in Khost, where the key posts are held by Khalqi, the military commander of the city, Mohammad Ali, was summoned to Kabul in January 1982 by Karmal, who wanted to replace him. To act in his place in the interim, Major Ali named an officer even more anti-Partchami than he was. Upon learning this, Karmal sent Ali back to Khost, considering this to be a lesser evil. A month later, 16 Soviet advisers tried to fly to Khost to study the situation with the Khalqi, but their plane received no authorization to land and had to return to Kabul. A few days later, a delegation of three ministers went to Khost: Soleyman Laeq, Partchami minister of nationalities and tribal affairs; Eug Nazar Mohammad, Khalqi minister of public works; and another Khalqi, Guldad, minister of higher education. The delegation's task was to convince Khalqi leaders to share power with the Partchami and to organize the elections. It failed, since the two Khalqi ministers are considered to be entirely pro-Karmal and pro-Soviet. As a result, the elections did not take place and in other provinces where the Khalqi are in a majority, they were canceled. Some 1,700 delegates were expected, but there were only 836.

Under such conditions, the general conference took place secretly and with a maximum protection on 14 and 15 March 1982 at the Polytechnical Institute in Kabul. After some 30 hours, it was decided that since "work on the agenda was finished," the general PDPA conference was closed. The real reason for its brevity was the violent clashes between Khalqi and Partchami that took place throughout the session. Already, on the eve of the conference, some ten members of the PDPA were killed in skirmishes between rival communists.

This did not prevent Mahmud Barialay, alternate member of the Politburo, secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and editor in chief of the HAKIKATE ENOELABE SAWR, official party organ, from calling the conference in his editorial an "event of immense political and social importance." For its part, TASS hailed the "atmosphere of unity and cohesion" marking the conference and emphasized "the strengthening of discipline and the homogeneousness of the party, as well as the representative nature of the delegates and the authority of the leaders."

While admitting that the political, economic and military situation is still bad, the Soviet press claims that the process on which the government in Kabul has embarked is "irreversible."

Shortly after the general PDPA conference, on 18 March, TASS published a long article repeating that the Soviet Union adheres to the Kabul proposals of May 1980 and August 1981 aimed at settling the Afghan problem. On the one hand, these proposals provide for tripartite negotiations with Iran and Pakistan, in the presence of the secretary general of the United Nations or his representative and, on the other hand, multilateral consultations aimed at drafting international guarantees. For Moscow, these talks can only cover "aspects exclusively outside the Afghan problem," TASS emphasizes, because "the country's internal affairs are the sole province of the Afghan people." "The question of the limited Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan could be examined and resolved within the context of such a political settlement."

While awaiting a solution, the Soviet Union is strengthening its base in Afghanistan. A year ahead of schedule, the road connecting Mary, in Turkmenistan, with Afghanistan, which had become inadequate to bear military traffic, has been joined by a route from Termez, the southernmost city in Uzbekistan, in Mazar-I-Charif. At the same time, a road and rail bridge was built over the Amou Daria in record time with a shunting yard on the Afghan side. In addition, a very wide highway has been built from the river to the old road, starting at the Soviet border and leading to Kabul.

Purges and Defections

Any official opposition to Soviet policy is punished by a "training period in Moscow," as was the case with the minister of defense, General Rafi, or Minister of Interior Sayed Gulabzoi.

The latter, belonging to the Khalqi faction, was "invited" to go to Moscow on 11 November 1981. According to the most recent information, he has not returned to Kabul.

General Rafi, a Partchami like Karmal, privately made harsh accusations against Moscow, protesting the Soviets' inability to put down the resistance and to control the country, as well as the exactions of the Soviet Army.

According to some sources, General Rafi was the victim of a shooting in September 1981 and was sent to the Soviet Union for treatment. His interim replacement was initially a Khalqi, Gen Baba Jan, then a man close to Karmal, Gen Abdul Qader, freed from prison by the Soviet invasion. On 4 January 1982, General Rafi was removed from his post and on the very next day, began a "training period" in Moscow.

Defections of Afghan diplomats serving abroad are commonplace. But even in Kabul, that of a high official belonging to the Khad (political police) is of particular significance. On 20 April 1982, Mohammad Hashem, director of the Khad's coding department, left his post and fled. Despite all the searches made by NKVD [expansion unknown] officers, he was never found. Soviet and East German advisers assigned to the Khad immediately changed the secret codes.

Life in Kabul

Since the Soviet invasion and the establishment of the Karmal regime, living conditions in Kabul have steadily deteriorated. Insecurity and anguish are the rule for the people, in addition to substantial material problems.

Prices doubled during the winter, tripled and even quadrupled for such items as briquettes used for cooking and heating. The city is overpopulated because of refugees driven from their provinces by Soviet soldiers or those of Karmal. Rent has gone up sharply, as have basic commodities. Inflation is approaching 200 percent, an estimate not denied by the Soviets.

In addition, 20 percent of Afghanistan's population has left the country and gone abroad. Some 30 percent of the arable land now lies fallow.

In Kabul, entire districts are often shrouded in darkness because the Mujaheddin blow up electrical facilities. Candle vendors have taken advantage of the situation to triple their prices. On the night of 1-2 May 1982, a violent series of explosions shook a group of houses close to an important Soviet military depot north of the capital, near the Dar-ol-Aman Palace. There were reportedly a number of Soviets killed and considerable material damages. According to certain accounts, the cause of the explosions was an act of sabotage committed by a Tadzhik Muslim soldier from Soviet Central Asia, which is not impossible given the fact that the depot was heavily guarded and that guerrillas could not have gotten close to it. On the other hand, guerrillas did fire two rounds of rockets at the northern wall of the Soviet Embassy on 3 May.

Because of the disorder and lack of security in Kabul, the government published a circular urging all officials moving about in certain districts of Kabul to wear weapons. An average of ten persons are killed a day in the capital.

Interurban buses are inspected by Soviet patrols and the best pass is to give hashish to Red Army soldiers. Others take advantage of the ceasefire to loot stores with complete impunity and steel equipment from Radio Kabul stations. Officials of the government station, when informed, were able to do nothing more than to order aides not to spread it around "because the Soviets are our friends."

Kidnapping

On 12 September 1981, Soviet adviser Mikhail Okhrimyouk, attache in the Afghan Ministry of Mining and Industry, was captured right in Kabul, at 1400 hours, by resisters belonging to the Islamic Khales Party.

Okhrimyouk, 67, was head of a Soviet geological mission, a member of the CPSU highly placed in the diplomatic hierarchy of his embassy and a personal friend of Nikolay Aleksandrovich Tikhonov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Leaving his apartment in the Soviet district of Kabul after breakfast, the Mikrorayon in eastern Kabul, Okhrimyouk followed his custom of taking the jeep provided for him and driven by an Afghan chauffeur, secretly a member of the Islamic Party. Near the Ministry of Defense and the presidential palace, the driver slammed on the brakes and the trunk, previously unlocked, came open. The driver got out and two resisters immediately took his place, knocked Okhrimyouk out and left Kabul, returning the salutes of militiamen at the guard posts. The Soviet adviser was taken to the mountains to a secret command post of the Mujaheddin, who treated him correctly and authorized him to write letters to his embassy, his wife and his friend Tikhonov. The following is the translation of the letter sent to the head of the Soviet Government, dated 1 October 1981:

"A great misfortune has befallen me. I was kidnapped in Kabul by the Hezb-e Islami-e Afghanistan, led by the Mawlawi Younos Khales, in order to be traded for their Mujaheddin.

"In traveling through many villages for 7 days, I saw only a people in arms fighting for their rights as a free people and against B. K. (Translator's note: Babrak Karmal?) I saw no Chinese, Americans or other nationalities. This is strange. Nikolay Aleksandrovich, my life is in your hands; save me, I beg you. You must put great pressure on B. K. He opposes these trades, saying that war is war and that there are many Russians."

The Soviet adviser added a post script that for his release in exchange for 50 partisan prisoners, he would "recommend, for a greater guarantee, the presence of Bulgarian, Czech and other diplomats. Save me, I beg you. My strength is weakening; my heart is in a vice. I am living on hope; the time is short."

This letter, like the others, was sent and reached the Soviet Embassy, which forwarded it on to Moscow, as proven by the embassy's receipt. It was registered under the number 41-541 and by the economic council under numbers 40-516 and 41-593.

Babrak Karmal dragged out the negotiations, splitting hairs, trying to gain time. Because of the "unsatisfactory results of the negotiations" and the inhuman brutality of the Soviets perpetrated on civilian populations in the regions held by the Resistance, Okhrimyouk was executed.

Accounts

Soviet troops constantly resort to the most brutal force: deliberate bombings of hospitals or clinics, the use of napalm, the looting of towns or villages they raze, the use of toxic gases, exactions of all kinds and summary executions.

Fifty-two French doctors have gone to Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion to care for civilians as well as partisans. Humanitarian organizations such as Doctors Without Borders, International Medical Aid and Doctors of the World

are on the spot, while two organizations are handling Afghan refugees in Pakistan: the International Red Cross and the International Rescue Committee, a private American institution.

The accounts of the French doctors are formal. The Soviets have difficulty tolerating the presence of these doctors, who are living proof that the Red Army does not keep its pledges. On 4 November 1981, Mig 27's and armored helicopters bombed the International Medical Aid hospital in Panchar Valley and one stone building was razed. The following day, three armored MI 24 helicopters attacked the Jaghori hospital (Ghazi Province), reopened by Doctors Without Borders, and bombed it a second time on 14 March 1982. On 6 November 1981, three armored MI 24 helicopters destroyed an International Medical Aid clinic in Nangarhar Province and other raids were made the same month on the clinics of Waras, Behsoud, Turkmen and Yakaolang.

The bombings generally last about 20 minutes and are carried out by 3 to 12, sometimes 15, helicopters, escorted by 4 to 6 fighters. Every plane fires two rockets in a single pass, then drops incendiary and fragmentation bombs.

Despite this Soviet determination for destruction, the doctors and nurses continue their selfless, dangerous mission. Even provincial governors under Kabul do not hesitate to send their patients to these charitable clinics. One hospital, set up in a deep cave in the mountains, operates safe from the bombings and has managed to set up an improvised operating room lit by kerosene lamps. Medicine is regularly delivered secretly to the different medical centers.

New Offensive

For the fifth time since 1980, the Soviet-Afghan forces, after four failures, have launched a new offensive against the Panchar Valley, bastion of the resistance, located 90 kilometers north of Kabul.

The valley, with some 90,000 inhabitants in the Hindou Kouch, commands the road from Kabul to the northern provinces.

The new offensive began on 20 May 1982 with a massive bombardment of heavy artillery and bombings by planes taking off from the major Soviet base of Bagram, 30 kilometers north of Kabul.

The leader of the Panchar Mujaheddin, Major Masoud, was not caught off guard, knowing that a new offensive was being planned. The information had been transmitted to him by inhabitants of the valley who had set up a secret network within the Afghan army.

Changing their usual tactics, the Soviets first shelled the valley, then sent the Afghan infantry ahead of their tanks in waves. Some 700 of Karmal's troops were killed and 300 others surrendered. A total of 21 Migs and helicopters were shot down and some 40 tanks and three mobile bridges were destroyed. There were heavy civilian losses because of the bombings. In the city of Chutal alone, 300 civilians were killed.

In addition, the Bagram air base was attacked by the Mujaheddin, who destroyed three Mig 17's, three Mig 21's and six helicopters.

Once again, the Soviet-Afghan forces had to withdraw with "heavy losses."

Open Letter to Leonid Brezhnev

Former Afghan Prime Minister Mohammad Youssof, who had personally discussed questions of peaceful coexistence between the two countries with Leonid Brezhnev when he was head of the royal government, sent an open letter³ to the head of the Soviet Union.

In the document, Youssof reminds Brezhnev of the assurances which the latter had given him of his "respect for the freedom, independence and territorial integrity" of Afghanistan. He also reminded the secretary general of the CPSU of this phrase of Lenin: "Always respect territorial integrity and always cultivate the friendship of your peaceful neighbor, Afghanistan."

"Your Afghan policy," the letter continues, "contradicts your past assurances. Our former relations were supposed to be a model. They now offer the spectacle of a small nation tyrannically sacrificed to the interests of another much more powerful nation."

Youssof then asks Brezhnev: "After the April 1978 coup d'etat, how could you have thought that our country was ripe for a Marxist revolution? How could you imagine that it was ready to accept an ideology in flagrant contradiction with all its religious, spiritual and national values? Finally, how could you think that it was willing to submit to a regime set up, supported by and made subservient to a foreign country, from Taraki to Babrak Karmal? Are we to believe, Mr Secretary General, that Taraki, Amin and Karmal were able to persuade you that they were authentic representatives of the Afghan people and capable of governing according to your wishes?"

The former Afghan prime minister accuses Brezhnev of having these "authentic representatives of the Afghan people" killed, writing: "On 27 December 1979, you killed Amin with your own troops. As for Taraki, killed by Amin, you did not even deign to mention his name at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, at which you paid homage to communist leaders who had died in 1979."

In conclusion, Youssof reviewed the over 2 years of war waged by the Soviet Union against Afghanistan: Sixteen million Afghans turned into implacable enemies; the destruction of cities, towns and villages; 4 million refugees; a half million people killed according to the latest estimates. The tiny Afghan PC, whose members are killing one another, is isolated, scorned and hated throughout the country. The economy is in ruins. At the same time, you have roused the spirit of resistance and profoundly shocked the Movement of Nonaligned Nations and the whole Muslim world."

Voice of the Resistance

The voice of the Resistance has been heard since October 1981, thanks to Radio Free Kabul, whose three underground transmitters are set up about 30 kilometers from the capital, near villages held by the Resistance. These powerful transmitters, in FM, have 20 watts and a range of 50 kilometers. They are designed to broadcast by remote control. They escape jamming and can even jam Soviet military communications.

Daily broadcasts are a half hour long, in Farsi and Pashtun. Another 15-minute broadcast in Russian is designed for Soviet soldiers. The latter includes a propaganda program on cassettes supplied to Radio Free Kabul by Russian patriots in exile in Europe. The Soviet press has attacked this free radio several times, for it saps the morale of the occupying troops. The radio's general board, set up in Pashawar by five Resistance parties, is planning to set up 36 more transmitters in 12 sectors in other regions of Afghanistan.

A delegation of five underground leaders traveled to Europe in March 1982, particularly to France, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland. In Paris, the delegation was received at the Matignon, the archbishopric and the headquarters of the political parties, except for the PCF, naturally.

These five Afghan Resistance leaders drew a complete picture of the situation for their hosts, for the men represented different regions of the country: Ahmad Zia Massoud, 24, leads a group of Mujaheddin at the entry to the Panjshir Valley (he is the brother of Maj Ahmad Chah Massoud, head of the Resistance in the valley). Mansour Ahmadzai, 32, heads operations in the suburbs of Kabul. Abdul Haq, 23, is head of a shock commando in the regions of Djalabad and Kabul. Habibollah, 25, comes from an underground organization in the central region of the country, and Salim, 26, a lieutenant in the regular army, organized the uprising of his radio group from the time of the Soviet invasion. Underground for 2 years, he leads urban guerrilla operations in Kabul.

From Florence to Geneva

The International Committee for Solidarity with the Afghan Resistance organized a 3-day seminar in Florence from 26 to 28 March 1982. It had the support of the Italian Socialist Party and was attended by several members of the European Parliament and representatives of the Afghan Resistance.

Italian President Sandro Pertini sent a telegram to the participants in which he hailed "the proud and noble Afghan people, forced to fight to defend their sacred right to decide their destiny freely." He labeled the current crisis as a "tragedy."

The resolution adopted at the close of the conference affirms that "the Resistance is a reality. It is identified with the Afghan people, who have taken up arms against the foreign occupation and for independence. Consequently,

it must be recognized internationally and receive not only humanitarian, food and medical aid, but financial and military help as well."

On 16 June 1982 in Geneva, talks began behind closed doors and sponsored by the United Nations, on a hypothetical political settlement of the Afghan problem.

Contrary to the proposals put forth by Kabul, these talks are taking place in the absence of the delegate from Iran, for Tehran has refused to take part in the conference, refusing to recognize Soviet control over Kabul and deeming that "no negotiations can succeed." The dialogue is indirect between Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs Yaqub Khan and his Afghan counterpart, Shah Mohammad Dost, for it must go through a delegate from the Office of Secretary General of the United Nations, Diego Cordovez. The presence of the head of Pakistani diplomacy can be understood by virtue of the fact that the voice of the Afghan Resistance can be heard insofar as the Pakistani minister is the interpreter for it, given the fact that Islamabad and Tehran have both denounced the Soviet occupation.

Under such conditions, there is little hope for a successful outcome of the talks, especially since the tone has risen in Kabul. On the eve of the Geneva talks, Afghan Prime Minister Soltan Ali Keshtmand clearly indicated that the Soviet military presence will be maintained as long as no political settlement has been reached to the satisfaction of Kabul. In an interview granted to the Japanese newspaper MAINICHI, the head of the Afghan Government stated that the Soviet contingent will remain in Afghanistan as long as an end to "the American-inspired aggression" is not guaranteed. He accused Pakistan of engaging in "acts of aggression in Afghan territory" and stated that the guerrillas "will soon be eliminated."

One Soviet diplomat in Islamabad has not concealed the fact that Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan will not cease until "the achievements of the April (1978) revolution have been consolidated once and for all." Clearly, the Soviet Union wants to turn this country into the Soviet Socialist Republic of Afghanistan.

FOOTNOTES

1. EST ET OUEST, No 662.
2. BULLETIN D'INFORMATION, DOCUMENTS DES PARTIS COMMUNISTES, published in Prague, No 4 (452), 1982.
3. REALITES AFGHANES, No 5, May 1982.

11,464
CSO: 4619/116

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

LATEST SOVIET FIGHTER DEPLOYED--The Sukhoi Su-25, the latest Soviet ground attack fighter closely resembling the American A-10 Thunderbolt II is said to equip at least one of the Soviet air force's tactical squadrons deployed in Afghanistan. This aircraft, armed with a Gatling-type rotary-barreled cannon, operates closely with Mi-24 Hind-D/E helicopter gunships. [Text] [Paris DEFENCE & ARMAMENT in English No 10, Jul-Aug 82 p 13]

CSO: 4600/715

ALGERIA

IMPORTANCE OF COUNTRY'S INDUSTRIAL POLICY STRESSED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 2-3 Jul 82 pp 1, 3

[APS Feature article: "Industrial Development: A Concern for Guaranteeing Economic Independence"]

[Text] Algiers, APS--Only 20 years after achieving its independence, Algeria can be proud of having an industry which is certainly in its formative stage but which includes all sectors of activity and is basically oriented toward satisfying the requirements of economic development and social progress. It is most important to stress first of all that this industry is controlled by the Algerian Government for the profit of the people.

Twenty years after independence, Algeria's industrial base is one of the most important achievements of the Algerian Revolution.

This achievement is all the more important since immediately after independence the Algerian economy was characterized by its orientation toward the former mother country, the lack of any industrial structure--the few established industrial plants generally had their headquarters in France--and the existence of large numbers of unemployed persons. Furthermore, the regulation of any economic activity was based on the interests of the French and multi-national corporations which were operating in Algeria. Agriculture was oriented toward satisfying the requirements of the French market (vineyards, citrus fruits, and so on). The mining industries were over 98 percent directed toward the export market.

The Algerian Government's assumption of a weak and disjointed economy and the need to develop it and make it a strong and independent economy capable of feeding, housing, educating, training and caring for millions of Algerians, in other words of assuring the country's development, have not been improvised. In Algérie, development is a concept which has been considered at length and whose stages and practice were already defined at the time when the Algerian people in arms were fighting for their political independence.

Political independence, for which the Algerian people paid in blood, only had meaning through economic independence. Through this basic principle, the Algerian people, their avant-garde party, the FIN, and their active forces made a political choice and adopted strategies to achieve national

development which was both planned and independent. These strategies can be basically summed up in the recovery of national wealth (mining and petroleum) and its use on the spot to satisfy the requirements of the national industry which must be established based on development needs, and in the achievement of a twofold agrarian revolution; first of all a political one, due to the need to put an end to exploitation in the fields, and then an economic one, to guarantee Algeria's self-sufficiency in food.

Algeria has resolutely opted for heavy industry as the basis for its development. The Tripoli program already stresses that "the true and long term development of the country is linked to the establishment of the basic industries needed to meet the requirements of modern agriculture...within this context, it is up to the government to bring about the conditions required to establish heavy industry.... At no price must the government, as has happened in some countries, contribute to establishing an industrial base which profits the local middle class, the growth of which it owes itself to limit by appropriate measures."

Thus, the Tripoli program sets the tone by emphasizing the need to establish a strong state sector whose orientation necessarily will be socialist. Later on, the National Charter specified the steps to be taken to achieve industrial development.

It is also stated in the National Charter: "The industrial revolution tends to result in profound changes in the country's economic structures so that it may pass from a traditional economy, essentially based on the tertiary sector, to a modern economy in which the links between sectors of production, and their complementary nature, characterized by an increase in trade between members of the same economic sector or different economic sectors assure harmonious development by extending industrial methods to all sectors of production."

The Charter specifies that "the industrial revolution forms a part of the socialist perspective which gives it its deep significance and its political dimensions." Therefore, "building a concrete basis for socialism implies establishing developed and diversified industry which extends to all sectors."

The route followed in the area of industrial development after independence consisted in the first stage of taking the weak existing industrial potential and merging it with the holdings of the national companies which were beginning to be established. Significantly, it was in this way that one of the first national companies to be established was the National Steel Company, [SNS], which was formed in 1964, thus giving concrete shape to the type of development to which Algeria aspired.

During these 20 years of independence, the national companies, which were made responsible for leading the industrial development effort in each sector, have been a development tool and a symbol of the Algerian people's supreme control of their wealth and especially of their future. To these national companies falls the difficult task first of replacing the foreign companies operating in Algeria and then of leading an unrelenting battle against international monopolies in order to bring the industrial development efforts to fruition based on the fundamental objective of development.

Mastering Technology

In general, the goals of the national enterprises were to train men in the various specialized fields to operate the large production apparatus which was to be established within the context of the policy of industrial development, to satisfy the requirements of the national market, to manufacture with a high degree of integration using the most productive techniques, and finally to work to assure gradual mastery of technology and thereby to reduce the country's dependence.

As the basis for the establishment of this "industry which assumes a global and widespread character," to use the expression in the National Charter, there had to be basic industries. The National Charter stresses that "the basic industries such as metallurgy, mechanical engineering, the electrical industry and electronics (SONELEC) were established. In the chemical and petrochemical industries, the basic products play a strategic and determining role since they assure the independence of national industry and, in short, consequently the independence of the country."

In fact, after the establishment of the SNS in 1964, followed in 1966, after nationalization of the mines, by the National Company for Mine Prospecting and Exploitation, in 1967 other companies, such as SONACOME [National Mechanical Engineering Company] and SN Metal [National Metal Construction Company], were formed. Thus, the SNS was made responsible for the strategic steelmaking sector with three basic goals:

--Metallurgy and primary processing of nonferrous metals.

--Manufacturing metals in various forms (plate products, bar and wire products, metal packaging and scrap recovery).

--Distribution of steel products and industrial gases.

The El Hadjar steelmaking complex which, with its 2-million-ton annual production capacity, satisfies a significant share of the requirements of various sectors for steel products, particularly the petroleum and housing sectors, is incontestably the centerpiece of the SNS.

The metal construction sector is also one of those which had practically no structure in 1962, apart from some production shops whose headquarters were located in France, and which, in 20 years of development, has participated the most in building the country. The establishment of SN Metal in 1967 had as its goal the revival and the consolidation of existing plants and the expansion of existing capacity through modernization and construction of new plants.

So, SN Metal participated in the construction of some large industrial projects, notably the El Hadjar complex. It also supplied all the equipment for the Djorf-Torba, Fergoug and Bounamoussa Dams as well as the equipment for the construction of 40 bridges and 10 cranes, including those at the Port of Annaba.

In 1980, it produced 794,777 tons of structural framework and boiler parts; and in 1979, 2,931 cranes. In 1978, it manufactured 642 cement mixers, 145 concrete plants, and 669 dumptrucks. In the same year, it manufactured 489 trucks. But, the most positive aspect in regard to SN Metal's development is the level of technology that workers in this sector have mastered in design and metal construction.

Along with the heavy industry sector which forms Algeria's industrial base, other sectors, especially light industry, have experienced significant development both in their production capacities and in improvement of their product quality, as is demonstrated by the presence of more and more products on the national market which are "made in Algeria" and their greater and greater contribution to satisfying national requirements.

Significant Figures

Thus, in 1981 Algeria produced 4.5 million tons of cement; 1.16 million tons of red clays; 830,000 ceramic plumbing fixtures; 835,000 square meters of prefabricated cabins; 85,000 tons of paint; 1.6 million tons of flour and semolina; 233,000 tons of cooking oils; 66 million linear meters of finished cloth; 14.5 million pairs of shoes; and 16,250 tons of tobacco.

These few figures and the more and more significant presence of national products on the national market attest first of all to the soundness of Algeria's political and strategic decisions in industrial development matters and especially to the irreversible nature of these decisions.

In fact, the Algerian Government's basic concern during the three previous planning periods (the 1967-1969, 1970-1973 and 1974-1979 plans) was the establishment of a significant industrial base. Strategic demands therefore called for the realization of planned investments which granted the largest share to industry. So, during the two 4-year plans, industry's share of planned investments was 45 percent and 43.5 percent respectively.

The advent of the 20th anniversary of independence also coincides with the third year of the 5-year plan which constitutes a qualitative change in development planning.

The development imperative which over the past 20 years was directed much more toward macroeconomic aspects now implies that priority be granted to the microeconomic aspects and to reestablishing the fundamental balances of the national economy once the country's political leaders have discovered and analyzed the distortions within the national economy due to rapid and significant industrial development.

Within this context, restructuring enterprises is the fundamental task of the 5-Year Plan in that it has a threefold objective:

--On the one hand, on the microeconomic level it aims to make the national enterprises economically viable entities which in the future must be responsible not only for satisfying national requirements but also for

financing development, since the country's political leaders have decided that the national petroleum reserves must be conserved for the consumption and the development of future generations.

--On the microeconomic level, it aims to assure a greater integration of the national economy through restructuring giant enterprises in giving them more humanly manageable sizes and also through taking into consideration the large industrial complexes, which, although they are highly integrated internally, are not at all integrated within the national economy. With this in mind, the 5-Year Plan places specific importance on subcontracting.

Finally, it aims at a redistribution of industrial activity throughout the nation, giving priority to the interior of the country, especially to the Hauts Plateaux and the south, in order to achieve one of the basic options of industrial development in Algeria: regional balance. The current concerns of national economic officials, particularly the search for greater efficiency in the national production apparatus, are the best example of the soundness of the strategic decisions made by Algeria following independence for the strengthening of political independence through a continuing and permanent quest for economic independence, enlightened by the socialist option contained in the National Charter.

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TWO NEW VILLAGES INAUGURATED IN CONSTANTINE

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 4 Jul 82 pp 1, 3

[Report by A. Benslama: "Two Socialist Villages at Mila and Telerghma"]

[See also following article "Unsatisfactory Situation In Housing Construction Examined", in which some of the production figures vary from thos cited in this one]

[Text] Interest is increasing in the farm country. In the wilaya of Constantine, two new socialist villages have just been officially inaugurated by wilaya authorities who, on the same occasion, proceeded to distribute keys to the housing units to the residents.

The first village, named Azzaba-Lotfi, is located several kilometers from Mila. It is comprised to 176 housing units.

The second village is located in the daira of Chelghoum Laid. Christened Ben Boulaid-Felten, it is comprised to 402 dwellings and is to be expanded to 600. This achievement is to be attributed to the youths in the national service.

Isn't it significant that these two villages should be inaugurated on the 20th anniversary of independence, thus conveying the political leadership's interest in promoting the rural community which paid the heaviest tribute for the country's liberation.

The Mila and Telerghma communes marked yesterday, Saturday, as a red letter day. Indeed, each of them recorded an important new achievement: the completion of a socialist village. These two villages, whose completion fortunately coincided with the 20th anniversary of independence, were of course inaugurated neither with fasting nor solemnity, but with the brand new joy of the recipients.

Mr Abdelkrim Abada, member of the Central Committee and secretary of the Mouhafadha, presided over the two ceremonies to turn over the keys, leading the Coordinating Committee.

The first ceremony had as its setting the multipurpose room of the village of Azaba-Lotfi, located 8 km from Mila. This new village of 175 dwellings was built by the intercommunal union, and not without difficulties for all that.

But, today all the social and cultural facilities visited by the members of the wilaya's Coordinating Committee are ready and equipped to the peasants' greatest satisfaction. During this inauguration, when leaving the six-room school that he had just visited, the secretary of the Mouhafadha announced that the single session will become effective when the next term begins here in this village and also and particularly in the Mila commune. So, the movement launched by the Chelghoum Laid daira for a single session is widening and will probably soon include the entire Constantine wilaya. A brief ceremony of turning over the keys simply closed this inauguration with simplicity and it was followed by another, this time in the daira of Chelghoum Laid.

Thanks to the Youths in the National Service

This ceremony was for the large Ben Boulaid Felten village which includes 402 dwellings, a number of which may be increased to over 600 due to the extent of the land reserved which covers a dozen hectares. Let us immediately note that the Ben Boulaid village was built entirely by the youths in the national service who thus have another job of national importance to their credit. The dwellings are very large and are adapted to the lifestyle of a grain and truck-farming region where livestock breeding is also practiced. Here the water problem considerably delayed turning the village over to its residents, among whom it is to be noted there are some small private farmers. All the administrative, economic and sociocultural services are grouped in the center of a village which gives the impression of great size. And it was in fact in a very large room which is none other than the youth center that the turning over of the deeds took place, in the presence of all the local civil and military authorities.

In a short speech, after having briefly recalled the work accomplished by the Algerian people over these past 20 years through their labor and their sweat, Mr Abdelkrim Abada paid homage in their honor to the youths in the national service who have just completed a new mission in the country's service. He also stressed that everything which has been done so far will assure the happiness of future generations. Having pointed out that due to the crisis that the Palestinians and the Lebanese are experiencing daily, President Chadli Bendjedid has canceled all official ceremonies, Mr Abada asked the recipients of the magnificent dwellings in this village and all the peasants to increase their production efforts and to continue to contribute all their attention to the earth which is the country's major resource.

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STATISTICS ON LIGHT INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT REPORTED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 7 Jul 82 p 3

[Text] The light industry sector, which includes various branches (construction materials, chemical and food industries, manufacturing and others), handles production, distribution and development work which employs more than 142,000 persons in plants and service departments throughout the entire nation.

The light industry sector includes 11 socialist production companies, 1 national enterprise for research and development, 1 institute for standardization and 2 training institutes; from these 44 new entities will be created as a result of the restructuring which is currently in progress.

Immediately after independence, the production capacity of the branches currently covered by this sector was limited to a few cottage-industry type plants for each kind of activity, plants which were chiefly located in the cities of Algiers, Oran and Constantine (some in an advanced state of decay).

In 1967, the sector had 178 plants, 37 of which had been completed after independence and before 1969 when their number was increased by plant takeovers and completion of 6 new plants in the textile branch under the 1967-69 3-year plan.[sentence as published] In 1973, the sector included 278 plants; and in 1979, 377 plants, including 81 new units completed during the 4-year plans. Finally, in 1981, the sector had 420 plants spread throughout the country, 40 of which were started up from 1979 on, at the same time that old plants were being modernized and modified.

In 1981, the activity of these companies, measured in sales volume, amounted to 16.5 billion dinars, a figure which includes production of goods and services as well as imports made by state enterprises as part of their mission to distribute products controlled by monopolies.

This sales volume increased 15.2 percent a year from 1969 to 1973, 37.7 percent during the period from 1973 to 1977, and 23.3 percent per year during the period from 1977 to 1981; while the value added grew from 1.03 billion dinars in 1969 to 3.85 billion dinars in 1977 and 9 billion dinars in 1981.

The year of reference selected to measure the sector's growth in production is the year 1973 which marks the end of the 1st 4-year plan and the beginning of significant industrial activity.

Here are the volumes for the principal products:

--Cement: 4.5 million tons in 1981 as compared to 1 million tons in 1973.

✓ --Red Clays: 1.16 million tons in 1981 as against 420,000 tons in 1973.

--Ceramic plumbing fixtures: 830,000 pieces in 1981, manufactured in plants completed since 1974.

--Housing and prefabricated units: 83,500 square meters produced in 1981 as against 18,000 square meters in 1973; as well as 3,225 Saharan units as against 562 units in 1974. [as published]

--Paint: 85,300 tons produced in 1981 as against 26,972 tons in 1973.

--Flour and semolina: 1.6 million tons in 1981 as against 1.15 million tons in 1973.

--Food oils: 233,000 tons in 1981 as against 102,590 tons in 1973.

--Finished cloth: 66 million linear meters in 1981 as against 37 million in 1973.

--Shoes: 14.5 million pairs in 1981 as against 2.4 million pairs in 1973.

--Smoking tobacco: 16,250 tons in 1981 as against 8,000 tons in 1973.

Total employment for the enterprises and institutes in the sector amounts to 142,000 persons (116,013 in 1978; 56,481 in 1973; and 38,500 in 1969). The average annual rate of increase in employment was 24.3 percent during this period.

The distribution of employment by type of activity shows the manufacturing industries' large share (32.8 percent), followed by the food industries (28 percent), construction materials (26.6 percent) and finally the chemical industries (11.5 percent).

It should be noted that the new jobs created have chiefly been in the interior of the country, while immediately following independence the jobs were basically located in the three major cities in the north of the country.

The current total cost of investment programs for the various development plans was estimated at 69.7 billion dinars on 31 December 1981, a figure which includes current investments and those planned before the end of the plan.

These investments have resulted in strengthening and expanding the national production capacity, creating thousands of jobs and satisfying the ever growing needs of the people.

The sector's development is continuing at a significant rate, with 60 projects currently in progress (30,000 new jobs to be created between 1983 and 1984).

To these projects must be added the plant projects whose sites will be opened during the second half of 1982, as well as numerous other infrastructures, distribution and training projects in progress.

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UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION IN HOUSING CONSTRUCTION EXAMINED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 7 Jul 82

[Text] Twenty years after the recovery of national sovereignty, despite the state's effort over these past 2 years, housing is still one of the sectors in Algiera which has met with the most delays during the development plans. This situation is one of the direct consequences of colonization; particularly of the outcome of expropriating the most fertile lands from the people and driving them back into the most barren regions, while all of the economic and social infrastructures were located in the north.

At the Roots of the Crisis

The rate of urban growth was relatively low, since 2,636,300 inhabitants (more than 30 percent Europeans) were basically concentrated in the country's urban regions. In 1966 the housing supply was estimated at 1.9 million units for all of Algeria, with 600,000 located in urban environments.

After the massive exodus of the colonists, other distorting factors aggravated the housing situation.

--The uprooting of 3 million persons during the war of national liberation.

--The rural exodus engendered by the aftereffects of the war.

--Acceleration of the process of unbalanced urban growth, particularly from 1967-1970 on under the influence of the preliminary results of industrialization efforts. To this we must add the growth in population at a natural rate of 3.5 percent. Algeria's resident population, which was 12,096,000 in 1966 (including 3.76 million urban residents and 8.34 million rural residents), increased by 5 million from 1962 to 1977 and is now estimated at 20 million.

The direct result of all of these factors has been the overcrowding of cities and the development of unsafe and unhygienic housing. In its first phase, this phenomenon affected the cities; then it spread to small and medium-size communities.

Also, following independence, the large housing shortage was to be aggravated in part by profound industrial, economic and social changes.

During the past decade, the housing situation has become a great concern; the capacity of the large cities (Algiers, Oran, Constantine and Annaba) to accept new residents following the rural exodus has been greatly exceeded. This situation has also resulted in a lack of control over the growth of cities and the overcrowding and rapid deterioration of existing structures.

Furthermore, combined with a booming population and the development of the economy, the lack of strict planning and a resulting program has led to a considerable increase in unhygienic construction.

Until the end of the second 4-year plan, close to 20 percent of urban dwellings and 80 percent of rural dwellings did not have running water, and more than 16 percent of urban dwellings and 75.5 percent of rural dwellings did not have electricity. Between 1966 and 1977, only 226,000 units of housing were constructed, while the population increased by 5.175 million persons. The housing shortage, estimated at 600,000 units in 1966, grew to 1.5 million units in 1977.

Between 1962 and 1977, the housing programs were less than 50 percent completed, and this was despite the administration's desire to speed up housing construction, particularly during the first 4-year plan.

Planning: Success Does Not Follow

It took until 1977, with the creation of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning, for an evaluation of the entire sector to be made. It was apparent from this evaluation that housing construction had not been sufficient to satisfy the demand brought about by the increase in population.

Between 1962 and 1966, only 24,000 urban and rural units were constructed.

As far as urban housing was concerned, housing construction, obviously insufficient, could neither reasonably absorb the shortage recorded during this period (1962-1966), nor diminish the crisis. The total planning programs for the entire decade from 1967 to 1977 involved 222,000 urban units; 60,465 under one program (3-year plan and first 4-year plan), and 162,000 under Program B (second 4-year plan). These programs were aimed at:

--eliminating regional differences;

--providing 90,000 units of housing under the second 4-year plan; and providing 100,000 units a year as of 1980.

At the end of 1975, out of 9,786 housing units called for, 1,554, or 14 percent of the initial program, had been completed; the remainder of the program was not completed until the end of the second 4-year plan--19,456 units (96.6 percent).

Moreover, out of 144,913 units under a special program, 13,210 have been completed.

At the end of this first 4-year plan, therefore, the urban housing program had a 19 percent completion rate. The second 4-year plan, considered to be a step toward solving the housing problem, provided for 103,576 housing units for a financial package of 10 billion dinars. At the end of this plan, less than 9 percent of this initial program, or 9,139 units of housing, had been completed.

At the end of 1977, there were still 94,437 units to be completed; 17,087 were in progress, and 7,355 had not yet been started under the second 4-year plan.

If the remainder of the first 4-year plan, estimated at 7,377 units, and of the special and additional programs are taken into account, the units remaining to be completed amounted to 15,328.

Socialist Villages: Still Short of the Mark!

As far as rural housing is concerned, the total planned programs during the 3-year plan and the first 4-year plan involved construction of 43 socialist farm villages, or 7,506 housing units and 38,000 rural units. For the 1974-1977 period, 135,000 rural units, including the ones in the socialist villages, were called for under the program for the second 4-year plan.

Large-scale construction of rural housing, one of the major concerns of the development plans, was initiated under the first 4-year plan through the construction of socialist farm villages [VSA]. So, at the end of the 1970-1973 period, out of 43 VSA's, or 7,506 housing units, called for, just 1 (148 units) has been delivered and 22,000 other rural units have been completed.

The completion rate experienced a slight increase during the second 4-year plan, especially for the VSA's. Thus, 36 VSA's (6,000 units) and 15,000 rural units under other programs were completed at the end of the decade.

Program achievements involved:

--116 VSA's equivalent to 22,000 housing units.

--1,171 units under the expansion of existing villages.

--856 units under eliminating unsafe housing.

Furthermore, the rural renovation effort through the method of individual construction made possible the completion of 28,131 units.

The 1967-1977 period therefore saw the construction of 96,500 rural units, or 52.8 percent of what was called for (182,802 units).

Urban Development: Disciplining and Structuring the Means To Achieve It

In regard to urban development, it must be noted that in the absence of a developed system for planning space, urban development plans did not attain an overall coherence, especially to the extent that the research methods existing during the past decade only partially responded to the needs demonstrated.

During the decade from 1967 to 1977, the number and size of construction projects other than housing strongly affected national development plans for buildings and public works due to the relative priorities of the first three development plans.

Also, considering the difficult situation inherited and the priorities then required of the country, the government had to act in a gradual way so as to allow it to act in stages to achieve the assigned objectives. For the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning, it was a matter of implementing an overall policy capable of spurring on the sector.

The strategy for implementing this policy and the development of new housing must be brought about by actions with regard to:

- Improving the sanitation of the existing housing supply.
- Making family home ownership easier.
- Developing apartment cooperatives and individual construction.
- Participating in home financing.
- Raising the real resources required.
- Decentralizing and restructuring the organizations responsible for promoting and managing public housing operations.
- Precisely defining major guidelines for rents.

Faced with the size of this task and given the requirements and the planned programs with regard to construction, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning has endeavored to discipline and structure its means to achieve it, particularly the enterprises under its authority (50 construction companies and 9 research or service offices).

Further, it is fitting to recall that it was in March 1982, particularly with the establishment of the National Office to Promote Prefabricated Construction, that the prefabricated unit made its mass entry into Algeria.

Under the current 5-Year Development Plan, completion of 450,000 housing units, including 300,000 urban units and 150,000 rural units; completion of the programs in progress during 1981, or 161,642 urban units and 65,619 rural units; and finally the starting of 440,000 new units, including 300,000 urban units and 140,000 rural units are provided for. So, although the housing sector has not yet obtained positive results, large-scale actions have nevertheless been initiated to spur it on and in time to insure beneficial consequences which will overcome the crisis and make up the housing shortage.

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

GAS AGREEMENT SIGNED--On 29 June 1982, the national company SONATRACH and the French Corporation for Research and Construction of Gas Equipment [SOFREGAZ] signed a contract for construction of an associated gas recovery unit for the Oued Noumer region, a project included in the 1980-1984 5-year plan for development of crude oil deposits. Construction of this unit, which will make possible recovery of gas which is currently burned, falls under the strategy of energy conservation and combatting the waste of our natural resources. The planned installations will include: two waste collection lines; a unit for separating and stabilizing oil by successively holding and reheating it in order to recover gases; three gas compression units (with a total power of 57,000 KW); three units to treat the gas for transport; a gasline to transport treated gas from Oued Noumer to the Hassi Messaoud-Hassi R'mel gas pipeline; related facilities (electricity, compressed air, fire protection, water, telecommunications, and so on); buildings, general facilities and two bases for employees. The daily capacity of the installations will amount to: 8.8 million cubic meters of treated gas to be piped out, and 8,785 cubic meters of oil, including 900 cubic meters of recovered and stabilized condensate. The value of the "turnkey" contract signed with SOFREGAZ is close to 470 million dinars. The National Enterprise for Major Petroleum Works (GTP) will handle the civil engineering and erection work. Construction will take 24 months, beginning with the contract's entry into force. It is fitting to note that this contract falls within the context of the economic cooperation agreement recently signed between Algeria and France. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 2-3 Jul 82 p 1] 9693

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EDUCATION CHIEFS DISCUSS FUTURE, ROLE OF UNIVERSITY TRAINING

University Heads Discuss Admissions

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 24 Jul 82 p 3

/Article by Labib al-Siba'i/

/Text/ The Egyptian household is now going through a state known as "the wait for the general secondary results"--the magic bottle or wand that will open the doors to the coordinating offices which will determine the futures of more than 140,000 male and female students who are to be admitted to the universities and institutes.

Every year the question of university admissions once again becomes the problem that preoccupies everyone.

It is certain that the policy on admission to Egyptian universities this year specifically, is on the verge of taking a new course in which it will be linked in integrated fashion to the government's requirements now that all studies have revealed the absence of this sort of linkage.

The policy of accommodating everyone who has general secondary certificate credentials and imposing more on the faculties than they have had the capacity to handle has led to a drop in the level of university education, the extension of admissions to students whose levels are not suited to a university education, and the creation of a surplus of graduates in areas for which labor requirements did not exist.

Cairo University has requested that the number of people admitted to it drop by up to 46 percent of the number admitted last year so that it will be able to perform its educational mission competently.

When Dr Kamal al-Janzuri, the minister of education, takes part for the first time in the meetings of the Higher University Council to determine the features and indices of university admissions in the light of the plan, and the ministers concerned with the sectors of production and services take part in the meetings of the Higher University Council's scientific sector committees to consolidate acceptance policies in the faculties belonging to each sector;

When Mr Sa'd Muhammad Ahmad, minister of manpower, states that radically to remedy the problem of graduates will require tying educational planning to labor planning,

which, in turn, must be tied to the economic and social development plan, guaranteeing it the wherewithal for carrying it out over the long range while, until that happens, the situation will require a decisive confrontation of the issue of education in Egypt with the objective of setting out a new strategy which will have the effect of achieving harmony between educational graduates on the one hand and the requirements of the domestic and foreign labor market on the other, as well as guiding corresponding surplus in areas of specialization of oriental languages, philosophy and psychology in the same faculties. Then attention should be given to the transitional training of graduates in certain fields of specialization which are experiencing a surplus in order to qualify them to work in specialized areas that are suffering from a deficit.

Dr Hasan Hamdi, president of Cairo University, says "At the beginning one must specify the motives for the increasing receptivity to university education. These can be attributed to a number of causes, first of which is the constant increase in the population, with the numbers of people knocking on the doors of university education this increase brings forth. Then there is the social view of education which the majority of people in the working class have, considering that education, and continuing education to its final stages, is the only real form of wealth available to their children and their means to improve their social status and incomes. Then there is the current system of the pricing of credentials, which places a higher value on a person with credentials than on the person's performance, capability or ability; then there is the government's commitment to employ every graduate, in accordance with the manpower statutes; then, there is the overall view of society that holds the university graduate in greater esteem than the graduate of an intermediate or technical education."

The president of Cairo University adds that it is possible to determine the features of a scientific policy for university admissions through a number of basic approaches including the fact that employment in the government and public sectors in a manner that will guarantee the gradual elimination of apparent and disguised unemployment);

When the university presidents and professors demand a comprehensive review of the policy of university acceptance: this all means that the problem absolutely cannot endure any more delay.

Mr Sa'd Muhammad Ahmad, minister of manpower, says that the educational system's output is not in keeping with the requirements of the local and foreign labor markets for labor; the annual budget the ministry presents shows credentials and areas of specialization in which there is a surplus and ones which fail to provide an amount surplus to the requirements of the government and public sectors in certain specialized fields, which are matched by a deficit in other areas of specialization. There is a continuous surplus of graduates in agriculture, for instance (general specializations, horticulture and land), while at the same time there is a continuous deficit in commerce and law graduates. This matter indeed requires that graduates in agricultural education who make up an obvious surplus be turned toward agricultural and livestock resource development and investment projects and that there be expanded admissions to fields of specialization that are experiencing a deficit at the expense of those accounting for a surplus. An example of that is the clear shortage in specialized fields of living languages and libraries and

documentation in the faculties of letters, and the number of people admitted to university faculties should be set in accordance with the actual needs of the government and society, on the basis of a 10-year plan taking consideration of rates of development, new projects, and the requirements of fraternal countries. The number of people accepted to similar faculties should be founded on the requirements of this plan, not vacant positions in each faculty, and this will result in a proper guidance of admissions to universities and a reduction of the burden on the Man-power /Ministry/, which is committed to employing every graduate without viewing the actual need for that graduate in the position he is given. Then there should be a development of the system of course work in the preparatory level so that some technical, industrial and vocational courses will be added to the curriculum, and there should be an expansion in technical institutes above the intermediate level, where the study period comes to 2 years after general or technical secondary, along with an improvement in the graduate's status and material levels. From the moral standpoint, one can give the label of assistant engineer, executive engineer, engineering technician or the like to graduates of technical industrial institutes, and the label of assistant accountant or accounting technician to graduates of commercial technical institutes. Likewise, it will be possible to give excellent students opportunities to study an additional year in the university. From the material standpoint, the salaries of technical institute graduates must be equal to those of university graduates; this will encourage receptivity to technical institutes.

The president of Cairo University requests an expansion in new occupational training centers which must be attached to companies, organizations and large authorities that will employ graduates of these centers in accordance with their specialized field. The media should take part in changing social attitudes toward graduates of technical institutes and expansion in the university faculties should be confined to the necessary faculties and specialized fields which are suffering from shortages.

Dr Muhammad Kamil Layla, president of 'Ayn Shams University, says "I am a proponent of expansion in all stages of education, enabling everyone to realize his hopes. When we demand that university education be linked to the development plan, that does not mean that we should specify that the development plan requires a specific number of people and that one must stop there! The situation is not like that-- after a period of time, or after a given number of generations, we will meet development needs; should we then put a stop to education? I believe that a proper beginning would be to break up the state of confusion that now exists between education and appointments!"

"When the coordinating office in turn apportions students to faculties in accordance with the student's general secondary grade, this spells the features of the real problem out to us. This is the problem of general secondary, which prepares and qualifies people for university education. In fact, general secondary has become something frightful in itself."

Dr Muhammad Kamil Layla went on, "Nonetheless, I can say that the coordinating office in its present form is a necessity, in spite of the terribly inflated numbers. Can one imagine that the number of students in a single faculty, the Faculty of

of Commerce, has come to about 30,000? Can one imagine that the ratio of students to teachers has reached one thousand to one?"

Dr 'Abd-al-Majid 'Uthman, president of the Suez Canal University, says "At the beginning a plan must be formulated that is connected with education and admissions on the one hand and the government's requirements on the other, and a review should be made of the notion of university education in particular, so that it will not be viewed merely as services that are offered to citizens, but rather, in spite of that, and indeed before that, as the most important type of investment, which is an investment in creating capable people and scientific staffs. Therefore, one must reduce, indeed eliminate, all losses in such investments. In addition, the government, considering them investments, must provide them with every resource in order to raise their level and competence. Frankly, this will not happen in the context of the tremendous numbers that are admitted to the universities year after year."

Dr 'Abd-al-Majid 'Uthman added "The time has come for us to demand that university admissions be restricted to a specific level of students, a scholarly level which is capable of assimilating a university education, so that their number will correspond to the government's actual requirements for various areas of specialization. This will make it possible for the government to spend generously on university education."

Dr Muhammad Talbah 'Uwaydah, president of al-Zaqaziq University, demanded that an integrated chart be set out specifying Egypt's and fraternal countries' requirements for graduates in various fields of specialization for at least 6 years so that the chart may be the basis on which university admissions policy will be founded in the plan year covered by the chart. In another area, each regional university should be linked to fields of specialization dealing with problems of the environment and the society of which it is a part, and at the same time greater support should be given to the regional universities, considering that they are the remaining avenue for expansion in Egyptian university education.

At the same time, opportunities for a university education must be made available to graduates of secondary agricultural, commercial and industrial technical schools through their own institutes or faculties.

Dr Faruq al-Tuhami, dean of the Higher Institute of Productivity of al-Zaqaziq University--the only institute in Egypt which gives agricultural, industrial and commercial secondary students a chance at a university education after their graduation--added that the philosophy of admissions to the institute is based on eliminating the prevailing notion that all the doors to university education have been closed to technical secondary graduates. Therefore the institute accepts students who have received these technical credentials, on the condition that at least 5 years have elapsed since they received them, in order to guarantee that they are firmly settled in their work and then have obtained the academic expertise which will subsequently be rounded out by studies in the institute.

Dr Faruq al-Tuhami added that opening the door to admission to the institute revealed an unanticipated surprise which was that tens of thousands of students who had graduated from technical schools were looking for an opportunity for a university education; the number of males and females who applied in the first 3 days alone came to more than 20,000. The first year, the institute was not able to admit more than 5,000. This number then rose to 7,000 last year, although the institute needs agreement from the students' worksites for them to devote themselves full time to studies.

That clearly means that even though these students were settled in their jobs they were still dreaming of university degrees!

Dr Samir Hasan, dean of the Media Faculty at Cairo University, demanded a commitment concerning the numbers of people admitted /relative/ to the faculties' resources and abilities to absorb students, on the basis of their facilities and auditoriums and the faculty members available to the faculties, where the nature of studies require special determinations on the student, carrying out tests on the students' abilities in order to ascertain that the students possess these specifications. It is certain that in the light of the current system of general secondary competition, the grade point average alone cannot suffice as a criterion for ruling on the students' fitness for all types of university study. In the Media Faculty, for instance, which admits general secondary students from various branches of science, mathematics and letters, even though the faculty has occupied first place among the students' choices since its establishment and the minimum grade for admission to it is above 81 percent, this grade point average alone is not enough to consider the student fit for study in the faculty. Therefore the faculty council has recommended that admissions tests be held to which students who have received an overall grade point of 80 or above can present themselves.

When the figures show that Cairo University, the greatest Egyptian university, is pausing this year, through its council, to demand a reduction in the numbers of people admitted to it next year from 17,000 to 9,000, at the same time that the University of al-Zaqaziq, a regional university, which was established in 1974, demands that the number of male and female students admitted to it increase from 13,000 to 15,500, the question that arises is, where do the regional universities stand? Are they in reality to become the strategic hinterland of university education in the next 50 years?

Regional University Role Probed

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 25 Jul 82 p 3

/Article by Labib al-Siba'i/

/Text/ The problem of university admissions and the search for places in various faculties keeps everyone who has passed the general secondary examination this year, and every year, from sleeping at night.

A question also remains on the role of the regional universities in the admissions policy this year. Can these universities, as a university president said, represent the university hinterland for Egyptian education, now that the old

universities are incapable of enduring more of the annual tempests they face? How can we guarantee that these regional universities, which represent a hope for an Egyptian university education, not be turned into another form of the massive universities? How can they be linked to the problems of the environment and development?

Dr Hasan Hamdi, president of Cairo University, said "The goal in establishing regional universities in Egypt in the early seventies was to alleviate the pressure on Cairo, Alexandria, 'Ayn Shams and Asyut Universities, which had started to absorb students several times greater in number than what they could support. This is on the one hand. On the other, there was the cultural resurgence in the Egyptian provinces and governorates. However, it was unfortunately not done in the desired way. I had imagined that there would be a kind of commitment to appointing regional university graduates to their own governorates. At the same time, haste was made in erecting a number of faculties in regional universities, but they were not provided with the necessary scientific ingredients in the form of university installations, faculty members and so forth, although this has been started to be done recently, since the Higher University Council's scientific committees of various sectors make an on-the-spot field study of each new faculty before a decision is made to start studies there."

Dr Hasan Hamdi added that one had to take a distinctive view of regional universities, guaranteeing that they would not assume a formal pattern, paralleling and resembling the large or old universities, and that these universities should be closely tied to the circumstances of the environment in which they were located. It would also be necessary to start setting forth a comprehensive plan that would guarantee that these universities were spared reliance on the appointment of faculty members from other universities, because that would turn the entire educational process into a matter of dictation on the part of the professor, who would give a lecture with his eyes on the clock, out of the fear that the train taking him back to Cairo would leave, while the student totally lacked any family relationship with his professor.

Dr Muhammad Talbah 'Uwaydah, president of al-Zaqaziq University, said "I still consider that the responsibility for university education in Egypt in coming years will basically have to be borne by the regional universities, since they are new and there is nothing restricting their constant progress toward development. They must make the same beginning the international universities have made. At the same time, opportunities for expansion in the old universities are limited and extremely scarce, contrary to the regional universities, which still have room; therefore, the responsibility of the regional universities must start as of now. It is not reasonable that they should seek to erect auditoriums that can accommodate the same numbers as those in Cairo University, which was built more than half a century ago--rather, they must prepare for the future and the next 50 years by erecting improved modern auditoriums which can accommodate more than 2,000 male and female students in which it will be possible to use modern educational equipment."

The president of al-Zaqaziq University said, "The numbers of students in the university's faculties will surge to about 80,000 this year, in view of the university's policy of permitting the people of al-Sharqiyah Governorate, students, workers and

faculty members to transfer to it. At the same time, the process of development is proceeding continuously in the light of scientific and international progress on the one hand and the requirements of the development plan and the governorate on the other. In fact, all the university's facilities are used for purposes of education. For example, the university's engineering shops work in various fields to provide services to the people of the governorate, and the students of the Faculty of Agriculture work to help peasants in the governorate develop and improve their crops. In fact, the university has finished setting up the most modern electronic press in Egypt at a cost of more than 1 million pounds this year. It will be used first of all to make university books available to students, then will print everything the governorate requires, whether books for various stages of general education or other publications. In addition to that, the university is actively graduating people in the specialized areas that the region needs, such as sports education, productive competence, and medical technology, so that the governorate can enjoy a degree of self-sufficiency in production and service equipment."

The president of al-Zaqaziq University continued, "Therefore I believe that it is not strange that Cairo University should demand a reduction in the number of students to be admitted to it next year while at the same time al-Zaqaziq University should increase the number of people it admits!"

Dr 'Abd-al-Majid 'Uthman, president of Suez Canal University, the most modern of Egyptian universities, stated that the increase in the number of students admitted to the regional universities would harm them and turn them into universities with large populations, and that it was necessary to control the numbers of people admitted to regional universities in particular so that it would be possible to finish providing all their component elements.

Dr 'Abd-al-Majid 'Uthman added, "The successful experiment of the establishment of Asyut University has given an easy image of the subsequent establishment of regional universities, and has made the process of establishing new universities seem simple. Consequently, an expansion which was not carefully studied in the process of erecting regional universities was started; unfortunately, studies in some regional universities have been started in a spontaneous fashion, opening up courses without real resources. In fact, some universities have started courses under the aegis of the old secondary schools located in these governorates."

The president of the Canal University added that a number of factors have worked together, in the case of the universities, to set them on a wrong course. First of these was the absence of adequate planning and study on the opening of new faculties, and a failure to guarantee them the proper components. Then there was the policy that was applied which called for us to begin with any resources available, which we would make up for what we lacked later; then there was a response to factors besides educational ones, for instance pressure from the masses, then the establishment of universities close to one another, which did not bring about integration among universities so much as repetition, duplication and mere imitation of patterns. The faculties were copied, along with all their departments, but no real resources were made available to them.

Dr 'Abd-al-Majid 'Uthman said, "This picture has faced us, and still is facing us, in all its dimensions, as we planned to establish the Suez Canal University. This was a pressing requirement in order to serve the cause of development in the canal and Sinai area. The Canal area, by virtue of its location, including Port Said, al-Isma'iliyah and Suez, which are three specific governorates differing from one another, consequently places great responsibility upon the university to provide specific services for these governorates.

"Therefore," the president of the Canal University stated, "the university's basic philosophy has been to start where the old universities are now; otherwise, it would be a repetition of them. It should be receptive to its locale and benefit from all forms of outside expertise. It should be a university which is absolutely not at all traditional. This is not just a slogan; rather, it is a reality, since a real university serves the environment directly with all its needs, and it is within that context that one should avoid establishing any new universities or scholarly areas of specialization unless these are based on an integrated study of the state of the society and the environment, and all elements are available to them. Thus, an integrated map of the canal area was set forth first of all, including its circumstances and requirements, and from that the directions in which the university was to move were determined."

In Port Said, there are two faculties. First is the Faculty of Commerce; what is taught there? The university president says that the faculty teaches its students economics, investment, economic liberalization, banking and foreign languages. The second is the Faculty of Engineering: it has oriented its academic programs to serve the conditions of the region. It teaches shipbuilding and such Suez Canal requirements as calculations of ship speed, scour and remote reconnaissance. As a result, study in the two faculties is now devoted to serving the region.

Suez has a Faculty of Petroleum. All its programs and academic curricula have been changed to serve the Sinai region and the Red Sea in full in terms of oil resources, minerals and mines.

The studies made on al-Isma'iliyah revealed that it includes reclamation and new farming areas; this resulted in the region's need for a faculty of agriculture of a non-traditional nature, alongside a faculty of science and education, then a medical faculty, which was established last year in an appropriate manner which was wholly different from all the medical faculties in Egypt. Suffice it to say that it has taken 3 whole years to prepare academic curricula in this faculty alone in order to come up with the best modern conception related to the circumstances of the environment.

The university president added "More than that, the university has decided not to allow any scientific degree in higher studies to be registered in any faculty unless the problem to which it addresses itself lies within the problems of the environment. Thus the executive bodies in these locations have become a party contributing to this research and thus the university has been linked to the society through a variety of institutions. At the same time, having faculty members settle down in the governorates where their faculties are located is to be considered a basic matter and not to be taken lightly.

"However, at the end," stated the president of Suez Canal University, "the attainment of stability is all connected to control over the number of people admitted to the regional universities, whose numbers are increasing in a carefully calculated, reasonable manner; otherwise, we will be surprised to find that these universities of hope, as I label them, are being turned into copies of the big universities, with the numbers they are all complaining about."

After all this, however, where does the coordinating office stand? It is concerned with all the problems and admission crises in the universities and institutes every year. What is its role? What is now the picture in the coordinating office, which will be preparing in a few days to greet the general secondary onslaught? Is it to be found guilty as far as the problem of admissions goes or is it the innocent accused party in the university admissions case?

Coordinating Office Role Reviewed

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 26 Jul 82 p 3

/Article by Labib al-Siba'i/

/Text/ Every time the university admissions process starts, the coordinating office stands in the defendant's box and charges rain down on it from all sides. The co-ordination results become the object of everyone's accusations. A girl who has been dreaming all her life of the Faculty of Economics gets admitted by the coordinating office to Letters. Because of just half a grade, the coordinating office throws a young fellow from Cairo down to al-Minya. What is the story with the coordinating office, the innocent party that is accused on the subject of university admissions every year? If we say that the High Dam is protecting us from the danger of Nile flood, will the coordinating office play the same role to protect our university from the onslaught of the general secondary? What is the state of emergency that was declared months ago inside the office, which in a few days will be meeting about 150,000 students waiting for news of their success in general secondary and will be bearing the responsibility of distributing them equitably and in a balanced fashion to more than 230 university faculties and various institutes, from Cairo to Aswan?

At the outset, Mr Fawzi 'Abd-al-Zahir, first deputy minister of higher education and general supervisor of the coordinating office, stated that the office is always sinned against as regards all the charges directed against it; the office's role is to achieve a process of balance between supply--the general secondary students who have passed--and demand, as determined by the Higher University Council, in the form of the numbers of people to be admitted to each faculty.

In other words, if we imagine that the people who pass this year will for instance come to 150,000, the office will arrange them by computer in descending order; that is, it will list these students, starting with the top student in the republic, who has received the highest grade point average, and going down to the 150,000th student, who has received the lowest grade. Then the distribution process will start, on the basis of satisfying first choices by listing these students in descending order. If we assume that the faculties of medicine will for instance accept 4,000 students and that the students in the science branch who have the right

to be admitted to these faculties have all expressed the desire to be admitted to them, admissions will stop at the 4,000th student in the list of people who have passed general secondary in this branch. In this case, the grade point average that student acquires will represent the minimum for admission to these faculties.

Preparations Months Ago

Mr Jamal al-Jawhari, director of the coordinating office, said that preparations in the office for starting the job of accommodating general secondary students started months ago. In fact, they began when the students filled out forms to take the general secondary examinations, when the computer proceeded to record and punch out data on all the students who had presented themselves for the examination. Immediately upon completion of the corrections, the office also followed up on recording the students' grades, then removed the data on students who had had to repeat the year, then completed the admissions process by recording the choices of the students who had passed, preparatory to pursuing the process of distribution among the faculties, after the Higher University Council had specified to it the numbers of students who were to be admitted to each faculty!

"Therefore," the director of the coordinating office went on, "I would like to tell every student that he must avoid these incidents which many people have committed in past years involving the juggling and falsification of grades on the passing form; last year that involved more than 30 students who falsified their grades by adding extra grades to their average; their admission was suspended and their papers were handed over to the office of the public prosecutor."

The issue, as the coordinating director says, is that now with the use of the computer it is technically absolutely impossible for a single case of forgery to slip through, no matter how well concealed it might be, for a simple reason, which is that all the student's grades are actually recorded before the declaration of the results in the computer, from the result records, in the Ministry of Education, and that what happens after that is just a matter of getting the data on the passing forms to correspond to the data that has actually been recorded. Any discrepancy between the two sets of data, however limited it might be, will be revealed by the computer in less than a second; therefore, slipping a single case of forgery through must be considered an impossibility!

Mr 'Abd-al-Sami' Qandil, deputy director of the office, added that the office would start handing out and receiving papers from students in the first stage within 48 hours: admissions would take place in four stages, each stage allocated to students who had received a specific grade average. The fourth and final stage would concern people obtaining 50 percent in the science and letters sections. The office was also preparing to establish nine branches in Cairo and the various regions, including two in Cairo, in al-'Abbasiyah and Shubra, and one each in Alexandria, Asyut, Tanta, al-Mansurah, al-Zaqaziq, al-Minya and al-Isma'iliyah. To make matters easy for the students, they would be permitted to receive and return papers in any of these branches, regardless of the governorate in which they received the general secondary /degree/ although if a student in Cairo, for instance, was present in Alexandria for the summer holidays, he could receive the papers and submit them in the Alexandria branch, and not have to go back to Cairo.

Mr Jamal al-Jawhari added that about 100 committees would be allocated to students to hand out and receive papers in each stage and that Egyptian students who received certificates of equivalency with the Egyptian general secondary from other countries should have these papers approved by the ministry of education in those countries and authorized by the Egyptian consulate or embassy before submitting them to the main coordinating office in Cairo. The students in groups that were exempt from the armed forces should receive their papers in the Ministry of Defense coordinating office, which is located in the Organization and Management Authority, personal affairs and social services branch.

As to the accusation that the office was contributing to the estrangement of students from their families and admitting people from Cairo, for instance, to other governorates, Mr Fawzi 'Abd-al-Zahir said "The office is absolutely committed to the rules on geographical admissions between the Universities of Cairo and 'Ayn Shams and the rules on regional admissions to the other universities. Starting now, I can tell students who have passed the general secondary who are from schools in the educational areas of Giza, West and South Cairo and Hilwan, or have presented themselves for examinations before their committees, that their admissions will be restricted to the faculties of Cairo University that are situated in Greater Cairo, to the exclusion of other corresponding faculties in 'Ayn Shams University, within the general coordination limits.

The Faculties of 'Ayn Shams University

"At the same time, the admission of students who have passed in the schools of the al-Qalyubiyah, Heliopolis, and North, East and Central Cairo areas will be restricted to the faculties of 'Ayn Shams University, to the exclusion of other similar faculties in Cairo University and also within the limits of general coordination, in the sense that students from any of these areas cannot for example enroll in the Faculty of Medicine at Cairo University if their grades qualify them for the Faculty of Medicine at 'Ayn Shams, and vice-versa. That is, if the grades of the students who have passed in the schools that are allocated to either of the two universities do not qualify them for a faculty belonging to that university but do qualify them for a similar faculty in the other university, they can be admitted to the other faculty by the coordination /office/ if that is listed in their choices in the selection card, in accordance with the order of these choices."

The general coordination supervisor added that as far as the faculties located in one of the two universities went, if they had no corresponding faculties in the other one, as was the case with dentistry, the media and economics in Cairo University or languages and girls' /faculties/ in 'Ayn Shams, admission to those would be open to all students in the Greater Cairo areas, which include Cairo, Giza and al-Qalyubiyah. At the same time, students who passed in the schools of Greater Cairo would have the right to apply for admission to the faculties of other universities outside Cairo and Giza or the faculties of Hilwan University, if their grade averages did not qualify them for admission to the faculties of their own governorates.

Students who have passed examinations in schools for exceptional people, the blind, languages, the Air Secondary school, ballet, athletics and the Military Boarding

School by the Pyramids could be admitted to schools which were remote from their places of residence, and, if they were admitted to the Universities of Cairo or 'Ayn Shams, admission would be in accordance with their place of residence in Cairo as stated on the white general secondary form.

Mr Fawzi 'Abd-al-Zahir said, "As for students in the provinces, students who have obtained a general secondary /degree/ from the Governorate of al-Minya and the governorates situated to the south of it can be admitted to faculties that have equivalents in the Universities of Asyut and al-Minya, to the exclusion of other universities. However, if a student's grade average does not qualify him for one of these faculties but does qualify him for a similar faculty in another faculty, his acceptance will /illegible/ in the latter faculty as part of the coordination /system/, if that is listed among his choices in the selection card, on the basis of the order of these choices. These students will also have the right to present themselves for admission to the faculties of other universities that do not have equivalents in the Universities of Asyut or al-Minya.

"As regards students in other governorates besides al-Minya and Asyut, the acceptance of those who have obtained the general secondary from schools in a governorate where a university faculty is located will be confined to that faculty, to the exclusion of similar faculties, unless the student's grade average does not qualify him for the faculty that is situated in his governorate but does qualify him for a corresponding faculty in another governorate; then he could be admitted to the latter faculty as part of the coordination /process/ if that was one of his choices, in accordance with the order of choices. Students who have passed in governorates where there are no university faculties, or there are faculties which do not correspond to their choices, will have the right to express a choice for any faculty in an Egyptian university. On this basis, if we assume that the first person in the examination in the republic is from Governorate S, and he wants to be admitted to the faculty of medicine, for instance, and this faculty is situated in his governorate, he cannot for instance be admitted to medicine in Cairo."

Timing Is Not Important Here

Mr Jamal al-Jawhari said that students are sometimes motivated by impetuosity as well as joy and therefore students must study their choices and the order of their choices carefully before presenting themselves to the coordinating office. The first person who presents himself will not get any special benefits, especially since the last person who presents himself will not lose anything by coming late. In the case of admissions papers, students will find stamps bearing the names of faculties and institutes which the coordinating office nominates for admission and the code used in the computer. The choice card contains 32 choices and, when the student affixes 32 stamps, each of which represents his choice of a faculty, the office will make the distribution by computer on the basis of three criteria. The first will be the number of students to be admitted to each faculty, then there is the grade average of the students wishing to join this faculty, then there is the order of their choices. Thus the process of the students' ordering of their choices is considered the most important stage the student goes through. The students must also be reasonable in selecting their choices and must not use them all

up in the quest of a faculty where they know their chances of being admitted are limited!

Mr Fawzi 'Abd-al-Zahir said "The coordinating office is permitted to accept an additional quota of people who are to be admitted to each faculty to maintain equality among students who share the same grade average. If we assume in the previous example that admissions to the medical faculties will be open to the 4,000th student, we will find that there are for example 20 students who have acquired the same average as this one; they will be admitted on top of the number stipulated for admission."

However, the real problem, as Mr Jamal al-Jawhari says, is when the number of these students rises above the percentage the coordinating office is allowed, especially students who have obtained 50 percent, who come to several thousand every year. They have equal grades; in this case a number of preferred courses are specified, in cases where the overall grade point average is the same. In admissions to the Faculties of Letters and Law, the Teachers' College, Antiquities, Media, Languages, Tourism, Hotels, and Fine Arts, that will be arts, art education, music, sports in both branches, science and letters. In the Faculties of Commerce, Economics, Political Science, Postal Service and Girls it will be general education, education, and special social service. In the technical commercial institutes and the International Institute of Administrative Cooperative Studies, literary section, the preferred subjects will be the student's grade average in the three languages.

As regards admissions to Faculties of Science, Education, the General Girls' Faculty, Education, Applied Arts, and the Chemical Technical Faculty in Shubra for Scientists in both branches, and Telephones, Irrigation, Drainage, Tourism, and Land Reclamation in the science branch, the preferred courses in the students' grade averages will be in the mathematics and science groups.

As regards admissions to the Faculties of Engineering, Technology and Electronic Engineering in Manuf, Oil and Mining in Suez, Architectural Planning and the Industrial Technical Institutes in the branch of mathematics and to the Faculties of Commerce, Postal Activity, Economics, Political Science, Fine Arts, Architecture, Social Service, Commercial Technical Institutes and the Higher Institute of Administrative Cooperative Studies for the scientist in both branches, the preferred subjects will be the students' grade averages in the mathematics group. With respect to admissions to the Faculties of Medicine, Dentistry, Veterinary Medicine, Pharmacy, Agriculture, Nursing, the Girls' Faculty (in Home Economics), the Faculty of Home Economics, Natural Medical Treatment, Cotton, Agricultural Sciences and Agricultural Cooperation, the preferred subjects will be the students' grade point average in the science and natural history group.

What Happens in the Case of Equal Grades?

Indeed, more than that, as the director of the coordinating office said, in the event of equal minimum grade point averages and grade averages in the preferred subjects for admission to a faculty or institute, preference would go to the younger person!

Mr 'Abd-al-Sami' Qandil said that a student can become acquainted on his own with the faculty for which he is a candidate. Among the papers handed out to him by the office he will find a card which he is to keep himself and on which he must include all the data listed on the choice card he presents to the office. When the admissions results are announced, the office will send a card by mail to every student concerning the faculty to which he has been nominated. However, the student can acquaint himself with this faculty before he receives a post card stating that his grade point average and the choices he has filled out in accordance with their order in the choice card in his possession are in keeping with the data on the minimum admission /levels/ which the office has declared, with attention to the conditions and rules on geographical admissions and regions. If the student's grade average, in accordance with his order of choices and conditions, qualifies him for a faculty or institute for which a minimum /level/ has not been announced, that means that it still has vacant places for the coming stage, and therefore students can be nominated to them as long as they meet the conditions for admission to them!

Education Minister Discusses Policy

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 28 Jul 82 p 3

/Article by Labib al-Siba'i/

/Text/ In a frank conversation, with the thinking of a scholar and a university professor, more than that of a responsible minister, Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi revealed all the features of university admissions policy next year, the criteria and reasons for this policy, why it was not previously linked to the government's plan requirements in the past, how this linkage can be realized, how the universities can absorb the next general secondary onslaught which they will face the next few days, what contributions the regional universities have made, whether there would be more expansions in construction of these universities, and the considerations governing this expansion.

In his conversation, Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi, the minister of education, laid stress on a number of important facts, foremost among them:

Every student who passed the general secondary examination this year would have a place in the various universities and institutes of different types.

The process of outlining admissions actually started with the determination of the government production and service sector's needs for graduates in coming years by 19 committees, each of which represents a sector of university education, containing the ministers of these sectors and professional union chiefs in them.

The Higher University Council will not just settle for determining the numbers of people admitted to each sector; it will also determine the criteria for distributing the students to each department and field of specialization in each faculty, lest we be surprised in a few years by the presence of a surplus of graduates in the Electrical Department, for instance, in the Engineering Faculty and a corresponding shortage of graduates in the Architecture Department of the same faculty.

The curve of constantly increasing numbers of general secondary students has actually started to drop this year. Future expansion will be in the realm of technical education.

The regional universities have made a tangible, direct contribution to reducing pressure on the old universities. These are the strategic hinterland of Egyptian university education; nonetheless, course work will not start in any new faculty until the presence of all its material and human components is assured; the policy of just laying cornerstones has ended!

At the outset of his conversation, Dr Mustafa Hilmie Murad, the minister of education, reassuring every family awaiting the general secondary results, asserted that every student who passed this examination would find a place in a university faculty or one of the various institutes. When its features are finally determined the outlines of admissions policy would concentrate on three basic criteria: first, the number of people who had passed the general secondary, then the capacity of the universities and institutes to absorb students, and, along with that, indeed prior to it, the government plan's requirements for labor in various fields of specialization.

The minister of education added that university admissions policy was connected to a fundamental matter, which was education and productive work, and that a discussion of the subject of education had to be dealt with through a number of approaches. First was the social approach, which was that education was the right of every citizen, to the extent that his intellectual status could support it, regardless of his social status; that was the principle stipulated in the constitution in Egypt. Then there was the economic approach, which was the extent to which education fulfilled the economic and social development plan's need for specialized labor: it was essential that we take up the two approaches, the economic and social, together, in complete balance!

Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmie added, "Education in Egypt has made rapid progress as a popular demand and at the same time as a response to society's economic needs. In the period after 1967, it happened that rates of development dropped, but it was not acceptable, or conceivable, that education could stop to keep abreast of the drop in rates of development. Rather, the sole basic approach remains, which is the renewed increase in development rates, and that is what started to happen in 1973! Here, the responsibility of self-direction lies upon education, so that it can fulfill the real requirements of the development plans and fill the requisite areas of specialization and the necessary scientific and technical levels. At some point, it was believed that the link between education and work would occur in the university education stage. It then became apparent that the universities could not support the influx from secondary education, and a new approach arose, that this link should be made beforehand, that is, at the beginning of the secondary stage; here the breakdown between general and technical secondary was made and technical education made its appearance as a channel paralleling general secondary. Then the need to have the link between education and work made even before that emerged, and a new type of basic education, through which professional and technical skills would be studied, made its appearance. This year we have managed to have general secondary education account for 40 percent and various types of technical education account for 60 percent /of the total/, which is the opposite of what used to be the

case, when general secondary education's share came to about 80 percent, as compared with just 20 percent in technical education."

The minister of education said "This prelude on the relationship between education and productive work is necessary if we are to come up with university admissions policy planning which every student expects from the general secondary. It is true that the prime burden of the responsibility for planning this policy lies on the Higher University Council, but the council does not have sole jurisdiction over this responsibility. Rather, it seeks the assistance of many general trends and technical agencies. Among the general trends are those it receives from such national agencies as the National Council of Education or the popular agencies such as the People's Assembly's Committee on Education."

Where Does the Outlining of Admissions Policy Start?

Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi went on to say, "Preparation for the process of outlining admissions policy began a long time ago, when the university presidents held a special meeting in which Dr Kamal al-Janzuri, the minister of planning, took part, to review the general framework of the universities' 5-year plan in terms of the number of graduates they would provide in the various specialized fields and the research they were carrying out, in the light of their connection with the government's economic and social development plan, real manpower requirements in the various specialized fields, and the connection between that and the university admissions policy. That is the first criterion to which admissions policy has committed itself."

The minister of education said, "It is necessary that all the data on the labor required be made available by the Ministry of Planning to the Higher University Council as regards the economic and social development plan's actual requirements at the nationwide level and that this data be expressive of long-range requirements, which ranges from 4 to 5 years, according to fields of specialization!"

The minister of education stated, "In addition to all that, the 19 Higher University Council committees each represent a sector of university education--agriculture, engineering, medicine, commerce and so forth--and they have been working diligently for months to prepare studies on the nature of admissions to the sectors they represent. Each of these committees includes all the deans of the faculties in its sector, representatives of the ministries involved with the graduates of this sector, and the head of the professional union in this sector. Admissions policies in each sector are studied in the light of the national policy the relevant minister presents. For example, the minister of health presents Egypt's national health policy and the labor that requires at various levels; this policy is discussed with the deans of the faculties of medicine, the specialists, and the head of the Doctors' Union; in the light of all that, agreement is reached on the numbers of people to be admitted to the medical faculties. In the sector of agricultural education, the ministers of agriculture, irrigation and /land/ reclamation set forth the features of national policy in these fields, they are discussed with the deans of the faculties of agriculture and the chief of the Agricultural Workers' Union, and, in the light of all this, admissions policy to the agriculture faculties is determined."

The minister of education stated, "Indeed, on top of that, we have not contented ourselves with this. Rather, for the first time, the Higher University Council is determining criteria which each faculty will commit itself to in distributing students to its various departments and fields. The Higher University Council will for example settle on determining the numbers of people admitted to the faculties of letters, and the faculties will then take charge of distributing the students among their own departments, and it will then become apparent that there is a surplus of graduates in other departments of the same faculty. Therefore, the council will set forth percentages or criteria for the faculties in distributing students to the various departments."

However--Can the Universities Support the Admission of All These Numbers?

Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi, the minister of education, went on: "The second criterion which will help in setting out the features of admissions policy is the universities' capacity to absorb students in accordance with the determinations their faculties make. If we look at our universities' capacities, we must admit that we have not yet come up with what we want. However, I can say that the developing countries feel great stress when they look at the rates at which the advanced countries are progressing. In fact, the International Committee on Educational Reform referred to this when it asserted that the developing countries had to adopt economic rates that were in keeping with their circumstances as they engaged in the process of educational reform. Nonetheless, the most important element in the educational process, the faculty member, is available in Egypt. It has a faculty force which is not available to any developing country in the whole world. Suffice it to say that Egyptian universities have 1,000 new faculty members available to them every year. As for buildings and equipment, we must admit that the investments which were provided to the universities in the context of the war economy were limited; the stage of revival, or prosperity, in the Egyptian universities, started in 1978, and its effects will appear soon. Dr Kamal al-Janzuri, the minister of planning, has agreed with the university presidents that in reviewing education one should not restrict oneself to considering it a service--rather, it is a basic investment, in the context of the attainment of development goals. Therefore, one is obligated to provide investments for it on these grounds. He also stressed the universities' role in the realm of scientific research and the need to provide all the resources which will enable them to achieve this goal."

Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi added that he had agreed to set investments in university education and scientific research apart in an independent fashion from the investments needed for teaching hospitals throughout the country, while taking the capacity and ability of the building sector into account and that three priorities would be observed in university projects--the completion of projects on which a start has actually been made, replacement projects, and new projects that are actually to be carried out.

Will the General Secondary Onslaught Obliterate All These Criteria?

Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi said, "There remains the third and final criterion in outlining admissions policy; that is the number of students who have obtained the general secondary /degree/, since that is a pressure force we cannot ignore. As I

said, we have begun to control this element for the first time. The curve of the constant increase in the numbers of general secondary students has started to drop. Suffice it to say that the numbers of students advancing into general secondary this year are about 14,000 less than those who entered it last year. We have reached the point where the general secondary does not exceed 40 percent /of the total/, as compared with 60 percent in the technical secondary. Here one must give attention to the 2-year system for institutes after the general or technical secondary, not just to reduce or absorb the onslaught from the secondary on the universities, but rather to cover the government's requirements for technicians. These institutes are not an Egyptian invention; rather, they are a system that is being applied in all the advanced countries in the world. In America there are the community colleges, which admit people who have received the equivalent of the general secondary; we in Egypt have 32 technical institutes, 15 of which are commercial institutes that contain about 40,000 male and female students, and 17 institutes containing about 10,000 students. The development of their specializations and curricula are constantly being observed.

Where are the Regional Universities on the Admissions Chart?

Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi, minister of education, said "Last year the number of students admitted to Egyptian universities came to about 85,000, 41,000 of whom were admitted by Cairo, Alexandria and 'Ayn Shams universities, as compared with 46,000 admitted by the regional universities. The question is: had the regional universities not been established, would it have been possible for the three former universities alone to support this number? The regional universities' role is therefore fundamental. They are indeed the strategic heartland for the expansion of university education in Egypt."

The minister of education went on, "I believe that there is no argument over the thought and philosophy that the policy of establishing regional universities was aimed at, in terms of democracy of education, the provision of equal opportunities for the people of various universities and regions, limitations on the migration from rural areas to urban areas, and provision of the wherewithal for social, cultural and economic development for the various rural areas, in addition to the social and economic effects that have arisen from the establishment of these universities as centers of thought and culture. We can all remember the vivid picture of social injustice and disturbances that prevailed in Egyptian society when education was concentrated in the capitals and the major cities and the rural areas were deprived of the values of education in general."

The minister of education said, "nonetheless, the emotional headlong rush to meet certain popular local demands and the response to them by erecting regional faculties or universities when resources are not available can lead to a setback, not just as far as the regional faculties are concerned but also for university education in Egypt. To that end, the Higher University Council has determined that no new faculties are to be started until a realistic scientific study is carried out by the committees of the sectors concerned on the presence of human and material resources available to start this study. The policy of laying cornerstones has

ended. Before any cornerstones are laid, it will be necessary to confirm that the human resources exist, before the material ones, out of respect for university education, because to adopt an approach other than this will mean ruining scholarly and educational values and graduating young people who have received only a little educational background."

11887
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SCHOLAR DISCUSSES ARGUMENTS, CHARGES AT AMERICAN CONFERENCE

Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic No 298, 11 Jul 82 pp 28, 29

/Article by Dr 'Isam-al-Din Jalal: "On the Watergate Conference on Psychiatry"/

/Text/ Dr 'Abd-al-'Azim Ramadan has written about what he has called the Watergate conference, the meeting the United States Psychiatric Association organized in Washington in January 1980. The gentleman presented his opinions on the course of events at this meeting, including the role of the Egyptian Pugwash /Conference/ and my personal role /in it/. Aside from the extent of the difference between my opinion and the gentleman's on many basic points regarding the events at that meeting, this is not the place for my comments, considering my commitment to the resolution of this conference based on my insistence on not publishing or opening up scope for exploiting these conferences for political goals. There is no doubt that Dr 'Abd-al-'Azim Ramadan is aware of the dimensions of this sort of approach among certain bodies, especially Israeli ones.

However, the two articles did review the positions of individuals and groups by name, and this requires that the impressions be corrected, in order to protect history, the effectiveness of these meetings, and individuals. There is no doubt that this is a correction which Dr 'Abd-al-'Azim Ramadan, as a distinguished historian, would welcome.

First, there was no Egyptian delegation. Consequently, it had no chairman or spokesman; rather there were a number of persons who had been invited by the American Psychiatric Association. As far as I personally was concerned, all the correspondence which took place between me and that society took place in my capacity as a chairman of an Egyptian society for endocrinological diseases and diabetes and as chairman of an Egyptian society for experimental treatment. It happened that we met as a group who had been called together, before traveling, with the purpose of exchanging opinions on the pitfalls and traps of conferences of that sort; while I, on the basis of long-standing practice, presented a group of reservations and caveats, that was not in the name of the Egyptian Pugwash, which had refused to participate in this meeting and numerous similar meetings before it.

It actually happened that in my scholarly capacity I wrote down stipulations in writing for my colleagues who were officials in the American association; I pointed out that many of the people who had been invited shared my opinion and that I did

not claim to be representing a homogeneous Egyptian delegation, because that did not reflect reality and also was contrary to my principles. The conditions were clear:

One. The meeting would be an international one, discussing all international crises, and not a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli one discussing the Middle East crisis.

Two. The agenda should be broken up into a review of the bases of military, political and economic crises. We had no objection to the addition of the psychological dimension as a newly-created one which a group of American psychiatrists were trying to crystallize as a science. My criticism of their efforts, which had been repeated in many international gatherings, that one had to be thankful for them but that it was an exaggeration to claim that they completed the scientific components which were presumed to exist in every branch of science.

Three. We should obtain a guarantee that would be binding on all parties that publication in any form be prohibited, in order to avoid the professional exploitation of participation, especially the participation by our eminent scientist colleagues who might be proceeding from a purely scientific commitment and might have no experience with the sleight of hand and maneuvering involved in political dealings.

Second, I am most anxious to correct impressions on the positions of the Egyptian Pugwash, although its traditions, its method of functioning, and the preservation of its effectiveness have been the object of esteem to all parties, foremost among them Palestinians, and they required acting in silence, far removed from the media limelight. Proceeding from objective detailed studies, the Egyptian Pugwash set forth from clear specific notions, the first basis of which was that there was no Palestinian problem or Egyptian problem prior to the 1973 war.

This is in consideration of the fact that Palestine represents the first line of security for Egypt and the Arab countries, above and beyond ties of blood and religion, and that it represents the only alternative sound link in Israel's communications with the Arab world to the strategy of aggression and expansion, since there is no alternative to these options. The Egyptian Pugwash has committed itself to boycotting all bilateral discussions and has insisted on and pursued trilateral Palestinian-Egyptian-Israeli discussions. At its last meeting last month, the Pugwash council stressed that the latest developments supported its continued commitment to this way of thinking. Let me not miss an opportunity to express my obligatory sorrow over the violation of the traditions of the Egyptian and international Pugwash, among whose leading members I am honored to be, by publicizing this sort of premise.

Third, after it became established, through actual practice, that the American organizers had violated the stipulations conveyed to them, that, regardless of the formal cover, the meeting had actually turned into a bilateral meeting, and that constant attempts were being made to highlight what was called the psychological dimension and to cancel the security, political and economic dimensions of the Arab-Israeli confrontation, it actually happened that I made a broad attack against this approach and declared that I was withdrawing from the conference. The nationalistic response of the Egyptian colleagues, the campaign of complaints and

dissatisfaction by the Israeli hawks, and the attitude of understanding on the part of the Americans and secular-minded Israelis resulted in a suspension of the withdrawal until a crisis occurred with the American assistant deputy secretary of state at a meeting at the American State Department.

Fourth, what I received from the assistant deputy secretary of state was not an explanation of American foreign policy but an apology that strain, fatigue and the failure to make preparations had caused him to imagine that the Palestinian issue was one of identity, and he insistently pretended not to notice the principles of territory, the right to self-determination and legitimacy, in response to Dr Mahmud Mahfuz' insistence on carrying out an American-Palestinian dialogue.

Therefore, there was no way to avoid obtaining not just an explanation of the actual state of American policy at that time but also an apology to the Egyptian participants for what I insisted was a blow against peace in the region as well as disdain for the nationalism and ideas of the Egyptian participants. When a diplomatic problem arose on the way in which the apology would be presented, and the meeting at the Department of State ended, it was necessary to insist on the impossibility of resuming the conference, which had met but had not convened because the Egyptians were not present, until the correction was openly declared, and I recommended to the gentleman that he delegate me to declare it in his name. That happened, and I announced the apology and the explanation to the conference.

Fifth, I was happy to receive an American Psychiatric Association delegation in Cairo after the conference ended, regarding their proposal to resume other sessions of this meeting.

We told the delegation, which contained eminent scientists, that we categorically refused to participate in any second or third conferences of this type and we presented them two specific options:

According to scientific principles, if the goal was to study the psychological repercussions of an international conflict, the composition of the conference was in violation of all scientific rules, because as a group psychiatrists did not represent a category that expressed influential public opinion in Egypt or in Israel. It would also be impossible for the group to be a sample of the society and at the same time analyze the impressions and effects which it might claim represented the predominant current in the society. For this reason, this meeting could not be considered scientific, because it lacked the recognized ingredients; in any event, it was far removed from our interest and our area of specialization, and there was no likelihood of any participation in it.

However, if the association wanted to be objective and frank, and it really did want a scientific discussion of the Middle East problem, our conditions were as follows:

One. The meeting should be quadrilateral, with Palestinian, Egyptian and Israeli /participation/ in the presence of the American association and the American State Department, as in the past. By Palestinians, as we asserted, the Palestine Liberation Organization was meant.

Two. We could not participate if the Palestinians excused themselves, because in our opinion that would not be feasible.

Three. The agenda would be specified by all the parties participating, not the American association.

Four. The members of the conference would be selected under the aegis of the parties participating, not the American association, and we stated that the Arab side's selection would parallel the Israeli selection in terms of experience, knowledge and expertise in the issue and its real dimensions, and not in terms of psychiatry.

Five. Assured guarantees of secrecy and the rejection of exploitation for publication or publicity purposes except by agreement of the parties participating, in a manner which would present the true nature of their positions.

In the course of objective scholarly discussion with the association delegation, in which Dr Mahmud Mahfuz participated effectively, it appeared that scholarly principles and customs helped the two parties arrive at a complete understanding of various positions.

So far as we know and as we had expected, the Israeli party rejected these conditions, and my connection with this series, and that of Dr Mahmud Mahfuz, were severed. I am sorry that his absence abroad prevents me from talking in his name at length.

While I assert my confidence in and appreciation of the motives of Dr *Abd-al-'Azim Ramadan as a distinguished modern historian, my hope is that he will agree with me that the difficulties of the historians' tasks multiply in the case of events in which he personally is taking part, especially if they are the object of debate and dispute. I also hope that he will agree with me that there are special sensitive points in the history of current events which /make it necessary/ that the history not be considered tendentious or have an influence on these events. Therefore I rebuke the gentleman for his generalization that all the participants in the Watergate meeting were supporters of the Jerusalem initiative. That in my opinion is an inference and an insistence which the principles of history do not require, though the requirements of justification may make it mandatory.

There is no doubt that the gentleman, from the standpoint of the meeting and others, realizes, as many people who are preoccupied with the issue in Egypt, Palestine and Israel do, that this insistence cannot be applied to me personally, and I am sad that we should have put ourselves in a position of political categorization without objective discussion and explanation.

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CROP LOSSES THROUGH POOR PACKAGING REVIEWED

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 11 Jul 82 p 2

/Article by Samihah Karim: "Would You Believe That We Lose 50 Percent of Our Vegetables through Transportation and 20 Percent of Our Cotton through Packaging?"/

/Text/ Could you believe that we lose 50 percent of our vegetables because of poor transportation and supply in the Markets and that we lose 20 percent of our cotton crop as a result of poor handling, transportation and packaging?

Indeed, some of our factories produce some commodities at above world price!

We lose 12 million work-hours a year!

These are some aspects of loss and waste in our lives. The situation calls for a comprehensive view and a new method of confronting the losses we incur without any logical justification.

If we must strive to limit the budget deficit, a comprehensive view of the important production sectors in the government will be required, so that one can strive to reduce loss, waste and spoilage in production.

What is the view of industrial experts and economists on this problem from which we are suffering in our lives?

Aspects of Loss

Dr Samir Tubar, professor of economics and member of the National Council of Economic Affairs, states that the aspects of loss in our lives are numerous, especially in production fields. They start with the production stage, proceed through the stages of wrapping, packaging, transportation, storage and marketing, and end with the process of household consumption!

For example, vegetable losses are estimated at about 50 percent as a result of poor packaging, transportation in animal-drawn carts and poor supply in the markets.

In addition, the cotton crop loss, as a result of poor handling, packaging and transportation, is estimated at about 20 percent.

Loss and the Construction of Roads

Another aspect of loss arises in the construction of roads and maintenance of public utilities, where work is repeated without reason as a consequence of a lack of coordination among various agencies and departments.

When a given road or street is built, we find that after it is finished, caravans of destruction incessantly come to hook up sewage systems, make electrical connections or lay telephone lines, and the paving process is repeated once, twice or three times!

Each time, financial resources are squandered and the final result is that the costs of constructing a single road are equal to the costs of constructing a number of roads.

Subsidies and Waste

Another manifestation of waste in final consumption is the lack of modern equipment for wrapping and packaging units which are in keeping with the numbers of people in a family, compelling consumers to purchase more than they need and consequently resulting in increased consumption.

Perhaps the essential reason for this waste consumption lies in the subsidies allocated to these goods, which the consumer is enticed to purchase in large amounts. Indeed, that results in the fact that a large portion of these subsidized commodities are drained off into non-human consumption!

Methods of Confrontation

Methods for eliminating waste and loss are numerous. Some of them need urgent, rapid treatment while others need radical solutions whose effects will appear over the long run. These consist of:

One, striving to design packaging, wrapping, transportation, storage and preservation methods which will limit loss during the production process, until the commodity reaches the markets in sound condition.

Two, redesigning models of sales units in packages with gradations of sizes, so that these may be in keeping with the number of people in the family.

Three, forming governmental and popular oversight agencies whose task will be to combat waste in all its forms.

Four, guiding subsidies in order to guarantee that they reach the people who are entitled to them, while gradually reducing them in accordance with a plan aimed at raising per capita income and linking the reduction in subsidies to gradual rises in the income level.

Five, designing media programs to enlighten the masses through environmental studies and highlighting the problems wasteful consumption causes.

Lost Hours of Work

Dr 'Adil 'Izz, director of the al-Sadat Academy, considers that the problem of waste and loss in our life appears in obvious form in worksites, since the number of hours of work lost per day in Egypt is estimated at about 12 million. If quality of performance is added to this time loss, the production we lose will be very great.

If productivity per person reached its true levels, in the sense that everyone who was able to work did work during the hours the government specified, that would help support national income and would bring the citizens themselves a real increase in incomes.

Thus Egypt could depend on its own agricultural and industrial output in meeting its requirements and exporting its surplus, and transcend most of its problems.

Organizing Work Methods

For example, there is the nitrogenous fertilizer production plant in Aswan, which consumes tremendous amounts of energy. It produces 130,000 tons a year and needs 12,000 kilowatt hours to produce 1 ton; generation of the electricity costs \$720 per ton, while the cost per ton in the world market is just \$160. This means that to import this quantity rather than producing it locally will save \$70 million a year, leaving out the other factors of production, such as labor, depreciation of machinery and investments.

Another method which will help reduce general spending is that of changing work techniques.

For instance the aluminum complex in Naj' Hammadi needs an estimated 3 billion kilowatt hours of electrical power. This plant's output comes to 123,000 tons of aluminum per year--that is, the cost of electric energy per ton of aluminum is \$1,222, while the world price of aluminum is \$1,260.

If we calculate the cost of workers' wages, depreciation of machinery and investments, we will find that the real cost of producing a ton of aluminum exceeds its world price.

Finally, in spite of the serious nature of the facts contained in the report which AL-SIYASI has made, to which the figures refer, along with the high rate of loss in commodities because of poor transportation and supply at a time when we are suffering from the problem of malnutrition and the efforts made to resolve that:

A number of solutions were contained in the report to eliminate this grave phenomenon.

Thus we find that we are spending large amounts of money which we would be able to save were it possible to restudy this sort of project.

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EGYPT

BRIEFS

PENSION, AID FUND--The allotments stipulated for pensions, compensations and aid in the new budget are estimated at about 890 million pounds. Of this, 831 million will be for insurance and pensions, 28 million will be in the aid and assistance set aside for about 200,000 families of fighting men, 24 million will be for Nasir Social Bank pensions and 7 million will be for social insurance pensions, in addition to the aid set aside for students in the Governorates of the Canal and Sinai. /Text/ Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 11 Jul 82 p 1/ 11887

OPPOSITION PARTY RESIGNATIONS--Sixty-seven members tendered their resignations from an opposition party committee in Kafr al-Shaykh. The members who had resigned stated in a letter they wrote to AL-SIYASI that the reason for these group resignations was the fact that the party chairman in the governorate had turned the party headquarters into a commercial office and had opened a tourist office and travel agency in the party's headquarters in the governorate! In addition, the party chairman in Kafr al-Shaykh had trafficked in supply commodities. /Text/ Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 11 Jul 82 p 1/ 11887

GOVERNMENT SALARIES--Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din, the prime minister, declared that the amount of wages and salaries for people working in the government and the public sector came to 3.3 billion pounds. In spite of that, it has been decided to pay out social raises with the goal of improving workers' conditions. /Text/ Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 11 Jul 82 p 3/ 11887

CSO: 4504/412

IRAQ

BRIEFS

LOST MILITARY EQUIPMENT--During the last Iranian offensive, Iraqi troops are said to have lost about 40 firing posts for Milan wire-guided missiles, some of which are reported to have been used by Iranian troops. [Text] [Paris DEFENCE & ARMAMENT in English Jul-Aug 82 p 14]

HELICOPTER PURCHASE--Iraq is said to be very interested in procuring French manufactured Dauphin Naval helicopters but no details have been given as to the number or the version (ASW or anti-ship) involved. [Text] [Paris DEFENCE & ARMAMENT in English Jul-Aug 82 p 14]

HELICOPTER MODIFICATIONS--Following unequal combats between Iraqi anti-tank Gazelle helicopters and Iranian gun-armed AH-1 Cobras, several Gazelles are said to have been armed with Matra Magic air-to-air missiles for self-defence. This conversion could be the reason for Euromissile's recently-initiated FAKIR (Famille Irak anti-helicoptere, Iraqi anti-helicopter family) programme. [Text] [Paris DEFENCE & ARMAMENT in English Jul-Aug 82 p 14]

CSO: 4400/426

POLITICAL OPPONENTS TRY TO STOP SHARON'S RISE TO POWER

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 9 Jul 82 Weekend Supplement p 5

[Article by Binah Barzel: "Levi and Aridor Intend to Block Sharon's Bid for the Leadership of Herut; Following War and Strengthening of Sharon's Position Herut Members Are Discussing Party's Future Leadership; Who Will Support Whom and What Internal Coalitions Will Be Formed; A Party Old-timer Summed It Up: 'One Does Not Choose Leaders--They Take Charge'; Meanwhile, Begin Is Long-term Leader"]

[Text] Who will replace Begin when the times comes? I put this question to a Likud leader this week. He replied without hesitation, "Begin."

This answer reflects the new reinforced admiration many in Herut feel toward the prime minister. The party is buoyed by the war and by the resulting rise of Likud power.

"Begin," one of the party's old timers told me, "will lead us until the next election in 1983. And why shouldn't he run again? He will lead as long as he can stand up on his feet."

Herut leader Avraham Appel told me: "When the issue comes up we'll take care of it. Remember when Jabotinsky died we felt orphaned. We wondered who could replace him. Was Altman the one? (Altman was the leader of the Revisionists at the time). And then Begin came along. One does not choose leaders--they take charge."

Planning and Taking Steps

It seems that this is precisely what many in Herut are afraid of, namely, a leadership appearing as a result of the euphoria of the war and taking charge. When one talks about "taking charge" one of course has in mind the famous "charge taker," Ariel Sharon. Sharon can take charge of the party's leadership with the same alacrity he has shown in the IDF assault on the Beirut-Damascus road.

The four leaders of Herut (David Levi, Yoram Aridor, Yitzhaq Shamir and Ariq Sharon) were busy this week conducting the war in Lebanon. But under the surface they had begun to plan and take steps for the expected contest. The

main effort seems to be made by the people of Deputy Prime Minister David Levi, who are out to block Sharon.

"Sharon," a close associate of Levi told me, "is like lightning. But one should distinguish between sudden lightning and electric power necessary to energize the system all year long. He is excellent as defense minister. But he is not the right man to head the party."

Sharon does not have his own following in the party that does his bidding and is considered his own faction. His power stems from his special relations with the prime minister, that became stronger during the war in Lebanon, and from his public charisma. This is not sufficient to secure a senior position in the party. The ones who decide on the leadership of the party are its institutions, in which the constituents of the party are fully represented, and matters are decided democratically, without any deals behind the scenes.

Point of Departure

Against this backdrop a possible alliance has emerged recently among Sharon, Shamir, and Arens. The assumption of this alliance is that Shamir and Arens have supporters who can give their votes to Sharon. Arens, according to this theory, is not an heir to the throne (he may become foreign minister in the future). Shamir will become the leader of the movement in Begin's place, with Sharon as his second-in-command. Sharon will thus win support inside the party and will reach the jumping point for the number one job when the real contest begins.

The proponents of this theory have told me: Sharon has become stronger, and this has greatly strengthened Shamir. Before, the possibility has existed of Levi and Aridor controlling the party and pushing out Sharon. But after the rise of Sharon, Shamir has become a central force who holds the balance of power in the party and no longer depends on the good will of Levi and Aridor." The nature of the alliance between Sharon and Shamir can be seen in a message Member of Knesset Roni Milo, a supporter of Shamir, has sent Sharon after his talk in the Knesset. The message read: "Although I support Shamir, I want to tell you that your speech was worthy of a candidate for the position of prime minister."

Sharon replied briefly: "I agree with you, in regard to Shamir."

General Staff Branch

But there is another theory about the alliance between Shamir and Sharon. The proponents of this theory who are close to David Levi say that during the war Shamir emerged as a rather weak personality. In the face of Sharon's barging into the government meetings, Shamir did not present the political view. "A government," one of Levi's supporters told me, "cannot be a branch of the general staff. A government exists so that it may exercise political thinking. Shamir has not shown any. He tags behind Begin and Sharon and hardly opens his mouth."

The one who did take a stand was Levi, who mobilized eight ministers (Burg, Aridor, Uzan, Hammer, Pat, Berman, Tzipori and Ehrlich in some of the votes) and put Begin in the minority on some subjects. Begin was angry at Levi and did not speak to him for several days (they finally made up and Begin started calling Levi "my friend" again). Levi did not agree with Sharon's and Begin's attitude toward those who criticized the war. He did not in any way disagree with the necessity of the campaign, but as one who is sensitive to the opinions of the common people (he received a great deal of messages from the front) he said that one should not disregard the criticism and refuse to listen to it by dismissing it as the "poison" of the media.

Ups and Downs

What is clear is that over against the Shamir-Sharon alliance an Aridor-Levi alliance is emerging. This alliance first began in the Blue-White faction in the Histadrut. It has had its ups and downs, but the two have always settled their differences and acted in harmony. The latest disagreement between them occurred shortly before the war in Lebanon with regard to the chairmanship of the permanent committee of the Herut convention. Aridor wanted this job, which Levi had held for years (and as a result acquired a great deal of power in the party), but Levi refused to give it up. Aridor's argument was that he wanted to help his supporters through this office, since they felt left out. Levi, who had turned this position into a much greater source of power than merely helping some party activists, was not about to give it up. In order to avoid a showdown with Aridor, Levi took the bull by the horns, as he has done in the past in dealing with party disputes. He called up Aridor and the two decided to meet. In this meeting they worked out their differences and decided not to do anything without first consulting each other.

"They are working together again," one of their followers said. "With Aridor's influence in the government and Levi's support in the party the two of them can put anything through."

By the way, there were those in the party who thought that the two had fought over the issue of bringing Weizman back. But it turns out that there was no disagreement between them. Levi tried to bring back Weizman a few months ago. He explored the possibility of Weizman's return at a wedding party. Weizman had said at that time that he was prepared to come back, but the party's headquarters had a "Do not Enter" sign that was directed to him. Levi's reasoning was that if Weizman did not come back he might form his own list and cause the Likud to lose in the next election. Begin strongly objected for personal reasons. Begin could not see taking back a man who had called him "dead person," "the late Begin," (and also "the shopkeeper," in a recorded interview). Levi had to give up the idea, and Aridor put a resolution through the party secretariat not to bring back Weizman. It was not directed against Levi, who had given up the idea of bringing back Weizman because of Begin's objection.

Minefield

And now what?

Luckily for Herut, it is not facing now the choice of a successor. The hope that Begin will continue, perhaps even for many years, is universal.

In the meantime a minefield is being laid to block Sharon's rise to the top. The convention scheduled for the end of June was postponed until November. The chairman of the organizing department, Mikha Reiser, a supporter of Levi, has explained that the postponement was intended to make it easier for those at the front and to avoid the summer heat at the party's headquarters.

These are sensible and perhaps even accurate reasons. But no less important is the reason that by November not only will the temperature go down, but also the excitement over Sharon will go down and he will not be able to take charge of a euphoric audience.

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ISRAEL

ISRAELIS TRY TO SETTLE INTERNAL RIVALRIES IN SIDON

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 9 Jul 82 Weekend Supplement pp 5-7, 40

[Article by Roman Prister: "Sidon: Masters and Servants; Why Did a Phalanquist Shoot One of the Hariris?; Why Did Refugees Spill the Milk Brought by Volunteers?; Why Did the Issue of Helping the Population Become So Delicate?; A Look at the Town from the Villa of a Local Millionaire and from the Slums of the War Casualties; The Truth Seems to Lie in the Middle"]

[Text] Mr Saini has a flower shop in the damaged heart of Sidon. Large areas of the city were not damaged, but here, in the business center, there is quite a bit of damage. "Nevertheless, here too life is going back to normal," we were told by Brig Gen David Maimon, who is in charge of helping the civilian population in southern Lebanon. Indeed, in the window we see fresh carnations of all different colors, green ferns and plants that for some reason are called "wandering Jew." The owner himself stands at the door looking for customers. He is clean shaven, wears a light grey safari suit and smiles.

How is business, Hawaja Saini?

So so. Praise to Allah, we make a living.

A sudden gust brings a cloud of dust from the ruins. Two giant bulldozers are flattening the intersection nearby. In the shadow of a soot-covered house several women are sitting doing nothing, as if waiting for the messiah. They have been sitting there since morning and will continue to sit till evening when we will be heading South, back to Israel. One cannot help but wonder, who in this town still licking its wounds from the shelling, where 50,000 residents are without regular residence, wants to buy fresh cut flowers?

"They buy, they buy," Mr Saini says. "They buy flowers mostly for the wounded who are still in the hospital."

In the morning Brig Gen Maimon saw us in his office and told us he was satisfied with the efforts of the IDF in reinstating health services in the town. It was not easy to do, especially since everything here is slow. When the IDF officers try to get the local officials to speed things up, the latter look at them in surprise and ask then "why the rush?" During the Ramadan

fast they only work 5 days a week. No one wants to make an effort. It is hard to tell when things are bogged down in red tape and when they are slowed down because someone refused to cooperate with the Israelis. Even those who at first received the IDF with smiles and rice are now reconsidering and wondering about the future. Because Sidon as seen by the journalists who arrive here escorted by the IDF spokesman is not the real Sidon. It will take a long time to find out what the real political and social powers in the city are. The coming of the IDF has turned the city upside down, and has raised to power some who have been kept down in the past. For example:

A few days ago a member of the Hariri family was on his way from his village to the city. He was stopped at the barrier, and when the Phalangists identified him they shot him in the neck. He was rushed to the hospital in Sidon. The incident was not reported to the Israeli authorities. The IDF officers would have been quite surprised if it had been reported. Not because of the shooting at the barrier--a rather common occurrence in Lebanon--but because of the special care the wounded was given at the hospital in Sidon. The name Hariri may be hazardous, but it also opens many doors.

Rafiq Baha-al-Din Hariri got his accounting degree in Sidon in 1969 and went to Saudi Arabia to look for a better life. The day his relative was shot by the Phalangists, Rafiq Hariri was in flight--in one of his three private airplanes--from Riyadh to Paris. But he soon found out about the incident. Telephones are not working in Lebanon. One cannot even call Sidon from Beirut. But Rafiq Hariri has a private international line that can connect him from his home in a suburb of Sidon to anywhere in the world.

He must have built his home in Sidon in order to make those who remembered how poor his family used to be green with envy. In his absence the residence is used by his parents, three of his five children, and some relatives. Two large buildings stand on 40 acres of land, surrounded with well kept lawns. A guard in a blue uniform stops us at the gate. Our driver parks his military jeep next to three cars covered with a dark canvass. We find out later on that the covers hide three luxurious Cadillacs. The intercom is used. A young man around 30 in a striped shirt comes to greet us. He is a cousin of the young millionnaire (age 39). His name is Yusuf Hariri. He will be glad to show us the home of the Hariris.

We rub our eyes: A giant door leads to countless rooms and hallways, all paved with clear Italian marble. Some rooms have wall-to-wall carpets. A large room all done in white--white upholstered armchairs, carved shiny Chinese table, crystal chandeliers; a dining room with table set for 24 diners; a black-and-white music room; a Buchstein piano, of course. A Philippino servant brings coffee in delicate China cups.

How many people work here?

Yusuf: Five guards and a dozen servants. These guards are all relatives. The others come from the Far East. They are very good workers.

Yusuf invites us to resume the tour. Lt Col Na'amani Livnat from the support unit (his civilian occupation is providing services for computers) is our interpreter. He follows Yusuf as if transfixed. Another room and another hall, and we are yet to see the upper floor and the servant quarters. When we reach the main door Yusuf explains this is not Rafiq Hariri's home. "Only the members of his family live here," our guide says, looking at us to see our reaction.

The home of the owner is about 100 yards away. Yusuf takes a key chain. A giant door made of glass and silver painted metal opens easily. A small hallway, its walls panelled with mahogany. Before us, an olympic swimming pool, clear water and clear air. Everything is air-conditioned. "When the electric power is off we use our own generator," Yusuf says. He pushes a concealed button and the roof over the pool opens without a sound.

Around the pool there are dark corridors. Rooms and more rooms. Most of the rooms are for guests, although a guest has never slept there. There is an extra dining room. The furniture is carved gold leaf, lotus shaped. Gaudy, to say the least. The master bedroom's ceiling is covered with mirrors. The bathroom handles are gold. The bathroom is the size of an average Israeli living room. The main surprise is kept to the end: all this is only the satellite to the main residence that is yet to be built. As you can see, Mr Hariri does nothing on a small scale.

He is now building a university and a university hospital for his town, Sidon. His private equipment is removing trash from the city streets, since the city equipment was damaged in the war. For the homeless he has sent recently a large shipment of medications, tents and mattresses. Yusuf complains that the IDF does not let him distribute the shipment to the needy. Brig General Maimon confirms: "Why does he give out presents? He is looking to gain influence. Now he gives a mattress of medicine, and tomorrow he will ask someone to throw a grenade on someone else. We don't know where his money comes from. Maybe it's terrorist money? We have even rejected a Red Cross ship. We do not need outside help. We have just distributed 3,000 blankets that were sent here by the Joint Staff. Each blanket has a label that explains that this is a gift from American Jewry. We have also distributed food and medications. Tents? Why should they live in tents? There is not one refugee at this point in Sidon who sleeps in the street."

Fly in the Ointment

It is true that several thousands of refugees have found temporary shelter in churches and schools that are closed down because of the summer vacation. Some families have even occupied homes under construction and stores that did not open. What will happen when the merchants claim back their stores? Undoubtedly the IDF will send them to the local police, since this is an internal Lebanese matter. A policeman has said: We will write down the complaint and refer it to the IDF.

What will happen to the refugees when school starts? Will they have to vacate the school buildings? Brig General Maimon has written a proposal for

the rehabilitation of the refugees of southern Lebanon. "Sooner or later we are going to leave. It is important that we think now about what we will leave behind. Human life is not too highly valued here. If we can prove by our actions that it is different with us, we may become friends. We have now a rare opportunity to show the beautiful things of our society. We have taken the first steps. We have improved the water system and the electricity, working closely with the Lebanese authorities. We have put at their disposal a military helicopter for land survey. But there is a fly in the ointment. They shouldn't regard us as the rich uncle who is willing to do all the work, solve all the problems. This is not at all easy. A week ago I invited the commander of the local Lebanese regiment for a talk. He came here with a large entourage made up of his officers. I asked him to use his officers to rehabilitate the damaged neighborhoods. I told him about a similar project the IDF undertook in the Hatiqvah section of Tel Aviv. He looked at me in amazement. This is a different world here, different concepts."

Maimon keeps emphasizing he is not the military governor and his unit is not a military government. "We do not intend," he says, "to rule in Lebanon in place of the Lebanese. We even returned the guns to the local police at their request. Their personal weapons are needed not so much as a means of self-defense but as a symbol of authority." Be it as it may, the local officials refer to Maimon as the Hakim, i.e., the highest authority. This may be prompted by the fact that he is using the headquarters of the former Lebanese governor and his desk still exhibits a sign in big letters, "Ra'is" (chief).

Dozens of people are waiting to see him. Each has a different problem. One man wants to travel to Nabatiyeh to bury his relative. The body is in the car and the odor is not pleasant. He wants a stamped permit, although one is free to move about. He is afraid to travel without a permit with a Jewish stamp. There are too many dangers on the road.... A woman had asked the Lebanese police about her husband who was arrested and did not come back. The police told her the man had been taken to Israel for an investigation, and she had to speak to the IDF. One of the officers at Maimon's headquarters explains patiently that if her husband is "clean" he has nothing to worry about. In the beginning of the week 500 detainees returned to Lebanon, all in good health. Anyone who did not collaborate with the terrorists will not be harmed. Your husband will undoubtedly be back soon." She appears encouraged and leaves, perhaps to return tomorrow. The mayor, Mr Ahmed Qalash, maintains that many residents of Sidon do not leave their homes and do not go downtown to open their stores because they are afraid they will be taken in for an investigation. "The Israelis take people they consider suspects indiscriminately. They have even stopped city sanitation workers during their work."

By the way: Menial labor in Sidon used to be done by aliens, mostly Jordanian, Egyptian or people from the Far East. Most of them run away with the fighting started, and now the Lebanese and the refugees are forced to "dirty their hands."

Guaranteed Help

A local policeman named Samir takes us to Ahmed Qalash's private home. One has to know his way around here, since the city is spread over a large area, without any visible urban planning. We talk on the way. "How was it in the past? It was chaos. When someone came to complain about the Palestinians the complaint was written down but no one lifted a finger to find the culprit. I have never seen a policeman dare to enter a refugee camp to arrest a suspect."

The mayor lives in a new apartment building in an affluent section of Sidon. The door is open, but there is an armed guard. The mayor has many friends, but there are also enemies. Most disputes around here are resolved with a gun or a knife.

A large room, dark, conservative furniture. The mayor is about 50, short, heavy set and limping. He does not appear too friendly. He talks to us surrounded with advisers. They are members of the city council. Perhaps he needs witnesses, so that no one may accuse him of treason. He tells us he was not elected to his office but rather appointed by President Sarkis. He is a private contractor and his livelihood is guaranteed. He has no financial worries. He does not receive a salary for serving as mayor.

Do you only do it for prestige?

I do it for troubles, Qalash says and starts listing them. The main trouble is housing for the refugees and for the Lebanese whose homes were damaged during the fighting. Maimon estimates the Palestinian refugees between 50,000 and 60,000, and the number of Lebanese families left roofless around 200. Qalash speaks in terms of 60,000 refugees and 20,000 Sidon residents. No one, however, has taken a survey and the numbers are guesses. The mayor is also troubled by the detentions and investigations.

We were told that before the IDF came the terrorists ruled in Sidon and the mayor had no real authority.

Ahmed Qalash: They only ruled inside their camps. Now they are scattered throughout the city, and they are my responsibility. True, they are not Lebanese citizens, but they have lived among us for 30 years. They are here, and I cannot ignore their existence. The city cannot deal with this problem. The Israeli rule must find a solution.

The friends and advisers nod in agreement. Hawaja Qalash speaks the truth and nothing but the truth.

And yet in Sidon, and apparently in all of Lebanon, each person has his own truth. The interests of family groups and pressure groups conflict constantly, and the unit providing help to the civilian population has to maneuver with great care in order not to hurt anyone and not to be hurt.

On Wednesday this week the city representatives asked for the help of the IDF in demolishing a house that was about to collapse. "This house is dangerous," they said. "We will be glad if your engineering corps can do the job. But if it is not possible we will do it ourselves. All we need is a little dynamite." Someone was ready to help. When Maimon found out about it he objected. "No way. The first thing you know the rumor will spread in town that the Jews are blowing up houses. Besides, someone in city hall may be trying to destroy the house of an old enemy. He will have us do it and then he will say it was done by order of the IDF."

Providing help is a delicate matter. Maimon does not have too many kind words about the unorganized help, provided in Sidon by various organizations and volunteers. "Anyone who is not familiar with Arab mentality and way of life should stay away. The Na'amat organization in Israel has offered to host in Israeli homes women and their babies for one month. I was not surprised when not one local woman accepted the offer. What Lebanese husband will allow his wife to go away for a month without him? An Arab man who would do such a thing will be ostracized. There is also a more practical consideration. The invitation went out to homeless women with a baby. Who would take care of her other children when she is away? God? And there is another example: The city of Haifa has sent here truckloads of milk. The local residents tasted the milk and spat it out. Why? Because they are not used to drinking pasteurized milk. They drink milk 'straight from the cow.' Another example: Thousands of clothing articles were collected for distribution among the refugees. But the refugees do not need clothes. They considered the act of charity as an affront. The good intentions have missed the mark, and even caused damage."

Are you in principle against volunteer help?

David Maimon: "I am against chaos. Constructive help, okay. Let an organization come here and undertake a specific project--repair a school building, paint a hospital wing, rebuild a public building. This is needed and clearly defined help. We will go home and leave behind our mark, and then many of them will remember that in time of trouble the Israeli neighbor stood by the side of the Lebanese."

Brig General Maimon is an odd mixture of military gruffness and a humane attitude. He is a former governor of the Gaza Strip, where he introduced order and security with a strong hand and without sentimentalism. Now the old soldier is wearing not only a uniform but also kid gloves. He considers it a singular achievement to have every public service run properly, every store and business opened. "In the beginning of the week we saw to it that the banks opened," he says with satisfaction.

The offices of the Lebanon Bank, the national financial institution (similar to the Bank of Israel) are housed in a new high rise building, down the street from the Israeli headquarters. On both sides there are damaged buildings, bullet ridden walls, soot covered windows. But the bullets and shells have shown respect for the stronghold of Lebanese banking. Except for one shell

on the upper floor and a few broken windows, there is no real damage. The local director general, Mr Ali Sharif, speaks of it with forgiving humor: "It's a good thing I don't have windows in my office. It's pretty hot, and the air-conditioning doesn't work properly. So at least I have a room with four air vents."

Sharif says people are coming back and putting their money in the bank, which shows a certain measure of normalization. He estimates the total volume of business at this time to be 25 percent of the ante-bellum volume, and he anticipates a doubling of the volume in the foreseeable future. He says that the shortage of certain products has doubled the prices. On the other hand the price of fruits and vegetables has gone down significantly. In the past the produce was sold in Beirut. Now, because contact with Beirut is cut off, the produce is sold locally in the busy market.

Sharif is friendly. Today we are guests. Tomorrow, who knows, we may be customers. Wasn't Lebanon before the civil war the financial center of the entire Middle East? "Our banking system is based on the Swiss system," the director general says. "When your army entered Sidon several people in uniform came to see me and wanted to see the bank records. I assume they wanted to know where funds came from, who paid whom, how much and why. But in keeping with my principles of banking I refused to show the accounts. The officers did not seem too happy, but they seemed to understand my situation. I hope they accepted my refusal in good spirit."

This was not his only unpleasant experience. His honor was insulted when the IDF lined up local residents and ordered the Muslims to stand to the left and the Christians to the right. "The Christians were soon sent home, and the Muslims had to stay. I did not like this discrimination. You should know that not every Christian is a friend of Israel and not every Muslim an enemy. There are certain things you ought to learn here. But the most important thing you must learn is that unless you help us establish a strong stable Lebanese government, you have fought in vain."

Lip service? Sharif insists he is sincere. "If I thought differently, or if I thought you were against the Muslims, I would be the first to fight you."

It is hard to picture the elegant fat little banker holding a Kalachnikov. He understands my skeptical look and smiles: I would fight you with my pen. The pen of a banker can sometimes be a most dangerous weapon.

We drink coffee, shake hands, and go down in the elevator. It is dangerous to take the elevator because of the frequent power failures. One can get stuck between floors. But this time the elevator is working properly, and we find ourselves in the center of town. The main street is bustling. Soldiers are shopping for digital watches and transistor radios. Israeli currency is accepted. At night they will give the shekels to Bashir Zaydan, the chief money exchanger, and he will give them Lebanese liras. What will Zaydan do with the Israeli money? He will sell it, for a certain profit, of course, to merchants who go to Kiriath Shmoneh and to the Good Fence to do business. This too is part of the normalization.

In the evening the owner of the flower shop, Saini, recognizes us. He has substituted his safari suit with a blue suit. "I sold flowers today for an engagement party," he smiles professionally. He takes a white carnation and pins it to my lapel. I thank him and I recall that in the beginning the Syrians and the terrorists were also welcomed with flowers and rice. The animosity came later.

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PALESTINIANS, ARAB STATES CRITICIZED FOR LEBANESE SITUATION

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 26, 9 Aug 82 pp 1-2

[Article by Marwan Iskandar]

[Text]

International concern is concentrated on the plight of the Palestinians in West Beirut and Israel's dilemma as to whether to launch a massive attack or not. Various commentators evaluate the situation in different ways: some believe that time is playing in favour of the Palestinians; others point out that the continuing process of Israeli penetration will, within a few weeks, remove any reason for a costly battle.

No-one seems to remember that the real casualty is Lebanon and its people. There are more Lebanese, both Christian and Muslim, in West Beirut than there are Palestinians. The Lebanese are not as well-armed as the Palestinians and they do not consider it to be their war. But the major impact is first and foremost on the Lebanese, whether it takes the tragic form of loss of human life or that of devastation of property and resources vital for survival in the aftermath of this terrible war.

No less than 90 per cent of the Lebanese in West Beirut are being held as hostages. Perhaps many of them are staying not because of threats at gun-point, but because their options are limited by the knowledge that their homes and belongings would be looted if they left. And most middle class Lebanese cannot afford to rebuild their homes from scratch when the fighting stops. Talk about a coalition between leftist Lebanese forces and the Palestinians is grossly inaccurate. The only Lebanese faction in the leftist National Movement that has not called for a Palestinian withdrawal from West Beirut is the Communists. And membership of this group is small, in spite of its destructive activities, which were particularly instrumental in spreading strife in 1976. Moreover, the Communists' coalition with the Palestinians in West Beirut is not motivated by Lebanese considerations or by concern for their country.

In the summer of 1982, the Palestinians kidnapped a mini-city called West Beirut. Their tactics and practices were very similar to those employed in the early 1970s for hijacking aeroplanes with innocent passengers taken as hostages. The only difference is that the Lebanese have paid a tremendous price already and are therefore, under these new conditions, enduring suffering which goes beyond that experienced by any other people in the past two decades.

Quite a number of observers heatedly point out that the Palestinians were driven back into West Beirut and that tragically this part of Lebanon has become the theatre for their last stand. This *ex post facto* reasoning overlooks the truth of the matter, which is that the Palestinians had their best proving ground in Dammour. This little town on the coast 20 kilometres south of Beirut had been under complete Palestinian control since 1976 when Syrian-Palestinian forces massacred most of its Christian inhabitants, while those who survived ran away to safer locations.

Dammour was the most suitable place for a Palestinian-Israeli showdown because it had been used as a major arms depot and training base for the previous six years. Moreover, a withdrawal from Dammour into the mountains and eventually into Syria would have been easier than a retreat from Beirut.

There was no big battle at Dammour, however. Instead, thousands of tons of ammunition, anti-aircraft guns and missiles, tanks and machine-guns were left in mint condition for Israel to sell later to India and Iran. The brutal truth is that Palestinian resistance was overwhelmed so fast that a last stand could only be staged behind 400,000 civilian hostages in West Beirut.

Time is playing into the hands of Israel, no matter what the Western or Arab press wish to portray. In fact given Israel's strangle-hold on West Beirut and the surrounding area, every passing day leaves the Palestinian fighters with less ammunition and creates more friction with the hostage population. In another month, this last remaining part of the once magnificent city of Beirut will succumb to Israeli pressure and continuous encroachment. The question for the Lebanese is what will they be left with?

Since 1975, more than 100,000 Lebanese have been killed or maimed by the ongoing war. Damage to property has written off more than 50 per cent of industrial capacity, 20 per cent of investment in agriculture, 30 per cent of public infrastructure and 25 per cent of dwellings.

In terms of human lives and property and installations, Lebanon has lost at least five times as much, relatively speaking, as the whole Arab world in all its wars with Israel. And most significant of all, Lebanon lost the chance to become the leading financial and technological centre of the Middle East during the boom years between 1973 and 1981, which resulted from oil price increases.

Against this tragic background, Lebanon has not received the benefit of Arab economic and/or political aid to any significant degree. What little it has had is well below requirements and is more a reflection of Arab impotence and hypocrisy. Only the moderate Arab states have demonstrated sympathy for the plight of Lebanon and its people, whereas the Steadfastness Front countries have forgotten not only Lebanon, but also the last member of their Front — the Palestinians.

Marwan Iskandar

CSO: 4400/426

PLO OCCUPATION VIEWED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST MAGAZINE in English 23 Jul 82 pp 4-6

[Article by Benny Morris and David Bernstein]

[Text]

LIFE IN southern Lebanon during the past six or seven years was clearly unpleasant — so unpleasant that a large part of its population fled north to escape the PLO, which had taken over much of the area and turned it into its main staging ground for operations against targets in Israel and abroad.

We got our first inkling of the recent south Lebanese past in Hasbaya, a village of 10,000 mostly Druse inhabitants in the rock-and-olive covered Hermon foothills about 15 km. north-east of Metulla.

Sheikh Salah-e-Din Kais, red-faced, thoughtful, insisted that the townspeople had never allowed the PLO to take up positions or open offices there. "No one in Hasbaya supported or joined the *muharibin*," he said.

In 1974, he told us, some PLO officials came into town seeking to open an "office," but "all that came of this was a burnt classroom in one of the schools."

"A neighbour also burnt down a house the PLO had rented on the outskirts of town," added one of the several councillors and other local notables who joined us in the deputy mayor's simple, grey office off the main street.

"We aren't afraid of anyone," said Kais, noting that the PLO had never attempted to take on the town's apparently well-armed local militia.

The PLO did, however, move into a number of smaller villages in the Hasbaya area, such as Kala'at al-Kifair — "where the villagers were unable to offer determined resistance," according to police chief Yussuf Abu Tai.

Apart from brief shopping forays, the PLO "never came closer than two-kilometres from Hasbaya," we were told.

Nonetheless, the town had been intermittently shelled by the IDF since 1971, said our interlocutor. He claimed that 49 people were killed in the shelling over the past decade — including nine in a single incident in 1979, when a shell fell in the centre of town.

Fear of the IDF was, the notables imply, far greater among Hasbayans than their fear of the PLO. They stand by their oft-repeated claim that the PLO had never established a base in the town, and dispute Israeli reports to the contrary. But they certainly wanted the PLO out of the area, and in 1979 sent a delegation to Beirut asking the Lebanese government to make the *muharibin* move further away from the town.

In general, the PLO appears to have behaved more or less correctly with the people of Hasbaya. Goods were paid for, and there was no attempt at "taxation" or extortion.

There was, however, one nasty incident, when a single PLO fighter

abducted two teenage girls of the Narj Mekama family and raped them in a nearby field. They first led us to believe that the girls were killed by the rapist. Only later did it emerge that, when the girls returned to the town they were killed by their own brothers, who were determined to protect the family's honour. The next day, the locals took up positions around Hasbaya and closed the town off to the PLO for two weeks.

In 1975, during the Lebanese civil war, there was one other violent incident in Hasbaya when the PLO attacked the local Lebanese Army garrison. Two Lebanese soldiers were killed, and the army evacuated the town.

WE WENT TO Lebanon in order to get an impression of what life was

like under the PLO — and, inevitably, given the numerous tales of atrocities, to verify what we could about a number of incidents.

Our purpose was not to arrive at definitive conclusions — that would take many researchers many months — but simply to record our impressions. To do more would clearly have been beyond our brief, given the almost total lack of reliable records and the generally chaotic situation still prevailing in the area after more than seven years of anarchy.

Political uncertainties about the future continue to hamper the investigator's task. Those we spoke to would frequently give the impression of opting for prudence, holding back any information they might have had, while others, perhaps eager to accommodate the new masters of the area, launched into flights of Oriental fantasy, with unverifiable tales of wholesale murder.

There were also problems of communication. On the simplest level, there was the problem of language — understanding was frequently incomplete, nuances were missed. And, perhaps even more important, events which occurred only a few years ago took place in an atmosphere so different from that which prevails today in the area, or which existed in Israel at the time, that understanding was frequently clouded.

IF HASBAYA suffered relatively little during the PLO years, Nabatiye the district capital of the area north of the Litani, was effectively taken over by the organization.

Its population of 60,000 dropped to 20,000 after the PLO moved in in 1968 and Israeli shells began regularly to pound the town. The increased PLO presence from 1976, when some 1,500 *muharibin* moved into the town and the surrounding countryside, led to further IDF strikes and civilian flight, leaving fewer than 10,000 of the original inhabitants in place.

"My house was hit [by IDF shells] seven times," the town's deputy mayor, Mustafa Mu'in Jabber tells us. "Most of my family fled."

A town councillor since 1966, Jabber says there was "no Beirut government" in Nabatiye during the PLO years — "only local government, with Beirut only paying the wages."

But how much real power did local government wield?

"So-so," says Jabber, smiling with embarrassment. Real power resided with the PLO, he says, curling his forefinger around an imaginary trigger. "We took care of water supplies, electricity and food stocks."

The police, he adds, did continue to function.

How?

"Ask the police," he tells us. Did city hall pay "taxes" to the PLO?

"No, not city hall. I don't know if the townspeople did."

Between 1976 and 1982, Jabber's family lived in Beirut, with Jabber himself making periodic trips to Nabatiye to take care of municipal business.

With the depopulation of the town, all high schools were closed but some elementary schools continued to operate.

Was there fear?

"Yes, like in all countries under occupation," says Jabber of the PLO years. "But I wasn't afraid."

He says he knows "nothing" about allegations of PLO atrocities of misbehaviour in the town. "Ask the police, they know," he says.

WE LEAVE Jabber's office feeling that the truth has not been exceptionally well served and make our way to the office of First Lieutenant Ali Awali, Nabatiye district's police chief.

"The PLO ruled completely. If anyone talked against the Palestinians, they put him in their prison" begins Awali.

What, then, was the function of the police during those years?

"I guarded this office," he says, a resigned — not bitter — smile on his face.

We tell him of the numerous reports about massacres, murders and rapes by the PLO in Nabatiye. Awali shrugs. We press him. Eventually, he says that there were "about 10 cases of disappearance"

— presumed murdered by the PLO — during the six years. We ask for details. Awali is unwilling or unable to supply any names of men who were allegedly murdered or disappeared.

What about rapes?

Awali thinks about it and says: "No, I cannot confirm any cases. There were one or two instances of PLO men who eventually married local girls" despite opposition from the parents. But fear of the PLO sufficed to make them accept the marriages."

We ask again about rape cases.

"No," he shoots back. "I don't know of any."

Did the PLO farm "taxes" or resort to extortion.

"No they had lots of money, they didn't need any from the townspeople."

Awali says the PLO did take food and other goods from shops without paying, and they took over houses for their own purposes. These usually belonged to people who had fled.

Why did the locals flee?

"Mostly because of fear of the shelling. My car was destroyed by a shell," he says.

He says that during the PLO years, some 200 Nabatiye residents died as a result of IDF shelling. He, as others we spoke to failed to make the connection between IDF retaliation of Nabatiye and PLO attacks on Israel from the area.

The PLO did occasionally help the police track down thieves — "if

they were not Palestinians, or if there were witnesses who were able to clearly identify the thief."

Did he himself feel humiliated by the fact that PLO rule left him virtually impotent?

Awali smiles, turns the question over in his mind, and doesn't answer.

WE LEAVE the police station and wander down Nabatiye's main street. A gaunt, toothless old man in a cafe tells us the PLO killed "many, many people." They killed one man in 10, and the other nine were afraid and intimidated. If a shopkeeper asked them for payment, they would shoot near his legs. PLO men came around selling their own newspapers. If someone refused to buy a copy, they burnt down his house. They often purchased on credit and refused to pay their bills at the end of the month. Some 70-80 persons "disappeared," he says. If they didn't like the way someone looked, they killed him.

But the old man, and the other two in the cafe, do not name anyone — relative, friend or neighbour — who had been killed.

We go from one shopkeeper to another until one young man — who had fled from Nabatiye and opened a petrol station in Beirut — takes us to Hassan Saburi, a local resident who was abducted and beaten by the PLO.

He is 58 and looks 65; a wealthy man, he lives in J'ba, an outlying village.

He says he is "apolitical, not a party man. But the *muharibin* persecuted everyone, everyone who spoke out against them."

In May 1978, Saburi and 14 other prominent residents went to Beirut to petition President Elias Sarkis to move the Lebanese Army into Nabatiye and expel the PLO.

When he returned to J'ba, terrorists in the middle of the night surrounded his house and took him off to a "lonely wadi." They roughed him up in their jeep and then beat him for eight hours in the wadi. "They said they would kill me and made preparations to do this. They asked for a ransom. I said I had no money on me."

Eventually, they released him. "I don't know why they didn't kill me," he says. Saburi went home, packed his bags, and fled to Sierra Leone for a year. The PLO did not touch his family.

Saburi says his cousin — Hassan Sharif Bader e-Din, also one of the 15 who went to Sarkis — was abducted for three days and tortured by the PLO.

Saburi relates that at one point during PLO rule, Nabatiye mayor Ahmed Sabagh was beaten by the Palestinians; he subsequently fled, returning only after the IDF arrived.

Saburi speaks of the *muharibin* with hatred and contempt. But he says he didn't know anyone in Nabatiye or its environs who was murdered by the PLO during their years of rule.

At the Saburi petrol station, where we have just interviewed the former abductee, we meet a Francophile Moslem doctor — he prefers not to give his name — who has just returned to his home in Nabatiye after years in exile in Beirut. He fled in 1976 after masked gunmen — he wouldn't say definitely if they were PLO — burst into his home and took jewelry and money worth \$5,000.

"That convinced me. We packed, and left," he says.

The doctor speaks of possibly emigrating from Lebanon; he's not sure tranquility will ever return to the country.

"GO TO ANSAR," we are told by an IDF colonel who hears we are investigating PLO rule and atrocities in southern Lebanon.

"Why?"
"Just go there," he says.

We drive to Ansar, a Shi'a town of 20,000, and stop on the main street, outside Mahmoud Mansour's fruit and vegetable shop.

"How did the PLO behave during the years of rule?" we ask.

"There were no killings, no rapes," he tells us. "They did not 'dishonour' girls, but they spoke rudely to them when they came to town."

We move on to his competitor, Ahmed Yassir Assi, who also runs a fruit and vegetable shop.

"Yes," he says, "the PLO raped girls and killed many people."

"When, where, how, why?" we ask. A few young men join us. Slowly, a coherent story emerges.

It was in 1980 or 1981. The town's Shi'a militia, which had always resisted a PLO presence in the town, took up arms and sealed it off to the Palestinians. The militia were led by the village *mukhtar*.

The PLO laid siege to the town and took it in a night assault. During or after the firefight with the militia, the PLO killed "some" Al-Amal militiamen.

"Who was killed? How many?"
Assi shakes his head. He doesn't know, or can't remember.

An electrician called Assaf comes to our aid: "They killed Yussuf el-Haf... Ihsan Mansour... and Hassan Yunis."

The assembled young men now hold a discussion. In the end, Assaf gives us two more names — Mahmoud Sheikh Ali and Mohamed Duhha.

"Five were killed altogether," he says.

Who were they?
"They opposed the PLO, fought against them, with arms," says Assaf.

Then the PLO raped the *mukhtar's* daughter.

Assaf does not volunteer any more information, or even mention the widely circulated story that, after the rape, the PLO dismembered the girl. But Assaf clearly implies that the rape was a brutal act of political revenge against the anti-PLO *mukhtar*.

WE CATCH the Roman Catholic archbishop of Tyre, Georges Haddad, at an awkward moment. He is sitting in his reception hall with about two dozen of the town's Moslem and Christian notables, discussing Tyre's — and Lebanon's — future. An aide outside tells us that "Haddad is talking with the Chamounists," the supporters of former Lebanese president Camille Chamoun.

We are ushered into the hall and seated in front of the archbishop and the chairman of the meeting, Khalil el-Khalil, Beirut's ambassador to West Germany. Our dis-

cussion takes place before the entire assembly, a fact which clearly inhibits some of those present from speaking out.

We ask what life was like under the PLO.

Haddad prefers to expatiate on the problem of the thousands detained by the IDF in southern Lebanon. He urges that they be released as a "gesture of reconciliation."

We return to PLO anarchy or rule in Tyre. He speaks of IDF destruction of buildings in his city.

Eventually, exasperated, Haddad admits: "Yes, there were murders and crimes."

He adds — is it by way of extenuation or explanation? — that there were different organizations in the PLO, "some of them more extremist. And there were crimes," he says. The implication is that these were committed by the "extremist" groups.

Pressed further about atrocities, Haddad tells us that in 1976, at the height of the Lebanese Civil War, seven Christians, brought from Damour, were crucified in Tyre.

"It was done by the Sa'ika," says one of the notables present, blaming the Syrian-affiliated PLO organization. The crucifixion followed the Phalangist conquest and destruction of the Tel a-Zaatar refugee camp in Beirut, where many Palestinians were reportedly killed by the Christian forces.

THE CIVIL WAR, says Haddad, tended to divide Christians and Moslems. "But not all the Palestinian organizations were involved in the killings."

He concedes that the PLO was inclined to persecute and strike out against persons who disagreed with or resisted them, or were identified as agents of Major Sa'ad Haddad or Israel.

The archbishop will not speak at all about alleged atrocities since the civil war.

"If you want anyone to say anything, don't ask him in a room full of people," one notable tells us.

So we take Kalil Hilawi aside. A Moslem in his thirties, he is training to become an architect and is willing to talk about the PLO years.

In the archbishop's courtyard, we ask:

"Did the PLO kill dozens, hundreds, thousands of townspeople?"

"They killed, oh, maybe more than 100 persons," he says. "There was fear. I was afraid to say anything against them."

Hilawi says they hunted down their opponents in the town. He tells us that, in 1981, a group of Tyre notables went to Beirut to complain about the PLO's presence and behaviour, and the IDF strikes which this presence elicited. Walid Arabi, a Moslem who had participated in the Beirut delegation, was "taken away in the middle of the night by a group of armed men. He disappeared."

Most of the PLO killings were of a political nature and of armed opponents, says Hilawi.

But there was also some random killing of civilians by trigger-happy gunmen.

Life for the apolitical, uninvolved majority in the town was often unpleasant, sometimes brutal and frightening, because of the PLO gunmen.

"They resorted to their weapons very quickly. There was no police, no law. I was on the beach one day. I looked at a girl. A PLO man — it was not his girl, he was drunk — saw me looking at her; he came up to me and drew his pistol. I looked down the barrel. It was scary. He fired some shots near my legs. One of them tore my pants. He didn't like the way I had looked at the girl. I didn't go to that beach again."

Hilawi now tells us of another incident, when he went with some of his family to another beach and "about 30 or 40 PLO men came strolling by, crowding around us. They made comments about my sisters, touched them. It was very unpleasant. But they eventually moved off."

In general, he says, there was some harassment of girls and of non-Palestinian males. "In the end people stopped going to places where Palestinians were to be found," he said.

Rapes?

"No, there were no rapes. I know of no cases, and heard of no cases. Maybe there was one or two or three, but I never heard of them," says Hilawi.

"But it was bad to live here," adds Hilawi. "It was domination, dictatorship, fascism — it was bad."

IN THE SOUTHERN foothills of the Shouf mountains, between Nabatiye and Jezzine, sits Aishiye, a Maronite village which was the scene of one of the most notorious massacres of the civil war.

Only two or three of the houses in the village centre are inhabited. Others appear derelict — some burned out, others structurally damaged, their gardens overgrown with weeds.

On September 19, 1976, a month after the Christian victory over the PLO at Tel a-Zaatar, a joint PLO-Lebanese Arab Army attack took Aishiye after a protracted bombardment.

"They came with 5,000 soldiers and tanks and artillery," says George Aoun, a 22-year-old former University of Beirut law student who is a soldier in Sa'ad Haddad's army.

"They fired at the village with 155mm. cannon from the Beaufort and Nabatiye," he says.

Aoun, a native of the village, was 15 at the time. He recalls that since

1975 Aishiye was defended by a Phalangist militia armed with IDF weapons — "M16s and FNs" — and IDF uniforms. "We were in radio contact with the Israelis through Haddad," he says, pointing to a building up the hill where the unit's transmitter was located.

According to Aoun, and other villagers who have only just returned from a long exile in Beirut, the PLO-leftist Lebanese forces, after occupying the village, slaughtered some villagers at random or for petty gain and systematically killed those they suspected of working with the Phalange or Israel.

Details about the killings are not as clear as we would have liked. But this is the picture:

Before the PLO entered the village, many of its defenders and their families — including Aoun — fled south, "through the forests," to Haddad-held Klea.

The PLO and Lebanese forces caught some of the villagers — including women and children — in the fields and "killed them for jewelry. Then they killed other villagers who had witnessed these killings."

The main part of the PLO-leftist force, "headed by Major Amar el-Abdullah and Major Tufayde then surrounded the village church where many of the villagers had taken refuge.

"The PLO called out by name a number of villagers and these were taken out and shot. Some of them were taken first to their homes where guns were uncovered and then they were shot," says Aoun.

According to this man the PLO knew which of the villagers were Phalangist activists or Israeli "agents" because before the civil war they used to drive through the village on the way to Jezzine and see many of the menfolk in IDF uniforms. The PLO remembered them.

Altogether, the PLO and leftists killed 54 or 56 villagers.

About 30 of the villagers, most if not all of them old men and women, stayed where they were and lived through the PLO period.

We meet Joseph a-Sha'ar and Khalil Am, who are both 74. After the massacre they were arrested by the PLO, blindfolded and taken to the Palestinian refugee camp in Rashidiye near Tyre and then to Fakahani quarter in Beirut. With five other villagers they were held for 40 days before being returned to Aishiye as part of a prisoners' exchange between the PLO and the Phalange.

But once they got back to the village, a-Sha'ar tells us they were not molested by the PLO. "They gave us bread and other food," says the old man.

Aoun and his family subsequently moved from Klea to Beirut where he joined one of the Christian militias.

Aoun's family returned to Aishiye earlier this month; other families from the village are now trickling back. Most of the houses were badly damaged during the years of dereliction and PLO rule and the fields were "eaten up by the goats," says Aoun.

Before leaving, we ask Aoun why the PLO and the leftists killed the villagers. "Because we are Christians and because we like Israel."

The IDF spokesman in Sidon, Sgan-Aluf Tzahi takes us to look at Sidon's now famous PLO jail. Outside on the walls of the Casbah alleys are posters commemorating two PLO martyrs. There is a red map of Palestine--from the Mediterranean to the Jordan--next to the faces.

Young girls wander by, smiling at the new batch of tourists.

The jail itself is a converted residential building in the poor quarter.

Iron bars block the windows of a number of upstairs rooms; downstairs are two rooms with entrances like ovens and can only be entered by crawling--solitary confinement cells.

Upstairs the prison office is in a shambles--atop a pile of dirty blankets is a painted, framed portrait of Arafat; files and papers litter the floor, perhaps an uncollected boon for intelligence officers.

"That's the bed," says Tzahi, pointing to a primitive, broken iron frame on which PLO jailers mass-raped young girls abducted from the streets of Sidon.

How does he know? The IDF, when it arrived in Sidon found in the jail a solitary prisoner, an Arab from Dir Hanna in the Galilee, who had been abducted by the PLO. He had worked for Israel's Border-Police and spent 10 years in PLO custody, explains Tzahi.

"He told us about the girls. He said he heard the screams from the girls being raped and the orgies at night."

The PLO reportedly locked up local inhabitants who spoke or acted against them. Unfortunately, Tzahi is unable to bring us or direct us to any local who had in fact spent time in jail and might have been able to describe what went on in there. Nor is the man from Dir Hanna available to be interviewed.

Sidon is Lebanon's second largest city with a population of over 180,000, mostly Sunni Moslem. PLO power in the area was based in the city's Ain Hilwe refugee camp, the Casbah and some 30-40 buildings in various parts of the city.

We are told by Tzahi that the PLO presence paralysed the municipality and the local police force and civil authorities were virtually impotent against armed PLO fighters who set up road blocks and roamed the streets doing pretty much as they pleased. Sidon's commercial life continued to thrive, however, as did its banking system, with the well-heeled PLO fighters playing an important role in the economy.

We have heard rumours of a widespread PLO protection racket--but our Israeli army spokesman points out that the PLO had all the money it needed and whatever isolated cases of extortion there may have been were probably intended as a show of strength.

All in all, he said, the local inhabitants displayed that remarkable Lebanese resiliency--the ability to make the best of a bad situation. "Liberty or death" is not a characteristic Lebanese slogan, he points out.

From the dingy Casbah and its jail we proceed to the Hamoud Hospital, a private, 150-bed palatial structure run by Dr Ghassan Hamoud, a scion of one of the city's wealth families.

A Sunni Moslem, Hamoud was born in Sidon in 1937. He studied in Bonn where he specialized as a surgeon.

He has a German wife. And he says his hospital, founded in 1966 is the best in the country, outside Beirut.

The PLO sent some of their hard cases, usually members of their families, for treatment.

No, he had no qualms about treating PLO men--on humanitarian and ethical grounds.

"But sometimes we treated them--and then they left without paying," he adds.

The Israelis, he notes, have been sending him wounded PLO men for treatment.

He recalls that during the PLO years there were cases of hooliganism when Palestinians pulled guns on his staff--part of the general pattern in the town. Guns, and the power these gave, often went to the heads of the PLO men. In altercations with townspeople--at roadblocks, for example--it was not uncommon for people to get shot.

Hamoud says that many of the 300-400 victims in Sidon during the years of PLO rule were hurt by such thuggery. Some of these cases were brought to his hospital for treatment.

But there were also killings connected with political opposition to the PLO, he is careful to point out.

Hamoud is adamant in denying knowledge of cases of sexual assault by PLO men on Lebanese or Palestinian women. Petty harrassment occurred, he said--but not rape, at least as far as he knew.

Hamoud was incensed by a recent article in which he was quoted as suggesting that he was privy to a spate of PLO rape incidents and that families brought their daughters to his hospital to be examined and treated after they were assaulted.

He admits, however, that the PLO's behaviour clearly degenerated between 1976 and 1982. At first, at "the start of their revolution and rule here, they behaved much better. But then they began to interfere in all out civil work. They took control of the streets, rented houses and turned them into military positions and so on."

They were initially "liked" by the merchants because they came with "real money."

But after 1980 they made lots of enemies among the Lebanese. Not a day passed without a shooting or some other trouble, recalls Hamoud.

Last May, many Sidonese residents went on a three-day strike to protest against Palestinian excesses. Eventually the PLO set alight a whole street of shops.

"We were afraid--of the PLO, and of IDF bombing. We couldn't turn to anyone--they [the PLO] were too strong," says Hamoud.

He stresses that despite the difficulties, no Sidonese left town--"not a single family. We are proud of our city. If we leave, we will become like the Palestinians--refugees."

At first, he concludes, the Palestinians had a "real revolution" and really planned or dreamed of returning to Palestine. But later, after a time here, they decided to take over here in Sidon in Lebanon and they forgot Palestine."

Our overwhelming impression of life in southern Lebanon during the years of PLO rule then, is that it was nasty and brutal with fear never far below the surface--fear of the PLO's arbitrary law of the gun and, in several cases, the even greater fear of Israeli air strikes and artillery barrages.

But it must be noted that apart from a few notorious massacres at the height of the 1975-76 Lebanese Civil War in Tyre, Aishiye and most of all, Damour-- we could find little or no substantive proof for many of the atrocity stories making the rounds.

There were clearly killings, many killings. Most were apparently politically motivated. Others were the result of plain thuggery, the acts of young toughs intoxicated by the power their guns gave them in a society where there was no other law.

Stories of rape and other sexual attacks were particularly difficult, in fact almost impossible to substantiate. This could have been due to concern for family honour in a largely conservative society which has created an effective taboo against even discussing the subject or--as we eventually came to suspect-- to the fact that the stories we had heard before visiting Lebanon were exaggerated.

There can be little doubt though that most people in the south are today both relieved and grateful that the PLO is no longer there to terrorize them. The flow of refugees back to their homes in the south, some after an absence of six or seven years, is the most convincing evidence of that.

CSO: 4400/426

LIBYA

TEXT OF WAGE LAW FOR LIBYAN NATIONALS

Tripoli AL-MUNTIJUN in Arabic 5 Jun 82 p 4

[Article: Law Number 15 for 1981: The Wage Law for Libyan Nationals Employed in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah"]

[Text] The General People's Congress:

To implement the resolutions of the People's Congresses convening for their third regular session in the year 1389-1390 of the death of the Prophet, which coincides with the year 1980 A.D., said resolutions having been formulated at the general convention for People's Congresses, People's Committees, associations, trade unions and professional associations (the General People's Congress) convening in a regular session that was held from 27 Safar to 1 Rabi' al-Awwal of the year 1390 of the death of the prophet, which coincides with the period from 3 to 7 January 1981 A.D.; and after examining Law Number 55 for 1976 A.D. regarding civil service and the regulations and degrees issued in that regard, the following law has been written:

Article One: The Wage Law for Libyan nationals employed in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah aims to establish the principle of equal salaries for comparable work and comparable responsibilities in the context of satisfying the basic needs of those who are subject to the aforementioned law and are entitled to an annual raise according to standards of performance and production.

Wages are earned in accordance with set averages of performance that are realized. All this is in accordance with the general principles and controls that are determined by regulations issued in accordance with the provisions of this law.

Article Two: In enforcing the provisions of this law a wage is to be construed as the money received by any employee employed at any one of the agencies mentioned in Article Three of this act. The amount of money a person earns in return for his work is determined in tables that are attached to this law or in those that will be issued in accordance with this law. To this wage would be added all raises, allowances and other monetary benefits that employees would be entitled to in accordance with this law and with the regulations and decrees that are issued accordingly.

Article Three: The provisions of this law apply to all Libyan nationals employed in the following agencies:

A. Municipal secretariats and people's committees; regulatory agencies and divisions that are affiliated with any of these secretariats and committees; and independent public agencies.

B. Public organizations, authorities and administrations and comparable institutions; regulatory agencies, such as the police, customs police and the municipal police; court personnel, public persecution personnel and personnel in other law enforcement agencies; and the armed forces.

C. Corporations and institutions that are native to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and are totally or partially owned by society.

D. Corporations, institutions and other agencies where the statement, "partners, not hired hands" applies but has not yet been put into effect, provided these firms are exempted from enforcing the rules and provisions pertaining to the tables that are attached to this law or those that are issued according to this law. This [provision] is to take effect on the date the aforementioned statement becomes applicable to these firms.

The provisions of this law do not apply to Libyan nationals employed in offices, companies and other firms that are affiliated with regional, international or similar organizations.

Libyan nationals employed in any other firms that are not mentioned in Paragraphs A to D of this article may be subject to the provisions of this law in accordance with a decree issued by the General People's Committee.

Article Four: The general framework of wages for all Libyan nationals employed in the agencies that are subject to the provisions of this law is set in accordance with the attached Schedule Number 1. To those wages would be added all raises, allowances and other financial benefits to which an employee would be entitled in accordance with this law and the regulations and decrees that are issued accordingly.

Article Five: Taking the provisions of Article Four into consideration, each one of the tables attached to the laws mentioned below is to be replaced by a comparable table. The conditions of employees of agencies that are subject to the provisions of the aforementioned laws are to be settled by transferring those employees to the new grades that are set in the tables that are attached to this law, in accordance with the settlement decisions and the wage tables that may be attached thereto in accordance with decrees issued by the General People's Committee.

Article Six: All salary and wage schedules, rules and provisions that were in effect prior to this law in those areas where the provisions of this law apply are hereby revoked.

The tables that are attached to this law, or those that will be issued accordingly, shall apply in determining the salaries of employees in those firms.

Article Seven: Taking into account the provisions of Article Four, the General People's Committee is to issue regulations and decrees to regulate wages and the tables where these wages are set for those who are employed in agencies, organizations, administrations, companies, public institutions and similar establishments that are subject to the provisions of this law, those to whom the provisions of the Civil Service Act Number 55 for 1976 A.D., or any other legislation mentioned in Article Five of this law, do not apply.

The General People's Committee shall set forth the provisions for settling the conditions of people employed in agencies mentioned in the previous section so they can be transferred to the grades that are included in the tables which are drawn up for them in the context of the attached Table Number 1, without violating the provisions of Article Ten of this law.

Article Eight: A. The General People's Committee has the authority to hire and promote workers up to the 11th grade and up to higher and comparable grades mentioned in Table Number 1 which is attached to this law. This applies to employees who are subject to the provisions of Law Number 55 for 1976 A.D. regarding civil service in secretariats, municipalities, agencies, organizations and public administrations, and the divisions and agencies that are affiliated with them.

Those employees may be hired and promoted into grades lower than the 11th grade in accordance with the laws and regulations that are in effect.

All other employees are subject to legislative provisions regulating appointments and promotions for all other employees.

B. Employees from grade 11 to grade 13 may be hired and promoted in those companies and firms where the provisions of this law apply by the specialized General People's Committee or by the Municipal People's Committee which supervises and oversees that company or firm, without violating other provisions decreed by legislation that is in effect with regard to the aforementioned agencies.

The General People's Committee is authorized to hire and promote employees in grade 13 and above in those firms, without violating the provisions of Paragraph B of Article Ten of this law.

C. In enforcing the provisions of the past two paragraphs, Paragraph A and Paragraph B, care is to be taken that the provisions of Law Number 40 for 1974 A.D. and the amendments thereto, regarding service in the armed forces, are not violated.

In all cases care is to be taken of the fact that an existing vacancy on the permanent staff of an agency must be filled by someone with the same professional specialization as that of the person who is being appointed or promoted. [It is also necessary] that the minimum set period for promotion be met in addition to the remaining other conditions that are set by law for filling the position.

Article Nine: Each one of the agencies that is subject to the provisions of this law is to prepare a projected plan for its permanent staff. This plan is to

include the positions the agency will need on both the professional and general staff in accordance with the provisions of Article 11 and 12 of the Civil Service Act, [Law] Number 55 for 1976 A.D.

The permanent staff of the agencies whose employees are not subject to the provisions of the aforementioned Civil Service Act are to be approved by the authorized secretariat to which these agencies are affiliated, in accordance with the rules and controls that are set by the Public Service Secretariat.

Article Ten: A. Grade 13 is to be the highest grade in those agencies where the provisions of the Civil Service Act, Law Number 55 for 1976 A.D. apply.

B. The provision of the previous paragraph applies to companies and firms that are subject to the provisions of this law. However, companies and firms that have a special bearing on national security or the national economy may be exempted [from compliance with this law] by a decree issued by the General People's Committee, in accordance with objective justifications. Said provisions are not to apply beyond Grade 14.

C. The highest grades in those firms where employees' affairs are regulated by special laws are to be the highest grades that are set in the pertinent salary schedules that are issued in accordance with the provisions of this law.

D. Employees with special expertise and high levels of specialization and professionals whose professions require exemption for special considerations may be exempted from the provisions of the previous paragraphs by a decree issued by the General People's Committee, provided that the exemption not exceed the highest grade mentioned in the attached Table Number 1.

Article Eleven: A. People in the following positions are to be appointed by decree issued by the General People's Congress:

--The chairman and justices of the Supreme Court.

--The president of the Accounting Office.

--The president and vice president of the Central Bank of Libya.

--The public censor and his deputy.

--Others who according to the law have to be appointed to their positions by the General People's Congress.

B. The General People's Committee issues a decree determining the salaries and all allowances and financial benefits of those mentioned in the previous paragraph, in the context of one of the financial grades mentioned in the attached Table Number 1.

Article Twelve: The financial provision for the secretary of the General People's Congress, for members of the secretariat of the General People's Congress and for the General People's Committee is determined by decree issued by the General People's Congress.

Article Thirteen: First, taking into account the provisions of the following articles of this law, all raises, allowances, benefits--regardless what they are called--which make up a fixed part of salaries that are now in effect or which will be attached to those salaries, whether they are regularly or irregularly disbursed, are hereby abolished in any one [or all] of the agencies where the provisions of this law apply.

Second, the following are exempted from the provision of the previous paragraph:

A. Monetary benefits and raises that have been set to carry out the provisions of Law Number 40 for 1974 A.D. regarding service in the armed forces.

B. The family allowance.

C. A commission allowance as limited by the provisions of Article Eighteen of this law.

Third, the provisions of regulations and decrees regulating overtime allowances, scholarships, training courses in Libya and abroad, teachers' allowances and travel and overnight allowances are to continue in effect unless these regulations are amended, abolished or replaced by decrees issued by the General People's Committee.

Article Fourteen: Employees who are subject to the provisions of this law are entitled to a housing allowance determined according to the classifications mentioned in Table Number 1 which is attached to this law.

A decree issued by the General People's Committee shall regulate the conditions according to which this allowance will be granted, in full or in part, or denied or suspended. The General People's Committee shall also issue other provisions regulating [disbursement of] this allowance.

Article Fifteen: The General People's Committee shall issue a decree determining the principles and conditions according to which a family allowance will be granted to employees. The General People's Committee shall also set the amount of this allowance and the conditions for denying it and suspending it.

Article Sixteen: Employees who are subject to the provisions of this law are to be granted an annual raise in accordance with the limits mentioned in the attached tables.

The General People's Committee shall issue a decree setting the principles and provisions that would indicate how the performance of employees is to be evaluated. This will link annual raises with employees' performance and productivity standards. Annual increases would be granted in full or in part according to those standards.

Article Seventeen: The General People's Committee shall issue a decree regulating the conditions and provisions under which non-military personnel in the armed forces who are subject to the provisions of this law become entitled to an overtime allowance. That decree will also determine the minimum number of hours that employees will have to work before receiving [overtime pay]. The decree

shall take into consideration working conditions in the various firms that are subject to the provisions of this law.

Article Eighteen: 1. Taking into account the laws and provisions that are in effect for military personnel in the armed forces, employees of agencies that are subject to the provisions of this law may be assigned when necessary to serve temporarily in another position in the same agency or in another one of the agencies mentioned in Article Three of this law.

2. To assign such employees the following is required:

A. That a person be assigned to a supervisory or a specialized position that cannot be filled by hiring or promoting someone to that position due to the existence of actual or legal impediments.

B. A person is not to be assigned to a position whose grade is two grades higher than his own.

C. A person is to be assigned to a position by a decree issued by the agency authorized by law to make such assignments.

3. The General People's Committee shall issue a decree assigning an individual to a position in the two following cases:

A. If a person is being assigned to a Grade 11 or to a higher position, provided that the appointment to the assigned position not exceed the highest grade that is determined for the agency to which the person is being assigned.

B. If a person is being assigned to two grades. The provision of this section does not apply to companies and institutions that are subject to the provisions of this law. In this case a specialized General People's Committee or the People's Committee of the municipality to which the company or the firm is subject, whichever the case may be, shall issue the assignment decision.

Otherwise, the specialized General People's Committee, the municipality's People's Committee or whoever is authorized to carry out their mandate shall make the assignment decision.

An allowance is not to be granted to personnel assigned to positions [other than their own] if they are assigned to similar or lower grades, unless the assignment is made in addition to a person's original work.

Other than the conditions and provisions mentioned in this article, the provisions that are determined in effective laws and regulations [also] apply.

Article Nineteen: The General People's Committee shall determine the financial provisions for those who are elected by the people to work on a fulltime basis at any one of the agencies that are subject to the provisions of this law.

Throughout their tenure in those positions to which they were elected, the personnel referred to are to be considered on loan from their positions.

Provisions regulating the lending of personnel in the Civil Service Act, Law Number 55 for 1976 A.D. apply to such personnel who are on loan, taking into account the nature and the term of holding such an elected position.

The General People's Committee sets the financial provision laws that apply to those elected personnel, if they were employed in any one of the agencies mentioned in the first paragraph of this article [?].

Article Twenty: At the proposal of the authorized secretary, the General People's Committee shall issue decrees to settle working conditions for those who hold the positions of secretaries of people's committees, chairmen of boards of directors of executive committees, or general commissioners assigned to national agencies, organizations, firms, companies or corporations.

Such settlement is to be effected within the limits set in the schedule that is in effect in each one of the agencies mentioned in the previous paragraph.

[These decisions of the General People's Committee] determine the financial grade to which [an employee] is entitled, how the period of service is to be computed and other such matters that have to do with settlement [of employee conditions] in accordance with the provisions of this law and the regulations and decrees that are issued accordingly.

Article Twenty-One: When necessary and if objective justifications therefor exist, the General People's Committee, at the suggestion of the General People's Committee for Public Service may issue a decree setting apart any activity by setting aside a sum of money for it or a specific percentage in addition to [those sums] that are set in the schedule of salaries which applies to employees pursuing that activity.

For the preceding provision the decree to set apart any activity has to be made on a categorical or a professional basis or for reasons that have to do with the work environment or the areas around which the work is performed.

For the purposes of applying the provisions of this law categorical discrimination is defined as the process of setting apart any group of workers who have their own salary schedule which may be attached to this law or issued accordingly.

To take advantage of the provision of Paragraph One of this article, it is stipulated that performance of the work continue in the area of activity that is being favored.

Article Twenty-Two: Taking into consideration what was mentioned in Law Number 40 for 1974 A.D. regarding service in the armed forces and the amendments to that law, no raises or monetary or in kind benefits may be granted to employees of agencies that are subject to the provisions of this law, except within the limits, the conditions and the provisions that are stipulated therein.

Materials issued to employees for their use in the performance of their work, such as tools, clothes and various equipment, and also food which is issued to people performing jobs that require the distribution of such foods are exempted from the provision of the aforementioned paragraph.

Article Twenty-Three: People employed in agencies that are subject to the provisions of this law must obtain the approval of the General People's Committee before accepting employment in any position or profession outside the Socialist People's Arab Libyan Jamahiriyyah.

The provision of the foregoing paragraph applies whether said employment comes in the form of an assignment, a loan or otherwise.

The General People's Committee shall issue a decree setting the rules and regulations for working abroad and the financial provisions therefor in accordance with the provisions of this article.

Article Twenty-Four: A grievance committee is to be formed at the Public Service Secretariat. This committee shall consider grievances that are submitted to it regarding settlements that are made for employees who are Libyan nationals, in accordance with the provisions of this law and the regulations and decisions that are issued accordingly.

The General People's Committee shall form this committee, determine its jurisdictions and how it is to carry out its duties.

Article Twenty-Five: Without infringing upon any harsher penalty required by any other law, anyone who violates the provisions of Articles 4, 5, 17, 18 and 21 of this law is to be punished by imprisonment for a period not less than 6 months and not more than 1 year or by a fine that is not less than 500 dinars and not more than 1,000 dinars or both.

Article Twenty-Six: Employees of the Public Service Secretariat who are identified by a decree issued by the General People's Committee shall serve as law enforcement commissioners with regard to enforcing the provisions of this law and the regulations and decrees that are issued accordingly.

Article Twenty-Seven: Law enforcement commissioners shall expose violations that occur in agencies, and they shall inform said agencies of these violations for the purpose of settling them in a period of time that shall not exceed 15 days from the date these violations were exposed or reported. Otherwise, violations are to be turned over to the authorized public prosecutor's office.

Article Twenty-Eight: Any provision violating the provisions of this law is hereby repealed.

Article Twenty-Nine: This law is to become effective on 1 January 1982 A.D., and it is to be published in AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [The Official Gazette].

The General People's Congress

Issued on 16 Dhi al-Hijjah 1390 of the Prophet's death
Coinciding with 14 October 1981 A.D.

8592

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Variable	Starting & Ending		Annual Raises		Growth Increases in Annual Salaries in Libyan Dinars									Minimum Number of Years To Be Spent on Job Before Promotion	Leave Allowance	
	Starting Salary in Libyan Dinars	Ending Salary in Libyan Dinars	Amount Annual Raise	Number of An- nual Raises	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth	Seventh	Eighth	Ninth	Tenth		
Sixteenth	7,000	8,200	120	10	7,200	7,320	7,440	7,560	7,680	7,800	7,920	8,040	8,160	8,280	- - -	1,200
Fourteenth	6,180	7,300	120	10	6,300	6,420	6,540	6,660	6,780	6,900	7,020	7,140	7,260	7,380	- - -	1,200
Fifteenth	5,280	6,400	120	10	5,400	5,520	5,640	5,760	5,880	6,000	6,120	6,240	6,360	6,480	- - -	1,200
Thirteenth	4,680	5,800	120	10	4,800	4,920	5,040	5,160	5,280	5,400	5,520	5,640	5,760	5,880	- - -	1,200
Twelfth	5,080	6,040	96	10	4,716	4,272	3,368	4,464	4,560	4,656	4,752	4,848	4,944	5,040	a period of time not limited to 1,200	1,200
Eleventh	3,720	6,680	96	10	3,816	3,912	4,008	4,104	4,200	4,296	4,392	4,488	4,584	4,680	not limited to 1,080	1,080
Tenth	3,240	4,200	96	10	3,336	3,432	3,528	3,624	3,720	3,816	3,912	4,008	4,104	4,200	5 years	960
Ninth	2,760	3,200	96	10	3,256	2,952	3,048	3,144	3,240	3,336	3,432	3,528	3,624	3,720	4 years	840
Eight	2,340	3,060	72	10	2,412	2,486	2,556	2,628	2,700	2,772	2,844	2,916	2,988	3,060	4 years	840
Seventh	2,040	2,760	72	10	2,112	2,184	2,256	2,328	2,400	2,472	2,544	2,616	2,688	2,760	4 years	780
Sixth	1,740	2,160	60	10	1,800	1,860	1,920	1,980	2,040	2,100	2,160	2,220	2,280	2,340	4 years	780
Fifth	1,560	2,160	60	10	1,620	1,680	1,800	1,860	1,920	1,980	2,040	2,100	2,160	2,220	4 years	720
Fourth	1,440	1,920	48	10	1,488	1,516	1,584	1,632	1,680	1,720	1,776	1,824	1,872	1,920	4 years	600
Third	1,260	1,740	48	10	1,356	1,308	1,356	1,452	1,500	1,548	1,596	1,644	1,692	1,740	4 years	540
Second	1,140	1,500	36	10	1,176	1,212	1,248	1,284	1,320	1,356	1,392	1,428	1,464	1,500	4 years	480
First	1,020	1,380	36	10	1,056	1,092	1,128	1,164	1,200	1,236	1,272	1,308	1,344	1,380	4 years	420

Table Number 2 - The Condition and Salaries of Employees Subject to Civil Service Law Number 55 for 1976 A.D.

LIBYA

AUSTERITY PLAN DETAILED

Paris SAHARA AFP in French No 634, 10 Jul 82 pp 13-15

[Text] Tripoli--Libyan officials say the country has weathered the worst of the serious economic crisis that has beset it since late 1981, but the austerity plan put in force in January of this year is still kept in effect.

The Jamahiriya has in effect put its ambitious 5-year (1981-1985) development plan on "hold." No new contracts have been signed since February, imports have been cut back considerably, even in the military sector, and the number of foreign workers in the country is reduced by 30 percent.

Western observers say the economic crisis which hit Libya several months ago following the spectacular drop in revenues is the result of both the oil crisis (overproduction, declining prices, etc...) and the deterioration of relations between Tripoli and Washington, a deterioration that led to American pressures to boycott Libya.

The second \$60 billion 5-year plan got under way during a time of euphoria: Libya, with its oil production in early 1981 coming to more than 1.6 million barrels per day at \$41 per barrel, was earning more than \$22 billion a year. It hit the "trough of the wave" in February, 1982, with production at 5-600,000 barrels per day and the price \$35.40 per barrel on average. Earnings were down by almost two-thirds.

Libyan officials, after an initial delay in responding to the trend--caused by their belief that it was only a temporary aberration such as the oil market had seen before--finally took the "bull by the horns" and in January of this year took a series of draconian measures to correct a situation that "could lead to a situation where Libya could not pay its bills."

A select committee (called the committee on financial resources), vested with considerable authority, was set up to supervise the rigorous implementation of the austerity plan. (To cite one example, no letters of credit can be issued without its authorization.)

The projects put on "hold" included:

--a railroad system that was to link Libya's major cities (though Libya is three times as large as France, it has no railroad), at a time when a contract to carry out the [preliminary] study on the first segment was about to be signed with a German firm.

--the city of Zouara (120 km west of Tripoli), which was to be given a port, an aluminum plant and an electric generating station.

--the proposed aqueduct to carry the fossil waters of the Sarir desert to the southeast region of the country.

--a thermal power station at Syrte.

--a chemical factory at Marza Brega.

--airfields and roads.

--expansion of the port of Misurata.

The military budget has also "had to take deep cuts," Western observers say. The same sources also say Libya has reportedly obtained Soviet agreement to either debt moratoriums or goods-swapping arrangements within the socialist bloc to cope with its debts for arms purchases.

In addition, according to Arab sources, Libya stopped assistance to several political and liberation movements around the world. However, the same sources say it resumed its aid to progressive Palestinian forces when Israel invaded Lebanon.

These "lean years" followed on a time of "squandering and laxity." Annual imports of consumer and equipment goods based on standing contracts exceeded \$14 billion--in a country of only 4 million people, one million of whom are foreigners. More than 10,000 containers chock full of merchandise has been sitting for months on the docks at Libya's ports.

Libya was Japan's biggest customer, if only for video-cassettes.

Western observers believe Libya seems to have learned its lesson and decided to "rationalize its decision-making."

Libyan oil production has climbed in recent weeks and seems to be stabilizing at one million barrels per day. If prices remain relatively stable, Libya's annual earnings should climb back up to the \$10 billion level.

But they are still not enough for all Libya's needs (the imports that cannot be cut, honoring of outstanding contracts, the repatriation of foreign wage-earners' pay--nearly 90 percent of such wages are sent out--and arms purchases). But they are enough, observers say, given its present reserves, to keep going for a long time at a slackened pace. The Jamahiriya is in arrears on its payments (the arrears are estimated at \$3-5 billion), but not on its external debts to date.

Libyan officials believe that they will be able to soften the austerity plan towards the end of 1982. Western observers for their part believe that Libya, despite its problems, remains a profitable market.

MAURITANIA

INTERVIEW WITH MOHAMED YESLEM O CHOU MAD, ECONOMIC CONTROL CHIEF

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 18, 19, 20 Jun 82 p 3

[Interview with Lt Mohamed Yeslem O Choumad, director of economic control; date and place not specified]

[18 Jun 82]

[Text] The role, mission and organization of the Directorate of Economic Control are the subjects raised by Lt Mohamed Yeslem O Choumad, director of economic control, in an interview with CHAAB. Lt Mohamed Yeslem O Choumad also made clear what the directorate expects of consumers and regional authorities in this interview, of which we publish today the first part.

[Question] Can you describe for us the Directorate of Economic Control, its mission, its manner of functioning? At this stage, is it possible to know whether this Directorate, which was recently established, has the means to carry out its policy?

[Answer] You have said it yourself: the Directorate of Economic Control is a recent creation that was only established in January 1981, following recommendations by the Military Committee for National Salvation [CMSN]; its main lines of activity were set forth in October 1979.

The organizational structure of this directorate includes three service offices and two divisions. These are the Service for the Suppression of Fraud, under which are the Division of Price Control and Stocks and the Division for Quality Control; the Service for Disputes and Economic Studies; and the Service of Measurements (control of weights and measures).

The principal mission of the Directorate of Economic Control is to watch strictly over the application of price regulations, thereby providing valuable assistance to price stability and protecting the purchasing power of consumers. Thus, it is for the Service for the Suppression of Fraud, through its two divisions, to supervise the reporting of violations of price regulations and to prepare statements and other appropriate administrative procedures.

The Service for Disputes and Economic Studies is charged with handling all legal proceedings and following up on them in the courts. This service is also charged with carrying out studies on the cost of living, which thus provide a range of information necessary for economic studies. It also represents the Ministry of Industry and Commerce before the courts.

Finally, with regard to the Service of Measurements, it is charged with checking on the correct use of weights and measures and reporting violations of the regulations in this regard. This service must also handle official approval of weights and other forms of measurement.

To respond to the last part of your question, I would say once again that this directorate is still new and does not have all the facilities (both human and material) necessary to the accomplishment of its mission.

However, great progress has been made in this direction in less than a year. I therefore think that we are doing what we can with what we have.

[Question] The function of economic control, we recall, comes under the Directorate of Commerce. It seems that at present it has relatively substantial means available to carry out its mission. What have been its achievements and what relationships exist between the Directorate of Economic Control and the Directorate of Commerce?

[Answer] In effect, the function of economic control, at one time carried on by a division, came under the Directorate of Commerce. However, as you know, the CMSN and the government, wishing to protect the purchasing power of citizens with low incomes, raised this function to a directorate in 1981, thus making it an independent institution. This made it possible for it to deploy itself more quickly and to extend its activity throughout the country.

Before speaking to you of achievements, I would like to emphasize that the Directorate of Economic Control was created subsequent to the adoption of the budget. Therefore, contrary to what you seem to be saying, it could not be provided with substantial human and material resources. However, we have an operating budget for the current period, which gives us a minimum amount of resources.

Having said that, I think that much progress has been made in accomplishing the mission of economic control, which is a permanent one, as far as that goes.

At the same time, I should remind you that before the establishment of the Directorate of Economic Control no activity on any scale was undertaken at the regional level. The limited form of control exercised at Nouakchott only uncovered about 400 cases per year.

The Directorate of Economic Control has given price controls a second wind. Thus, from July to December 1981, 1,500 cases were prepared covering 7.5 million Mauritanian ouguiyas in different transactions, 300 of which cases were prepared covering the provinces.

By the end of May 1982, and for the first 5 months of the year, 2,400 cases were prepared covering 8.3 million Mauritanian ouguiyas in monetary transactions, including more than 700 cases prepared in the provinces by mobile strike forces.

These figures adequately show the breadth of the struggle we are carrying out against fraud and illegal prices in all their forms.

As for the relationships between the Directorate of Commerce and the Directorate of Economic Control, it is important to note that these relationships take place at two levels: first, in terms of price control and then in terms of the control of stocks of merchandise.

In terms of the former, I would say that up to now the basic studies leading to the fixing of prices of local industrial products have been undertaken by the Directorate of Commerce. If our economic studies on the cost of living show the need to regulate the price of a product of large-scale consumption or of current consumption, we then ask the Directorate of Commerce to undertake the necessary studies, looking toward the price regulation process.

As for the second point (the control of stocks of merchandise), it is necessary to understand the process of the new, obligatory declaration of stocks to clarify the relationships that we have with the Directorate of Commerce.

In effect it is obligatory for every importer, manufacturer and producer of products specified by regulation of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce to make a monthly declaration of his stocks of products on hand at the end of each month. It is precisely the Directorate of Commerce that receives and handles these documents. We therefore look to it to provide us with a list of the companies or industries that have not provided their monthly statement of stocks, so that we can take the necessary action against them.

[Question] Despite the efforts made to establish and get this office moving, we still note that prices continue to rise illegally. Why does this gap exist?

[Answer] The struggle against illegal price increases is a day-to-day struggle, and everyone is involved, as I have always said. If, despite the efforts made, illegal increases in prices continue to occur, it is for the two principal reasons: 1) the stubbornness of our merchants, who have a taste for illegal profits, and the inadequate numbers (if not a total absence in certain parts of the country) of economic controllers to watch over them; and

[19-20 Jun 82]

2) the refusal or avoidance by consumers to denounce the speculating merchants and those who charge illegal prices. It is important to appreciate the major role of the consumers in the process of price control.

The consumer is, in effect, in permanent contact with the merchant and he is in a position to know the prices charged. Despite their frequent complaints, however, consumers refuse to cooperate with the economic control service.

Hence, there has been created a situation in which a merchant who does not encounter either someone who checks prices or a vigilant consumer does not hesitate to sell goods at exorbitant prices. Unfortunately, it happens that we cannot provide permanent checking of prices in every store. In this case, therefore, it is clear that the consumer must be the first to check prices. He must understand, accept and perform this role.

[Question] What do you expect from consumers and from regional authorities?

[Answer] From consumers we expect, without despairing of getting it, the assistance essential to the protection of their purchasing power. They must know that the economic function has been established in a directorate for the protection of their pocketbooks, their purchasing power. Consequently, it is their duty to set aside certain harmful prejudices and provide strong assistance to the economic control function.

From the regional authorities we ask that they support materially and morally the personnel of the economic control service assigned to them. These authorities play a very important and even decisive role in the work of economic control because they have the power, over a broad range of violations of price regulations, to recommend appropriate penalties against the lawbreakers. Whatever the vigilance of the price controllers and the extent of the control function, these are subject to failure if an appropriate outcome does not follow the cases of violations of price control. Therefore, I am persuaded that the regional authorities, to whom we have assigned a high number of competent officials from the first class of inspectors, controllers and economic control agents, will know how to provide material assistance as well as moral support, making it possible for them to properly accomplish the mission assigned to them.

Therefore, I think that the regional authorities, who have always asked us to give them economic controllers, will know best how to safeguard the interests of their low-income populations.

[Question] We recently attended the graduation of the first class of inspectors, controllers and economic control reporting agents. What does this development mean to you? And how can these controllers work honestly in so corrupting an environment, in a sector characterized by anarchy?

[Answer] In effect, we have just obtained the services of the first inspectors, controllers and reporting agents since the establishment of the Directorate of Economic Control. This event is therefore important, because it is the first time in the history of our economic control effort that such a class has been graduated in Mauritania. We are still trying to fill the gap that the lack of personnel has created.

Therefore, we believe that this first graduating class, called the "class of hope" by the minister of industry and commerce, will know how to meet our expectations and those of the consumers, both in terms of honesty as well as competence.

It is true that our merchants still have this bad habit of always looking for easy solutions to the numerous problems they create for themselves. However, I must say that there is every hope for this class, thanks to the advice the minister of industry and commerce and I myself gave them at the time of their graduation.

I would also add that their recruitment was based on criteria of morality and competence in the course of their selection. Furthermore, for the first time we added to the program for this class a high-quality course of training in civics. In view of this situation and these circumstances, I think there is every hope that this class will demonstrate its competence and its honesty.

[Question] Bogus controllers have recently been arrested in Nouakchott. That is a precedent that is at least potentially dangerous. In your view, how can people distinguish between a false and a real controller, and what role can the merchants play in this regard?

[Answer] We recently arrested two bogus controllers in Nouakchott. That is a serious matter, and we must fight energetically against this kind of activity, which tends to damage the interests of the merchants and to tarnish the high-quality image of the economic control service. The genuine economic controllers always carry a properly signed, professional identity card, bearing statements in Arabic and French, as well as the photograph of the person concerned. This card must be exhibited and presented at the demand of the merchant being inspected, after [as published] a report has been made.

However, we must emphasize that the merchant has the right to refuse any check made in his shop when the professional identity card is not shown to him.

It is therefore the duty of all merchants (who complain about it, for that matter) to help us identify those individuals who are not bona fide controllers and who misrepresent themselves, by using the control procedures which I described above.

[Question] Finally, do you have any appeal to make to the merchants and the consumers?

[Answer] In the interview I gave over the radio in October 1981, I asked merchants and consumers, each one as far as he was concerned, to give us their assistance. I repeat this appeal by asking the merchants, once again, to respect officially established prices, to follow the publicity given to prices and to respect the standards applicable to the bills of lading, for we will no longer hesitate to punish improper actions.

To the consumers, I ask that they cooperate closely with the economic control agents who are entirely at their disposition for the protection of their purchasing power.

5170
CSO: 4519/227

MOROCCO

INTEGRATED PROJECT EVALUATED

Rabat ALMAGRIB in French 9 Jun 82 p 4

[Article: "Evaluation of Achievements of Fes-Karia-Tissa Integrated Project"]

[Text] During the conference on "the prospects for the socio-economic development of Taounate Province," organized on 29 and 30 May by the Taounate Association of Former Students, Driss Fassi El Fihri, provincial director of agriculture and agrarian reform, gave a report on the Fes-Kariat-Tissa project and on its importance in the integrated development of the region.

Describing the project, Fass El Fihri emphasized that it involves a 350,000 hectare area, including 260,000 cultivated hectares where 280,000 inhabitants live, forming 34,000 families divided among 18 rural communes.

The total cost of the project is 700 million dirhams divided among the different sectors, involving the Ministries of Agriculture, Equipment, National Education, Health and the National Agricultural Credit Bank (CNCA).

The objectives of the project, Fassi El Fihri adds, are the achievement of economic and social development of the zone and improvement of the standard of living of the 280,000 inhabitants forming 34,000 families, improvement including raising their incomes and, at the same time, their standard of "living."

The creation of jobs and reduction of the rural exodus are also objectives of the project.

All these objectives, Fassi El Fihri says, should be achieved thanks to the following measures:

--Improvement of extension services, research and training.

--Access to credit by all farmers, on good terms, in order to finance their operations.

--Improvement of distribution channels.

--Erosion control.

--Construction of a road system.

--Construction if infrastructures of a social nature (education, health, drinking water).

Intervention of an Agricultural Nature

The role of extension services which is assigned in the project is of prime importance. It consists of raising the farmers' technological level with, among other things, the introduction of appropriate farming techniques, balancing of crop rotations, and professional organization.

In order to strengthen extension services in the project zone, it was decided to create an Operating Center (CT) for each commune, giving it the means necessary for efficiency (accommodations and vehicles) and the training of qualified extension agents at Sahal Boutahar School.

The organizational chart of each CT will be modified to include stock-raising and soil conservation in addition to plant production. Each CT will have an agent exclusively reserved for administrative tasks.

At present, Fassi El Fihri explains, staffing is being handled as extension agents arrive in the 115 sectors of the zone. Three groups of engineers specialized in large-scale farming, extension services and hillside farming have been formed to assist the extension agents. The number of cooperatives has grown from 40 to 140 with 7,000 members farming 68,000 hectares, or 20 percent of the farmers and 25 percent of the area of the zone. Sixty other cooperatives are being formed this year.

The growing of medicago, an Australian lucerne intended to replace fallows, is off to a good start with the farming of 800 hectares in 1981, he continued. The audio-visual support unit has been organized and is covering most operations.

As far as the training of personnel is concerned, Sahal Boutahar agricultural school has successfully undergone all planned reforms and is operating precisely in accordance with the project design. Up to the present, it has received 131 students, 24 of whom are completing their third year of training before rejoining the CT's to which they have already been assigned.

Training courses abroad are intended to train 30 engineers in their disciplines of agricultural management, soil conservation, medicago growing, and enology.

Six engineers have now completed their training, and 10 others are being trained at this time.

On the other hand, three foreign consultants have been recruited and are working in the groups of young engineers whom they are helping to train.

In the field of agronomical research, a station specific to the zone has been created in Karia. It began its activities as early as the 1980-81 season. Its programs, consistent with the orientations of the project, are prepared with the collaboration of the central research services. A five-year master plan has been prepared.

The project, aware of the problem of circulation of spare parts (intrants), provided for 18 supply offices and 18 repair shops on a trial basis, at the rate of one office and one shop per commune.

These supply offices have all been operating since 1981, managed by the supply cooperatives. They have distributed 8 million kilograms of spare parts (intrants) in 1981 and starting this year will benefit from credits on the part of CNCA.

As for the repair shops, which are entrusted to mechanics confirmed and controlled by committees representing the farmers, they provide maintenance at unbeatable prices.

The Karia-Tissa project, Fassi El Fihri adds, likewise provides for an erosion control program, since 130,000 hectares of good soils of the zone are threatened by definitive deterioration by hydraulic erosion. The project also provides for the treatment of 24,000 hectares as a prelude to the organization of a genuine soil conservation service.

Up to the present, the provincial director of agriculture and agrarian reform says, it has been possible to treat 5,000 hectares, including 3,000 hectares of olives. The program planned for 1982 is to plant 6,000 hectares.

In the stock-raising sector, the Karia-Tissa project provides for three veterinary posts, eight parasiticide baths, four stables which are already functioning, as well as two horse breeding stations and three artificial insemination centers which will be built during this year.

As far as Agricultural Credit is concerned, loan conditions based on the productive potential of the land and not on fiscal criteria have been instituted. The material and human infrastructure has been strengthened in order to make it possible to get closer to the farmers. Nine local funds have been created for the 18 communes of the zone.

Finally, a \$12.5 million (approximately 72,500.00 dirhams) allocation has been reserved for the zone.

Infrastructure

The project also provides for the construction or reconditioning of 420 km of roads and has reserved 250 million dirhams for this sector. One hundred km have been built, and work is in progress on 137 new km.

The drinking water supply, which will cost 90 million dirhams, will affect 20 percent of the population of the zone distributed over 200 douars.

Once the studies were completed, a first installment representing one-third of the whole, was delivered in 1981; a second installment representing two-thirds will be delivered this year.

In the sector of education, the project provides for the construction of 68 new classrooms and 152 lodgings, in addition to 22 dining halls and other supplementary equipment.

Thirty-six classrooms, 57 lodgings, nine canteens and other equipment had already been completed by the end of 1981, Fassi El Fihri said.

For health, the project provides for the construction of equipment of four health centers, a dispensary and 14 lodgings for personnel.

The start of the construction is planned for 1982 with 40 percent of the program.

Economic Data

The area planted in hard wheat, Fassi El Fihri explains, will decrease by 45 percent and that in soft wheat will increase by 116 percent. Production will thus increased from 550,000 kilograms to 1.9 million kilograms.

The area devoted to forage will increase from 7,200 hectares to 23,000 hectares, and production, from 20,000 to 140,000 tons. Fallows will be discontinued or decreased. The olive tree plantations will increase from 18,500 hectares to at least 26,500 hectares, and the production of olives from 32,000 to 58,000 tons in year 10 of the project. Production of goat meat in live weight will increase from 1,500 to 4,000 tons, and that of beef from 850 to 1,500 tons.

In conclusion, Driss Fassi El Fihri affirms in light of actual experience that the formula of the integrated project seems to be the most adequate means for promotion of bour [as printed] zones.

9380

CSO: 4519/230

MINISTERS, DEPUTY GOVERNORS, COMMISSIONERS NAMED

Khartoum SUNA in English No 4176, 2 Jul 82 pp 5-7

[Text] Khartoum, 2 July (SUNA)--President Numayri yesterday decreed the appointment of new ministers and deputy governors of the regions.

They, together with the governors of the region, and the president of the southern region High Executive Council, took the oath before the President at the peoples palace yesterday.

Dr 'Abdallah Ahmad 'Abdallah-- The governor of the Northern Region spoke on behalf of the regional governors and ministers. He hailed the president for the confidence he bestowed on them, and confirmed their will to change the confidence into real work.

President Numayri has earlier yesterday relieved all the former deputy governors and ministers of the regions.

Following are the names of the new regional deputy governors and ministers:

Northern Region:

1. Muhammad Al-Hasan 'Awad al-Karim--deputy governor
2. 'Abdallah 'Ali 'Gadallah--minister for housing and public utilities.
3. 'Abd-al-Latif 'Abd-al-Rahman--minister for public services.
4. Ja'far al-Hasan al-Husayn--minister for administration and region's affairs.
5. Dr al-Tayyib 'Ali Abu-Sinn--minister for administration and region's affairs.
6. Mukhtar 'Abd-al-'Al Humur--minister for finance and economy.

Kordofan Region:

1. Fadlallah Hammad--deputy governor.
2. Muhammad Ahmad Hasan Jiha--minister for public services.
3. Al-Taj Fadlallah 'Abd-al-Rahim--minister for agriculture and natural resources.
4. Al-Fatih Muhammad al-Tijani--minister for finance and economy.
5. Daldum al-Khatim Ashqar--minister for administration and region's affairs.
6. Mirghani 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Hajj--minister for housing and public utilities.

Darfour Region:

1. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Qadir Arbab--deputy governor.
2. 'Abd-al-Rahman Muhammad Mahmud--minister for administration and region's affairs.
3. Ibrahim Adam al-Din--minister for public services.
4. Muhammad 'Abdallah Sharif--minister for finance and economy.
5. Ma'mun Muhammadi--minister for housing and public utilities.
6. 'Abd-al-Rahman Busharah Dusa--minister for agriculture and natural resources.

Eastern Region:

1. Sulayman 'Uthman Faqiri--deputy governor.
2. 'Abdallah Ahmad al-Hardalu--minister for administration and region's affairs.
3. Muhammad al-Amin Hamad--minister for public services.
4. Dr Hasan Ahmad Habash--minister for agriculture and natural resources.
5. 'Uthman 'Ali Salih Kodai--minister for housing and public utilities.
6. Ahmad Muhammad al-Amin Tirik--minister for finance and economy.

Central Region:

1. Sa'd 'Awad--deputy governor.
2. 'Abdallah Imam--minister for finance and economy.
3. Dr Mu'tamid Ahmad al-Amin--minister for health and society welfare.
4. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Karim 'Asakir--minister for construction, housing and public utilities.
5. Ya'qub 'Isa Jufun--minister for education and guidance.
6. Salah Yusuf al-Simit--minister for administration and region's affairs.
7. Dr 'Uthman Khalifah--minister for agriculture.

Replacements:

In a Republican decree issued yesterday, President Numayri relieved three commissioners of provinces and appointed three new ones to replace them.

The President appointed 'Uthman Ibrahim Sharaf commissioner of the Red Sea province to replace 'Uthman Ali Salih Kodai, Husayn Ba-Bakr, Commissioner of Northern Darfur Province to replace 'Abdallah 'Abd-al-Rahman Shuqayri, and Dr Adam al-Zayn, commissioner of Southern Darfur Province to replace Ibrahim 'Umar Muhammad Maddibu.

CSO: 4500/255

SOUTHERN REGIONAL MINISTERS, COMMISSIONERS SWORN IN

Khartoum SUNA in English No 4179, 7 Jul 82 pp 1, 2

[Text] Khartoum, 7 July, (SUNA)--The Deputy President of the High Executive Council for the Southern Region (H.E.C.), Regional Ministers and commissioner of five provinces in the Region were sworn-in here yesterday morning before the First Vice-President Major-General 'Umar Muhammad Al Tayyib.

The oath-taking ceremony was attended by Vice-President Joseph Lagu, H.E.C. President Joseph Tombura, Presidency Minister Dr Baha'-Al-Din Muhammad Idris and Deputy Chief Justice Salah-Al-Din Shubaykah.

Those who took the oath of office were:

Dhol Achwil, Deputy H.E.C. President and Regional Minister for Legal Affairs.
Othwonh Dak, Regional Minister for Finance and Economic Planning.
Ajo Dedi, Regional Minister for Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Nikanora Manok, Regional Minister for Health and Social Welfare.
Arkangello Kwak, Regional Minister for Housing and Public Works.
Serafino Wani, Regional Minister for Transport and Communications.
Faroug Akasha, Regional Minister for Culture and Information.
John Wol, Regional Minister for Cooperation and Rural Development.
Habakok Siro, Regional Minister for Wildlife Conservation and Tourism.
Samuel Renzi, Regional Minister for Public Service and Manpower.
Charles Kot, Regional Minister for Decentralization Affairs.
Nikola Oboya, Regional Minister for Commerce and Supply.
Daniel Mathews, Regional Minister for Industry and Mining.
Kornellio Koryon, Regional Minister for Coordination.
Francis Wajo, Regional Minister for H.E.C. Affairs.
Lazaros Lay Paul, Leader of the Regional People's Assembly.
Dacifio Lado Lolik, Advisor on Political Affairs.
Darius Bashir, Advisor on People's Local Government Affairs.
Peter Moranyar Bit, Commissioner of Al-Buhayrat.
James Mabor, Commissioner of the Upper Nile Province.
Michael Mario Dor, Commissioner of the Janglei Province.
Charles 'Ali Bilal, Commissioner of the Western Equatoria Province.
Gajok Warnyang Lubai, Commissioner of the Eastern Equatoria Province.

Education and Guidance Minister Philip Obeng has earlier taken the oath of office before President Gaafar Mohamed Nimeri.

First Vice-President 'Umar Muhammad Al-Tayyib called on the Southern Region's High Executive Council (H.E.C.), the regional Ministers and Commissioners to safeguard national unity and maintain security and stability.

Al-Tayyib said the regional government was responsible for unifying ranks to consolidate Sudan's Unity.

He said maintenance of national unity boosts popular democracy through which people could exercise power.

He called on the southern Region's leaders to exert their utmost in serving the masses and to adhere to the people's charters and to get rid of tribalism.

Gen. Al-Tayyib called on the region's assembly to establish a legal apparatus to assist in the legislation movement in the region to enable it control performance and follow up implementation.

He criticized the deterioration of essential services in the region which he said was due to the lack of both administrative supervision and citizens participation.

CSO: 4500/255

SYRIA

WAR IN LEBANON CITED AS REASON FOR HIGHER TAXES

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 26, 9 Aug 82 p 3

[Text]

The Syrian government last week raised a number of taxes and dues, citing the need for additional revenues to cover the cost of fighting in Lebanon against Israel during the early days of the Israeli invasion. But what put a sting into the tail of the move was the second reason for increasing charges upon Syria's taxpayers given by the government. The new charges were needed, it said, because of the lack of final support from other Arab states for Syria's war effort.

The new measures doubled the cost of a Syrian passport to SL 200 (\$50) and airport taxes for passengers were also raised by 100 per cent. Real estate taxes have been increased by 15 per cent, the tax on gasoil and petrol went up by 10 per cent and stamp duties were raised by 20 per cent.

Syria has been trying, so far in vain, to raise money from Gulf states to make good its losses in the fighting against the Israelis. This newsletter understands that when Syria's Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam asked Saudi Arabia's King Fahd for cash to replace just over 100 Syrian aircraft shot down by the Israelis, the King retorted that he had never before heard of a country which had lost such a large number of warplanes in return for the one Israeli aircraft downed by the Syrians.

Syria has also been demanding a huge sum as financial compensation for taking in Palestinian guerrilla fighters now besieged in west Beirut. Israel is meanwhile understood to oppose resettling the PLO fighters in Syria, presumably in order to prevent any strengthening of Syria by an influx of cash from the Gulf.

CSO: 4400/426

KUWAITI AID, FINANCIAL POSITION VIEWED

London ARABIA in English No 12, Aug 82 pp 41-42

[Text]

Syria's recent losses in the Israeli invasion may persuade Gulf countries to increase aid to Damascus. Kuwait's National Assembly, which in February 1982 voted to end its \$48m aid for Syrian peacekeeping troops in the Lebanon, has now rejected a motion to cut off its annual \$290m for Syria as a "front-line" state agreed at the 1978 Baghdad summit. Saudi Arabia, in spite of irritation with Syria's pro-Iranian stand, has not curtailed its funding commitments; and Syria has recently strengthened its friendship pact with the Soviet Union.

However, hopes that Syria's market and economy will improve in the near future are slim. The government's announcement on May 18 of a 10 per cent cut in all budget allocations for 1982 underline Syria's continued tight funding position. This move reflects three things: a shortfall in Arab funding; a downturn in world oil prices; and Syria's depleted foreign exchange reserves.

The budget for 1982 (excluding development funds) had been set at Syr£33.4bn (\$6.18bn), of which current spending lies at Syr£16.8bn (\$3.1bn). It is most unlikely, however, that defence spending, which

constitutes nearly 60 per cent of the current budget, will be cut back. Syria's campaigns to maintain internal security are costly and its military commitments to the Lebanon, whatever the short-term outcome of Israel's invasion, are unlikely to disappear overnight.

Syria's shortage of foreign exchange has been singularly evident over the past month. UK and US banks in London have reported delays of up to six weeks on Syrian payments. One UK bank went so far as to say that Syria had barely enough foreign exchange to conduct its day-to-day business. The correspondent banks in London were certainly worried by the delays, but have not revised their credit ceilings.

Some flutters went around the international banking community when it was announced that the Bahrain-based Arab Banking Corporation (ABC) had raised a \$50m five-year club credit for Sayarat, Syria's state vehicle importing company. This credit, according to ABC, was quickly over-subscribed, and out of the 10 banks approached they got positive responses from five. These are Al Bahrain Arab African Bank, Arab Bank for Investment and Foreign Trade, the

Arab Investment Company, Banco Arab Espagnol and the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank.

While US banks at once questioned the political motivation behind this deal, the main thrust appears to have come from Japan. After some detailed market research Sayarat awarded contracts to Japanese, East European and South American companies. The Japanese, who do not consider Syria a very reliable credit risk, will not grant export credits without bank guarantees or financing up front. The ABC deal has therefore guaranteed Syrian payment.

Syria's 1981-85 five year plan relies for nearly 10 per cent of its proposed Syr£100bn (\$18.5bn) spending on foreign funds, either in the form of aid or investment by other agencies and countries. While there is a market of nine million people and some fundamental economic resources, Syria's centrally planned economy has made a poor showing. Domestic oil production has been running at a constant level of between 160,000 and 170,000 bpd, with little new investment in the industry; but the plan also allocates Syr£100m (\$18.5m) of foreign exchange to hydrocarbon development.

CSO: 4400426

DRAFT DECREE EXTENDS SOCIAL SECURITY TO LIBERAL PROFESSIONS

Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 410, 12 Jul 82 pp 32-34

[Article by Hedia Baraket]

[Text] The liberal professions, once much sought after because they freed their members from "austerity" or at least from the rigidity of a fixed and unchanging salary, are now beginning to be abandoned and avoided, sinking into the kind of oblivion that so closely affects the evolution of ways of thinking. We are certainly not referring here to medical or legal careers. Today, the fields of government service and public or private enterprise willingly guarantee to their salaried employees not only a stable present but also a certain future by assuring them, as well as their families, of a decent income and by protecting them, as well as their children, from any deterioration resulting from a decline in their living standards.

Meanwhile, old age, illness, extended sickness and death constantly threaten the members of the liberal professions and in particular skilled personnel working for themselves, small farmers and merchants. This has reached such a point that these professions have been visibly affected over the past several years.

There is a time for everything. And the "crisis" in this sector has reinforced a need for security, which is apparent and largely justified, concerning with insuring this category of workers against everything, or at least insuring them against the unavoidable risk that comes with the passage of time, that of growing old.

Some 350,000 workers in this sector, in the course of the past week, were directly affected by the draft decree expanding the system of pensions to the aged, to invalids and to the heirs of skilled mechanics, merchants, doctors and pharmacists, as well as to all other categories of persons who work for themselves.

The draft decree defines these workers as persons principally occupied in a professional activity for their own account, having an income, not a salary. Consequently, when the work stops as a result of old age, illness, or death--frequent risks for this category of workers because of the difficult nature of their work--all sources of income are exhausted. There are many social

problems that stem from this situation, affecting both the worker himself as well as his family.

Against these risks and hazards the present draft decree provides for the extension of the social security system to this category of worker through the National Social Security Fund.

There are two conclusions to be drawn from this new measure. First, its humanitarian aspect is undeniable. Second, it provides for the completion of a policy of social justice that is already commendable. The current draft decree would thus appear to have the advantage of extending social security protection to all socioprofessional groups in the country.

In the future, skilled workers, small farmers, merchants, doctors, pharmacists --all will have a right to free medical treatment, to a temporary pension in case of an extended illness, to a pension in case they are physically unable to work and to a pension when they retire. For the members of the liberal professions, retirement age is fixed at 65.

In case of death, widows and children will not be abandoned to an uncertain future, such as that which once awaited the orphans of a skilled worker or merchant for whom, during his lifetime, even savings were at a very limited level. A pension will assure them of the minimum in the way of a decent life.

In return for these guarantees of social justice, the insured worker will belong to the National Security Fund and will join it by paying every 4 months a sum of money which is in no way comparable to the pension he will collect in the more or less near future.

However, the problem is to determine the level of these contributions. This is all the more the case since it involves income difficult to determine or to estimate.

Thus, to bring a certain logic to this social effort, some clarifications have already been provided in the course of a press conference given on this occasion by Mohamed Ennaceur, minister of social affairs. The basis of the contributions to be paid into the fund has been fixed in terms of a lump sum payment determined in accordance with six different kinds of income. The income classes vary between 660 Tunisian dinars per year, or a minimum income of 50 Tunisian dinars per month for Class 1, and 15,000 Tunisian dinars per year for Class 6. This basic range in income is subject to revision in case of a noticeable increase in living standards.

When the insured worker is placed, according to his choice, in one of the six classes, the contribution made is fixed at 10.65 percent, broken down as 5.40 percent to cover the social insurance system and 5.25 percent to cover the pension system.

However, it is provided that insured workers paying contributions for income Classes 1, 5 and 6 can renounce coverage under the system of social insurance and in this case pay only at the rate of 5.25 percent for coverage under the

pension system. This measure is intended to lighten the burden on insured persons with low incomes and to exempt those in the categories with very high incomes from paying for insurance that is of very little interest to them.

To provide more coherence for the system, certain arrangements have been made affecting the conditions for the granting of allowances, having regard to the particular circumstances of the people concerned. This involves in particular providing for transitional measures permitting the granting of pensions to insured persons over 45 years of age, when the system enters into effect; fixing the minimum old age or invalid's pension at the level of half of the interoccupational guaranteed minimum wage [SMIG], based on an annual working year of 2,400 hours; and fixing the minimum pension at 30 percent of income based on payments made into the fund for 120 months (60 months in case of invalids' pensions). The maximum pension will be 80 percent of income.

Membership in the fund will be obligatory. It is possible that this will lead to reservations already observed on other occasions on the part of certain categories of the liberal professions. For doctors, for example, this social security coverage may be interpreted as an "indirect" check on their income. For their part, merchants and skilled workers, and above all the oldest workers, would be more comfortable with day to day living, an outlook they have inherited from a long business tradition.

However, it has been proved on more than one occasion that an appropriate public information campaign can deal with this latter reservation.

5170
CSO: 4519/252

TUNISIA

RESULTS OF INS SURVEY OF POVERTY EXAMINED

Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 410, 12 Jul 82 pp 36-38

[Article: "Toward the Eradication of Pockets of Poverty"]

[Text] What is poverty in Tunisia? Where are the last pockets of poverty? A broad study by the National Institute of Statistics [INS] answers these two questions.

The national study of family consumption, carried out in 1980 by the INS, was the basis for preparation of the Sixth National Plan.

It was learned in particular that poverty is disappearing in Tunisia. During the 5 years from 1975 to 1980, the number of poor people dropped by 400,000, from 1,223,000 to 823,000. This occurred despite the increase in the population during the same period, estimated at 800,000. A figure of 823,000 poor people in a population estimated at the same time (1980) at 6,369,000 results in a figure of about 13 percent, compared with 22 percent in 1975, a decline of 9 percent in 5 years. Although this favorable development continued in 1981, let us continue to use the figure of 13 percent.

The theoretical threshold of absolute poverty has been calculated on the basis of a minimum income necessary to provide for needs vital to life (minimum needs in calories).

Taking international standards into account, this threshold has been determined to be 60 Tunisian dinars per person per year in the rural areas and 120 Tunisian dinars per person per year in the urban areas.

In the rural areas, the number of poor people totals 430,000; the figure for the urban areas is 393,000 (large, medium and small cities and communes). The researchers have commented that between 1975 and 1980, the number of poor people in urban areas declined more quickly (down 15 percent) than the number of poor people in rural areas (down only 4 percent). This occurred despite the exodus from rural areas and the natural increase in the population. Therefore, there is a certain resistance to the trend in the rural areas. What are the causes?

First of all, there is this fact: the farther you go from human settlements (cities, large concentrations of population, etc.), the more poverty remains. The population below the minimum level is found in more than half of the cases (52 percent) in small concentrations.

<u>Location of Poverty</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Dispersed rural areas	430,000	52
Small and medium-sized towns	271,000	33
Large cities	122,000	15
Total	823,000	100

In a previous article (see DIALOGUE No 409 of 5 July 1982), we have seen this same kind of rural area gain access only with difficulty to safe drinking water (as an example and as one of the possible indicators of progress).

However, the study goes further since it locates poverty geographically. It is in the northwest and the west-central regions that the most substantial numbers of the poor are to be found, 17.6 percent and 19.6 percent, respectively. Whereas in the more heavily populated areas of the northwest and the west-central region the total poor dropped between 1975 and 1980, in the rural areas, by contrast, it increased noticeably in the west-central region (and even in the east-central region).

According to the researchers, this situation is due to the drought that affected these areas, particularly at the end of the 1970's and in 1980 and which had a negative impact on agricultural production and on living standards in the rural areas. The measures taken in 1981 to fight this dependence on climatic conditions could not be evaluated by the study, which took place beforehand.

Some 44 percent of the poor are included in the agricultural sector (or about 355,000 persons). They are most often members of rural families whose size is more than seven people. It was also noted in 1980 that the west-central region of the country had the smallest percentage of participants in family planning programs and the highest fertility rate.

Thus, if we wanted to prepare a profile of a poor person in Tunisia, we would say that he is:

- located most likely in the west-central region;
- engaged in nonirrigated, subsistence agriculture;
- head of a large family; and
- a resident of a village far from other villages.

However, this profile can only be a theoretical one, since in the west-central region the situation varies from one province to another, and if there are points of similarity, there are also great differences between Kairouan, Sidi Bou Zid and Kasserine.

Nevertheless, for these three provinces the problem of water has dominated development of the incomes of the poorest of the poor.

With this clarification of the problem, the eradication of pockets of poverty in the course of the Sixth National Plan enters into the area of what is possible, despite the great difficulties inherent in the development of dispersed rural areas.

For the rest, regional development projects in the Sixth National Plan, which are quite numerous and properly focused in the western part of the country, with the three new development centers (Jendouba, Kairouan and Gafsa), in our view may not be able to reach these last pockets very easily because of the very fact of their dispersion.

Will a spontaneous regrouping of the rural population be the consequence of these measures? Or rather will such a regrouping be a prior condition, as was the case more than 10 years ago at Jendouba?

We think that that is not a real problem and that the essential question is that the population affected by action taken in the name of progress must be really benefited by such action, where they are located. Rural ties are strong, and it is only right that this is so. Rural development activity must be integrated and must affect families, beginning with rural women (family planning, the productive effort of the family), who stimulate the progress of mankind.

Finally, was Jean-Paul Sartre right or wrong when he made one of his characters say (in "God and the Devil"): "There are two kinds of poor people: those who are poor along with others and those who are poor all by themselves. The former are the real poor. The latter are rich people who have been unfortunate!"

5170
CSO: 4519/251

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

PRESIDENT OUTLINES POLICIES TO NATIONWIDE COUNCIL

San'a' AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 28 Jun 82 pp 1, 2

Article: "In His Meeting with the Committee for National Dialogue, the President and Commander Says 'We Welcome All Sincere Nationalist Ideas'"

Excerpts Our brother Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, the president and commander general of the armed forces, met with the Committee for National Dialogue the night before last, during his Ramadan meetings with various classes of the people.

Our brother the president and commander went on to say, "We are attaching great hopes to the general people's conference, because the people will make their final statement on their national charter, whose principles and values will be derived from the values of Islam and the principles of the revolution, namely the comprehensive theory of national action on the Yemeni stage, to which all classes of the Yemeni people must commit themselves."

Our brother the president and commander addressed the Committee for National Dialogue members, saying "You, brothers, who represent a single national force, have managed to reach the most important practical results, which will have the effect of moving the course of democracy in our country forward in advanced steps toward greater guarantees of public and private freedoms for our new Yemeni society and the people in it, strengthening our country's progress toward the attainment of great successes, because work in the field is the only criterion of the attainment of gains, and work alone is the means by which people can express their commitment to the principles of the revolution, serve the people and look after the country's higher interests." Our brother the president spoke of his hope that the society of the national charter would be a society which transcended all errors and negative features, a society which considered labor and sincerity to be the basis of true nationalism in a society transcending all inherited ailments and ailments imported to it from abroad, and a society exercising its right to democracy in a free, effective manner. He said:

"Democracy is not a gift. Rather, it is a right which the people exercise; we in the political leadership can only enhance the atmosphere in order to help the growth and flourishing of democracy in the context of the triumphant September march. Our call for the convening of the general people's conference is only a single step in this democratic direction, from which we cannot swerve, because that is an integral part of our loyalty to our people and our belief in the September revolution."

Our brother the president and commander emphasized that the force of national unity in our country was a preventive barrier protecting our revolutionary gains and giving us

guarantees of continuous victories for the sake of building up a Yemen of freedom, democracy and justice, and that a meeting of ideas and opinions within the growing society was to be considered an important condition for the attainment of complete security for constant growth, social progress and economic prosperity, which is the most prominent task the Committee for National Dialogue has performed.

He stressed the need to deepen the foundations that would guarantee the continuation of this rapprochement and the concentration of all national efforts on construction and the renewed attainment of the cavalcade of modern civilization. The leaders are not against any nationalist ideas that arise from devotion to the Yemeni nation and from an absolute faith in its ideas, its genuine spirit and its traditions and the goals and principles of the immortal September revolution. He said,

"We stress today the covenant we made with the people from the day we first bore our national responsibility. We will never be opposed to constructive purposeful national ideas which serve the nation and set forth from the people's ideas and principles, for which they have fought and sacrificed throughout the course of their long history of struggle. We welcome all sincere nationalist ideas aimed at striving on behalf of the people and the revolution with impartiality and sincerity, if they are free from all personal ambitions, selfish interests and foreign allegiances. We reject all ideas which are alien to our beliefs, our genuine nature and our revolution, whatever they might be and whatever source they might come from."

Our brother the president and commander declared that the door to dialogue was open and that the dialogue with everyone was continuing through the Committee for National Dialogue, proceeding from the general amnesty the government declared and based on devotion to God, the country and the revolution and the rejection of all foreign allegiances. On this basis, until the convening of the general people's conference, the committee for dialogue will be assigned to meet and conduct a dialogue with everyone who wants to rally beneath the banner of the revolution and the march of the national charter and believes in the validity of the peaceful development of society as a basic point of emphasis for construction and development. In concluding his statement, our brother the president and commander recorded our brother the president's thanks to the members of the Committee for National Dialogue for the efforts they had exerted throughout their period of work and to everyone who took part along with the committee in making the small-scale people's conferences a success and expressing the citizens' views. He also expressed his great esteem and regard for all the people whose participation and response had great effect in making a success of the task of the Committee for National Dialogue and the convening of the small-scale people's conferences and on whose efforts depends the success of any nationalist activity which is aimed at virtue, progress and the prosperity of the country, the strengthening of its sovereignty and independence and the implanting of security and stability, wishing the committee success and good fortune in its coming tasks.

Our brother Husayn al-Muqaddami, chairman of the Committee for National Dialogue, then spoke, offering our brother the president and commander, in his name and the name of the members of the Committee for National Dialogue, greetings and felicitations on the advent of the blessed month of Ramadan, which is occurring as our country is achieving victory upon victory in every field of national action along the road to the attainment of the goals and principles of the immortal 26 September revolution.

He said, "Brother president and commander, your continuation of this splendid tradition, through your democratic meetings with the organizations, workers, citizens and every

group, shows the extent of your desire to learn their cares and issues and the problems facing people and to work to solve them. A quick glance at what our country has witnessed in a single year, from the last month of Ramadan to this month, will show us that great transformations and great tremendous achievements, which every citizen has sensed, have been made in various fields of life in the Yemen of the September revolution, and that our country, under your wise leadership, is still along the road to attaining a great deal. The formation of the Committee for National Dialogue is one national initiative: how many of them has our country witnessed in the last 4 years of the life of the glorious revolution, in order to achieve national reconciliation and embody national unity in its most splendid forms, bringing our country which suffered much calamity before the revolution, forward to attain all the noble goals on whose account the immortal 26 September revolution occurred. We all sense the zeal of our brother the president, the prime official in this country, with respect to attaining national unity, as one of the great goals of the revolution, considering that to be the greatest guarantee in order for any revolution, country or nation to realize successes and attain the gift of safety."

Our brother al-Muqaddami stressed the conviction everyone held that security and continuity were basic elements in the attainment of development, the achievement of all goals, and the understanding that we could not attain anything outside the scope of national unity, peace, stability, togetherness and consultation. He said, "Therefore the government has striven to establish the committee for dialogue and has given every citizen of Yemen the opportunity to meet through logical, purposeful, constructive dialogue, rather than destruction and violence. This action enjoys the esteem of all the groups of the Yemeni people. In spite of the time it has lasted, it has, through experience, conviction, and the granting of opportunities to all the people of Yemen to take part in dialogue, deeply study issues and exchange opinions from the premise of Islamic beliefs and national allegiance to Yemen's soil and traditions, given everyone a chance to take part in building the nation through their opinions and actions, and it stresses that the nation belongs to everyone and that all the people in it must cooperate to build it up." Our brother al-Muqaddami added, "Brother president, I can tell you that, in the course of the dialogue among these groups and personalities that are present, we have been able to assert the possibility of a meeting and dialogue among the people of Yemen, setting forth from loyalty to Yemen and its soil and loyalty to almighty glorious God. We managed to make our national task a success after turning to the masses with referenda and opinion polls on the draft national charter, which lays fundamental emphasis on the principles of our Islamic belief and the goals of the 26 September revolution." He addressed himself to the course of activity of the Committee for National Dialogue, stating, "The acts of the committee for dialogue have proceeded as they must, out of the belief that this is a national process and that everyone must carry it out and be anxious to make it succeed. We are completing our task by offering the draft charter in its final form, after the necessary amendments have been made. These do not do injustice to the basic points of emphasis and the masses' conviction that the process of questioning the views of the citizens, which included all the people of this country abroad and domestically, has underlined.

"The draft, now, in its final form, has yet to be submitted to the General People's Conference, which has been assigned to be the greatest meeting place for the people's will and the representatives of the people with respect to the most important national issues, committing themselves to the interests of the nation, which represent the interests of all and create the responsibility for all to preserve them through dia-

logue, through proper performance, through devotion to God and the nation, through effective participation in the people's conference, and, coincidentally, through the production of results, which will allow us to proceed behind our political leadership toward the interests of the nation, attainment of the goals of the revolution and the construction of a strong, well organized government." In his discussion, he addressed himself to the activities of the committee which is preparing for the general people's conference and to the Ramadan meetings between our brother the president and the various groups of the people. He said, "It is a great, exceptional tradition that the top official in the country should meet with everyone and discuss important national issues modestly and sincerely with them.

"Brother president, I stress to you, in my name and that of our brothers, that after you assigned us to prepare and ready ourselves for the people's conference, the committee held continuous meetings. With thanks to God, it has laid out the broad outlines of the people's conference. Everything has been done, and nothing remains except to determine the date of the conference. Through your directives, we have sought to be concerned to provide an atmosphere which will guarantee that the conference activities are a success and that it will produce positive results in the context of national construction which is binding on everyone. Let us turn a new leaf through comprehensive cooperation and constructive national labor." In addition, our brother the president hear a comprehensive report on the progress of work in the Committee for National Dialogue starting with its formation and different aspects of preparations to hold the general people's conference.

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END